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Abstract 
Modern disasters are frequently beyond the management capability of any one organization 
and repeatedly necessitate an approach requiring multiple organizations such as those 
witnessed following the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 and the Haiti earthquake in 2010. An 
increased susceptibility of societies impacted by natural and man-made hazards consequently 
requires a coordinated response from public and private organizations in an effort to mitigate 
the risk to the affected communities. Failure to enact an adequate response to manage the 
consequences of disastrous events has the potential to create widespread death and injury to 
an already vulnerable global population. 
This doctoral thesis by publication draws attention to the specialist workers involved in 
emergency management arrangements, commonly called liaison officers, from organizations 
involved in multi-agency coordination efforts. Liaison officers are required to span 
organizational boundaries to provide linkages between organizations engaged in emergency 
management events. Consequently, they are deemed fundamental to the success of any multi-
agency coordination approach. However, the work of liaison officers is problematic as they 
are invariably confronted by a myriad of social, organizational and technological 
complexities. The unique nature of multi-agency coordination in emergency management is 
generally highlighted by coordination failure and continues to be inadequately addressed in 
practice and in research. 
The principal aim of the research was to explore the work of liaison officers involved in 
multi-agency arrangements and suggest a framework for improving multi-agency 
coordination in emergency management. The research was thus embedded in human factors 
drawing on theories that also provided a contextual understanding of dynamic socio-cultural 
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environments. In so doing the research explicitly drew upon the methodology of core-task 
analysis which is a conceptual modelling approach for the analysis of empirical qualitative 
data that is typically suited to high reliability environments.  
The qualitative data used in this research was collected from a series of individual interviews, 
observational studies and focus group interviews conducted with liaison officers from public 
and private organizations across three Australian states. The findings are presented in five 
scientific research papers. Three of the papers have been published in internationally 
recognized peer-reviewed journals. The final two papers have been submitted for publication 
and are currently under review.  
The contributions of this research have enhanced knowledge development and provided 
insights that can be utilised in evidence-based practice in emergency management. The 
theoretical contribution provided an insight into the work of liaison officers in the context of 
emergency management arrangements. The methodological contribution permitted the 
application of core-task analysis to the domain of emergency management where it had not 
previously been applied. Finally, facets of this research have recently been implemented by 
industry into operational doctrine and organizational learning processes.  
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Preface 
Given the developmental nature of thesis by publication in Australia I would like to first 
elaborate and provide a more detailed explanation on the structure of this thesis.  
In the University of Tasmania‟s policy statement regarding Thesis by Publication it states that 
“as a guideline, when the majority of a thesis is to be comprised of published papers, 
anywhere between three to eight papers bracketed between an introduction (that lays a 
coherent foundation to the research) and a conclusion (that draws the findings together and 
provides a clear statement concerning the findings) could be considered acceptable”.  
However, in this thesis by publication I have included a separate literature review chapter and 
a separate methodology chapter as these were requirements for a graduate certificate in 
research that was part of my doctoral studies. Although these are facets commonly associated 
with the more traditional format of a thesis (Mullins & Kiley, 2002) it allowed me to 
comprehensively articulate the literature review and methodology aspects of the research that 
are sometimes difficult to convey in a published paper due to the imposed word limitations. 
This is in contrast to the format of some thesis by publications that amalgamate these two 
areas into a Framing chapter. Therefore the reader may encounter some repetitiveness 
regarding these particular chapters when reading the literature reviews and methodology 
sections located in the five research papers.  
As I was awarded a scholarship from the Australian Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre 
and thus aligned to one of their projects titled Organizing for Effective Incident Management, 
the research in this thesis will be explored from an Australian perspective. 
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1.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I will outline the purpose and importance of this thesis by publication. Firstly I 
will present a brief overview of the research problem highlighting the significance of the 
topic under investigation. In the next section I will explain the global research question, 
methodological approach and three particular research questions framing this thesis. A guide 
to the thesis will be then be offered providing details how it is composed and finally a brief 
conclusion will be given.  
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1.2 Research problem 
Globally, both natural and man-made disasters such as the World Trade Centre attacks in 
2001, European heat wave in 2003, Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004, Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, Haiti earthquake in 2010 and the Fukishima nuclear incident in 2011 give 
prominence to the susceptibility and vulnerability of society to suddenly-occurring events. 
These disastrous events have a great impact upon society that is becoming increasingly 
urbanised and thus reliant on the interconnectivity of the communities where we live. The 
interconnected nature of modern society is dependent upon the effective functioning of 
critical infrastructure to provide public services, maintain a quality of life and encourage 
economic growth (Boin & McConnell, 2007). There is an expectation in industrialised 
societies that essential critical infrastructure services will still be available during extreme 
catastrophic conditions despite their vulnerability to disasters (de Bruijne & van Eeten, 2007; 
Marti & Hollman, 2008). Societal dependence on critical infrastructure is highlighted during 
disasters when significant damage to these assets and subsequent period of disruption 
deprives citizens of basic services often for considerable periods of time (Gheorghe, Masera, 
de Vries, Weijnen, & Kroger, 2007). Hurricane Katrina caused untold damage to critical 
infrastructures depriving its citizens of basic services with an estimated rebuilding cost 
exceeding $200 billion and the reconstruction of the physical environment and urban 
infrastructure estimated to take 8 to11 years (Fritzon, Ljungkvist, Boin, & Rhinard, 2007; 
Kates, Colten, Laska, & Leatherman, 2006; Leavitt, 2006; Simpson & Lasley, 2010). 
Consequently, organizations involved in emergency management arrangements require a 
coordinated approach to mitigate the damage during the disaster if possible and facilitate 
recovery from events that have the potential to create widespread death and injury, with loss 
of utilities, infrastructure and services. 
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 Disastrous events whose scale, complexity and duration, often transcend the 
management capability of any one organization (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996).  
require organizations to transition from independent entities and assemble into temporary 
supra-organizations to address the problems in situations where there is little time to plan for 
this (Janssen, Lee, Bharosa, & Cresswell, 2010). Organizations “routine” expertise evolves to 
encompass a multi-agency management capability in which routine and emergency actions 
need to be combined and applied appropriately depending on the demands of the situation. 
This multi-agency approach occurring within the structures of the temporary supra-
organization requires a coordinated response. However, despite its importance, the concept of 
multi-agency coordination in emergency management and associated challenges are 
ambiguous and warrant further investigation. The ambiguity means that despite 
improvements, a lack of timeliness compounded by the inappropriate delivery of resources 
often results in no services, as experienced during Hurricane Katrina. This is still an 
important concern today and therefore as a society we need to better understand how this can 
be improved.   
Consequently, a crucial aspect of the response environment involves how these 
diverse organizations can be integrated to create a more holistic response. It is necessary to 
understand how the representatives of the multiple organizations involved in the emergency 
management arrangements operate. These personnel have to manage their operations in the 
back drop of all the complexities inherent in disastrous events using their existing means 
while operating in real time conditions and often with poor information.  In emergency 
management, the people who represent the organizations involved in the multi-agency 
coordination efforts  are habitually called liaison officers (Helsloot, 2005; Perry, 2003; 
Wolbers & Boersma, 2013). In order to analyse the work of liaison officers and how multi-
agency coordination works I needed to find a theoretical model suited to this undertaking.  
Chapter 1 
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In this research I will adopt an approach grounded in human factors and ergonomics 
and draw upon a core-task analysis methodological framework to guide the project. This 
methodology is a conceptual modelling approach for analysis of empirical qualitative data for 
defining the constraints that a particular domain puts on the actors working in it.  I 
acknowledge that the research could have used other methods such as cognitive task analysis 
approaches. However, due to the open ended and dynamic system of the research setting, 
where the external environment and subsequent interaction with the workers is decisive, I had 
to choose a framework that was suitable for this complex and uncertain environment. In 
addition, I will also be using the concepts of situation awareness and boundary spanning as 
mechanisms to investigate the problems of liaison officers working in multi-agency 
coordination arrangements. Further details of these constructs can be located in Chapter 2 and 
further explanation on the core-task analysis methodological approach is provided in Chapter 
3. The following sections will contextualise the terms of emergency management, multi-
agency coordination and liaison officers that were briefly referred to previously.  
1.2.1 Emergency management  
The definition of emergency management is extremely broad and unlike other, more 
structured disciplines, it has expanded and contracted in response to disastrous events 
(Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2011). In the literature the term emergency management is 
interchangeably used with the term disaster management and also crisis management (Boin, 
2004; Comfort, Waugh, & Cigler, 2012; Quarantelli, 1997; Zimmerman, 1985). An 
uncomplicated definition of emergency management is that it is a discipline that deals with 
risk and risk avoidance (Haddow et al., 2011). However, risk also represents the possible 
occurrence of a harmful event that has some known likelihood of happening over time 
(Comfort, 2005). Ultimately, in a complex social world it would be impossible for any 
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government to avoid all possible consequences (which represent a component of risk) in the 
kind of natural hazard events that can become disasters (Wildavsky, 1988). 
Consequently, in this thesis I will adopt a definition by Emergency Management 
Australia (1998). They state that emergency management is a range of measures to manage 
risks to communities and the environment. It is also the organization and management of 
resources for dealing with all aspects of emergencies including the plans, structures and 
arrangements which are established to bring together the normal endeavours of government, 
voluntary and private organizations in a comprehensive and coordinated way to deal with the 
whole spectrum of emergency needs (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998).  
Emergency management can be described as a lifecycle that incorporates four basic 
phases. The four phases are closely related to each other and include mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery (McEntire, 2012). Figure 1.1 illustrates the four phases 
in emergency management.  
Figure 1.1 Lifecycle of emergency management 
 
The mitigation phase which can also be termed the prevention phase refers to actions 
taken in the pre-emergency event setting to identify risks, reduce the risks and thus limit the 
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negative effects  identified that may impact the community. The preparedness phase denotes 
the actions taken prior to the event that enable the emergency management organizations and 
the potentially affected communities to be able to respond adequately when impacted. The 
preparedness phase also allows organizations to select and provide appropriate training for 
liaison officers who may be expected to fulfil the role. The response phase can be described 
as a stage where liaison functions are deployed. This is when an emergency event could not 
be adequately mitigated to reduce the impact to the community and subsequently the 
emergency management organizations trigger their response efforts in an effort to minimize 
damage to the impacted community. The final phase of recovery involves attempts to return 
to routine community processes. Liaison officers are pivotal in the recovery phase which can 
involve decisions and actions relative to rebuilding homes, replacing property, resuming 
employment, restoring businesses, and permanently repairing and rebuilding infrastructure. 
Therefore as the recovery phase has such long-lasting effects and usually high costs, the 
participants (including liaison officers) in the process are numerous and include all levels of 
government, the business  community, political  leadership, community activists, and 
individuals from the community (Haddow et al., 2011). 
While recognizing the importance of every phase in the lifecycle of emergency 
management, the focus in this thesis is the preparedness and response phases. These phases 
typify where liaison officer‟s involved in emergency management processes are most likely 
to work within multi-agency coordination arrangements in the chosen research domain. 
During the response phase of a disaster, multi-agency coordination can occur simultaneously 
at several hierarchical levels within organizations to address operational, tactical and strategic 
demands (Paton & Owen, 2013). Liaison officers can be expected to work at any of these 
three levels.  Australian emergency management arrangements follow similar concepts used 
in other countries such as the National Incident Management System (Walsh, Christen, 
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Christen , Lord, & Miller, 2011) used in the United States of America and the gold–silver–
bronze command structure (Pearce & Fortune, 2006) adopted in the United Kingdom. In 
Australia the operational level typically occurs locally and is activated at the onset of an 
incident. Tactical arrangements take place at a regional level and are often invoked for 
multiple incidents within the same locality. Strategic arrangements ensue at a state level and 
adopt a multi-agency coordination approach offering strategic direction to the emergency 
events.   
1.2.2 Multi-agency coordination  
Coordination in emergency management is the way in which different organizations or parts 
of the same organization work or act together in order to achieve a common objective 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2011). Multi-agency coordination in 
emergency management can include membership of many tens of public and private 
organizations who never or very rarely interact together, and certainly never do so in the high 
risk and high stress emergency response context. These organizations with differing social 
histories and areas of expertise have a role in disaster response because the demands of the 
situation require their expertise. Nevertheless, if a disaster brings together diverse 
organizations that act in an autonomous manner, the consequence will be frequent confusion 
and conflict regarding objectives, and with problems establishing lead and subordinate 
organizational roles. This is because organizations act based upon their particular 
requirements and not the collective management of complex multi-faceted needs. There is a 
public expectation that these organizations will coordinate their efforts synergistically in a 
disaster in an effort to manage the consequence of risk to the affected community.  
Modern society is reliant on the effective functioning of critical infrastructures such as 
energy, water, communications and transport to provide and maintain a quality of life (Boin 
& McConnell, 2007). The degree to which a hazard event becomes a disaster (or not) is 
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influenced by the severity of disruption to critical infrastructure and how quickly it can be 
restored. Organizations can never be fully in control of their business environment and 
consequently engage in business continuity management practices. This can often be defined 
as an internal process that identifies potential impacts that threaten an organization and 
provides a framework for building resilience and the capability for an effective response that 
safeguards the interests of its key partners, reputation, brand and value creating activities 
(Smith, 2003).  This can differ to crisis response issues that require a holistic and coordinated 
approach engaging multiple organizations (that regularly have competing objectives) to 
achieve a common goal. 
Frequently the importance of coordination in emergency management is emphasized 
by coordination failure (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006; Lutz & Lindell, 2008; Moynihan, 2007; 
Reid, 2006; Teague, McLeod, & Pascoe, 2010; Wise, 2006). In the literature it has been 
found that the temporal constraints can cause delays in accessing resources or assimilating 
information (Janssen et al., 2010; Mishra, Allen, & Pearman, 2011). In addition, 
communication between organizations and the community is challenging during a disaster as 
a result of dysfunctional systems due to critical infrastructure breakdowns (Aedo, Díaz, 
Carroll, Convertino, & Rosson, 2010; Comfort & Kapucu, 2006; Manoj & Baker, 2007; 
McEntire, 2002). This frequently results in a deterioration of quality information (Bharosa, 
Janssen, & Tan, 2011) that can be compounded by a lack of familiarity and incompatibility 
with the information systems used (Baber et al., 2007; Coates, Wilson, Hawe, & Crouch, 
2011; Ley et al., 2012; Saoud, Mena, Dugdale, Pavard, & Ben, 2006) and differing 
organizational information requirements (Van de Walle & Turoff, 2008). Information sharing 
is a necessity to satisfy the information requirements of the organizations involved in the 
relief efforts in a struggle to inform their situation awareness which is often interpreted as the 
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ability to understand what is going on, which is required to aid multi-agency coordination 
(Curnin & Owen, 2013).   
During the response phase of a disaster, multi-agency coordination can take place 
informally in temporary locations at the incident site or in a structured environment such as 
an established emergency operations centre. At a strategic level, temporary supra-
organizations invariably assemble at a designated emergency operations centre. A deficiency 
in the situation awareness of multiple organizations at a strategic level emergency operations 
centre can affect decision making capability which can impact actions at the tactical and 
operational level (Paton & Owen, 2013). Therefore the activities of liaison officers at a 
strategic level are vitally important to the emergency response efforts. From an Australian 
perspective, the need to establish strategies to improve multi-agency coordination is gaining 
increasing attention.  As one of the most bushfire
1
 prone areas in the world, Australia has also 
been affected by recent catastrophic bushfires including the 2009 Black Saturday Victorian 
bushfires and 2013 Tasmanian bushfires. Both of the post-disaster inquiries as a result of 
these bushfires cited problems associated with a lack of coordination between organizations 
pointing toward the complications of multi-agency coordination (Tasmanian Government, 
2013; Teague et al., 2010). Multi-agency coordination during disasters is still a problem in 
Australia today. 
Effective multi-agency coordination requires a collective approach from public and 
private organizations that includes the emergency services (e.g. police, fire and ambulance 
services) and non-emergency organizations (e.g. military, non-government organizations, 
critical infrastructure agencies, land management agencies).  These organizations have to 
span organizational boundaries to provide linkages between organizations that facilitate the 
required information sharing and cooperation (Harrald, 2006; Janssen et al., 2010).  
                                                          
1 For the purpose of this thesis the Australian term of bushfire shall be used which is comparable to the term of forest fire in 
Europe and wildfire in North America. 
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1.2.2.1 Organizational boundaries 
When multiple organizations come together in the event of a disaster they will encounter 
numerous boundaries.  These often include the different administrative and technological 
boundaries amongst organizations. In addition are the cultural boundaries unique to particular 
types of organizations. Depending upon the extent of the disaster, geographical, jurisdictional 
and political boundaries may also be encountered. When working at the boundaries of 
organizations, liaison officers are often deemed to be practicing „boundary spanning‟ 
activities. Boundary spanning is a useful tool to consider the work of liaison officers who 
need to operate at the boundaries of their organizations to facilitate and enable multi-agency 
coordination. 
1.2.3 Liaison officers  
Multi-agency coordination in emergency management and specifically the role of liaison 
officers is problematic due to a myriad of social, organizational and technological 
complexities (McMaster & Baber, 2012). Fundamental to the enactment and maintenance of 
the required linkages between organizations is the requirement for liaison officers to have 
credibility in their role in an effort to obtain adequate information to inform their situation 
awareness of the event (Salmon et al. 2011), engage in team decision-making (Salas, Rosen, 
Burke, & Nicholson, 2007), and effectively coordinate their activities so that decision making 
and coordinating activities may be effective. 
Given the pivotal position of liaison officers within multi-agency coordination 
arrangements it would seem that their activities would be the focus of a good deal of attention 
in the international emergency management literature. Nevertheless, in this literature the 
concept of liaison officers working within emergency management arrangements is often in 
reference to the sharing and exchange of information between organizations, particularly 
within the notion of multi-agency coordination (Bharosa et al., 2011; Kapucu, 2006b). 
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However, the role of a liaison officer is far more than that of an information conduit. In 
addition, the overwhelming majority of research that describes personnel fulfilling a liaison 
officer capability from the multiple organizations involved in the emergency management 
arrangements invariably focuses upon those from the emergency services. This is despite the 
active participation of non-emergency organizations.  
Non-emergency organizations, such as land management, non-government 
organizations and the military are instrumental in multi-agency coordination arrangements.  
In addition, critical infrastructure organizations are fundamental to any response efforts, 
particularly the maintenance of community lifelines such as health, transport, 
telecommunications, water and energy services.  
However, although the role of liaison officer is considered a designated role that is 
recognized and supported by all participating agencies involved in emergency management 
arrangements, the role is often temporary in nature. All agencies are expected under 
operational doctrine and directives to designate a liaison officer to attend an emergency 
operations centre as requested. Nevertheless, the personnel fulfilling the role of liaison 
officers invariably hold other permanent positions within their agency and only fulfil this role 
as required often in a temporary capacity. This is typical of the temporary supra-organizations 
formed during disasters within strategic level emergency operations centres that comprise of 
personal who have full-time positions within their respective agencies but are expected to 
shift to different roles as the demand arises (Meltsner & Bellavita, 1983). 
A lack of empirical research collectively investigating the full spectrum of liaison 
officers‟ involvement in emergency management arrangements deserves further investigation. 
In particular this concerns the liaison officers: 
 Role in multi-agency coordination; 
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 How this role is fulfilled; 
 Challenges encountered when performing the role; 
 Mechanisms used to manage the constraints; 
 How they influence multi-agency coordination in emergency management. 
This research is guided by a desire to advance the capabilities of liaison officers who provide 
the linkages between organizations in strategic level emergency operations centres and who 
ultimately have the ability to improve multi-agency coordination. 
This is important to this thesis because most of the research pertaining to multi-
agency coordination in emergency management is often conducted not from a strategic or 
tactical level but at an operational level with first responders (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-
Cirocco, 2010). This research will focus upon the liaison officers working in strategic level 
emergency operations centres where decision making has a cascading affect and often 
impacts the actions at the operational level. However, working in an unfamiliar and complex 
environment such as an emergency operations centre can exert additional constraints on the 
work of the liaison officer. Therefore I will adopt a human-environment interaction approach 
in an effort to develop and provide mechanisms that may be used to address the constraints 
identified in multi-agency coordination and  thus mitigate the consequences of risk to the 
community (Veelen, Storms, & Aart, 2006).  
Finally and in reference to the need for further research on this topic, Janssen et al 
(2010) in an introduction to a special issue on advances in multi-agency coordination 
arrangements in emergency management, depict the importance of workers, such as liaison 
officers, performing boundary spanning activities.  “In spite of their crucial role, little is 
known about how boundary spanners influence cross-agency coordination and their 
effectiveness for disaster management success” (Janssen et al., 2010, p.4).  
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1.3 Global question guiding the research 
In the previous section I introduced the view that multi-agency coordination in emergency 
management is necessary and complex. Entwined in these complexities are the liaison 
officers from the multiple organizations involved in the emergency response efforts.  
Contemporary literature provides little guidance how liaison officers engaged in providing 
organizational linkages and spanning organizational boundaries should be selected, trained 
and deployed to fulfil the many aspects of the roles and activities they need to perform. The 
inclusion of liaison officers in multi-agency coordination is recognized in contemporary 
emergency management research (see for examples Schraagen & Van de Ven, 2011; Wolbers 
& Boersma, 2013). Nevertheless there is limited evidence exploring how liaison officers 
explicitly influence multi-agency coordination in emergency management.  
Liaison officers are present in all phases of the emergency management cycle. 
However, the emergency services are invariably the lead organization, particularly in the 
response phase. Nevertheless, a coordinated approach requires the active participation of all 
liaison officers in an effort to mitigate the consequences of the hazard to the affected 
community. Individual liaison officers from multiple organizations involved in a coordinated 
approach will ultimately influence aspects of the response efforts. The importance of liaison 
officers within multi-agency coordination arrangements in the setting of emergency 
management is uncharted territory. The global question guiding this research can be 
presented as follows: 
How can liaison officers improve multi-agency coordination in emergency management?  
The objective of the thesis presupposes that an exploratory process is adopted utilising 
empirical research methods. However, prior to commencing on the research journey the 
generic nature of the global research question, which can generate many different answers, 
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needs to be addressed. Consequently I needed to specify the problems further and therefore in 
an effort to achieve the objectives of the research it was necessary to understand three 
conditions. Firstly, foundational knowledge was imperative to understand how liaison 
officers from multiple organizations with often differing goals currently perform their role 
within multi-agency coordination arrangements. Secondly and in an effort to identify the 
constraints of operating within multi-agency coordination arrangements, it was crucial to 
explore and appreciate the challenges and associated demands that are encountered by liaison 
officers in their work domain. Finally, it was important to ascertain what specific 
mechanisms are required to facilitate multi-agency coordination in emergency management. 
These conditions led to the formulation of the following three research questions. 
1.3.1 Research questions 
Research question 1 
How do liaison officers responsible for emergency management arrangements coordinate 
their activities in multi-agency arrangements? 
The purpose in answering the first research question was to understand the role of the liaison 
officer working within the emergency management domain.  This required analysis of the 
current context and I sought to identify through the actions of liaison officers what constitutes 
inter-organizational linkages, how the linkages are performed and finally to ascertain if the 
concept of boundary spanning depicted in other domains is applicable to this environment or 
needs to be modified. 
Research question 2 
What demands and challenges are placed on liaison officers within multi-agency 
coordination arrangements? 
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The second research question was aimed at developing and analysing the potential constraints 
that liaison officers face when performing their activities and develop a suitable framework. 
It sought to analyse the specific challenges faced by liaison officers operating in this 
environment, determine if these challenges are generic in nature or specific to liaison officers 
from certain organizations, and reveal what mechanisms they embrace to overcome the 
constraints. 
Research question 3 
What improvements are needed to support liaison officers to fulfil their role and enable more 
effective multi-agency coordination? 
In providing an answer to the third research question, I drew upon findings generated from 
the previous research questions that were intended to scope out the terrain of liaison officers 
working within multi-agency coordination arrangements.  By analysing the challenges and 
subsequent mechanisms that liaison officers adopt to support multi-agency coordination, I 
was able to suggest solutions for how liaison officers can improve multi-agency coordination. 
Therefore the objective in answering the third research question was to develop a theoretical 
framework that models how liaison officers can facilitate multi-agency coordination in 
emergency management. The purpose of this was twofold. Firstly, the theoretical framework 
aimed to contribute to theory building in the discipline of emergency management and in 
human factors and ergonomics. Secondly it provides guidance for industry and in particular 
policy makers and liaison officers in performing inter-organizational linkages in emergency 
management that ultimately improves multi-agency coordination. 
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1.4 Guide to the thesis  
This thesis by publication is based on the five research papers presented sequentially in the 
appendix.  The thesis follows the University of Tasmania‟s requirements for Thesis by 
Publication as described in the preface and is structured as follows to address the objectives 
stated earlier in this chapter.  Chapter 1 provided the context for the thesis and provided the 
global research problem and subsequent research questions guiding this project. I will then 
present in Chapter 2 the theoretical foundation and identify the advantages and limitations 
with respect to the related research and their contributions to a solution for the research 
problem defined in this chapter. In Chapter 3 the methodological stance adopted in this thesis 
will be specified and I will explain the rationale for using the described techniques. Chapter 4 
introduces and summarizes the five research papers while providing details of co-authorship. 
Finally, Chapter 5 provides the conclusions where I will explain how the thesis has 
contributed to theory development, implications for industry and suggest an agenda for future 
research. Figure 1.2 provides an overview of the thesis and depicts the relationship between 
the five chapters and the research questions. 
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Figure 1.2 Thesis outline depicting the relationship between the various chapters  
 
1.5 Summary 
In this chapter I set the scene for this thesis by publication by introducing the research 
problem and why it is of significance in today‟s society. I then offered the research questions 
guiding this thesis and provided some background on the theme to be understood. A guide to 
the thesis was then presented which positioned the aims and objectives in the corresponding 
chapters.  
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The importance of multi-agency coordination in emergency management is that it is 
an indispensable requirement in any disaster. Improving multi-agency coordination in this 
environment can only benefit the communities impacted by disasters. However, before multi-
agency coordination in emergency management can be enhanced, the challenges associated 
with this approach need to be explored. Consequently, in the following chapter I will examine 
the related literature to ascertain what the challenges of multi-agency coordination in 
emergency management are and if they offer solutions to the research problem stated earlier.  
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2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to review the existing research and in particular the literature 
associated with the challenges of multi-agency coordination in emergency management and 
what mechanisms are in place to address them. I recognize that in multi-agency coordination 
there are two core issues, the ability to understand the situation and the actions required to 
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enable multi-agency coordination. The first issue pertains to sense making and principally 
understanding the situation. This is identified in section 2.2 and in particular I explore a 
construct that is useful for thinking about sense making in the domain of emergency 
management that is termed situation awareness. I explore differing aspects of situation 
awareness and discuss how it is applied in an emergency management context and report on 
some of the challenges associated with building situation awareness in this environment 
including the temporal, technological, communication and cultural challenges.  
In section 2.3 I examine the second core issue which is the requirement for liaison 
officers to cross over between organizational boundaries and how this action is executed.  
The construct that is useful for this can be designated as boundary spanning. I then unpack 
what activities may be required by liaison officers when spanning organizational boundaries 
in an effort to build their situation awareness. Consequently I review the concept of boundary 
spanning from an historical and contemporary perspective focusing upon the activities 
required for the role. I then review the boundary spanning literature in the context of 
emergency management. Finally I conclude with identifying gaps in the related literature 
with respect to the research questions identified in Chapter 1. 
Prior to commencing the literature review it is important to explain how this was 
conducted. Multi-agency coordination in emergency management is a multi-disciplinary 
research area and the literature selected for inclusion in this review was chosen because of its 
relevance to different aspects of this thesis. However, the literature was drawn from a wide 
body and consequently not every area has been described in the same depth. I used the 
following databases to perform my literature search: ProQuest; CAUL Wiley; SAGE Premier; 
and Taylor & Francis. The terms used to search for relevant literature included: 
• Multi-agency and coordination and emergency and disaster management; 
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• Situation awareness and emergency and disaster management; 
• Boundary spanning and spanners and emergency and disaster management; 
• Liaison and officers and emergency and disaster management. 
2.2 Multi-agency coordination  
In order to understand the concept of multi-agency coordination in emergency management, 
it is important to briefly review the way in which other fields of research define the notion of 
coordination. Gulick (1937) suggested that coordination requires the linkage of strong 
functionally organised bureaucracies to solve problems. This is consistent with the definition 
provided by Malone and Crowston (1990) who believe that coordination is the ability to 
manage dependencies between entities. However, these traditional definitions of coordination 
tend to focus on the management of dependencies and have a limited applicability to fast 
response organizations (Faraj & Xiao, 2006) such as those that operate in emergency 
management. Indeed, organizations that are required to respond in these situations are 
exposed to coordination challenges due to the necessity to operate in uncertain, dynamic and 
complex environments. This is because suddenly-occurring events by their very nature 
require flexibility and adaptability to address the constraints of working in this fluid 
environment that poses numerous challenges to those encountered in static and stable 
organizations (Dugdale, Darcy, & Pavard, 2006; Kettl, 2003; Mendonça, 2007; Van de Walle 
& Turoff, 2008). 
The challenges involved with the coordination of multiple organizations are often 
exemplified in a disaster purely because a disaster is more than simply a big emergency 
(Quarantelli, 1982). Kettl (2003) stated that coordination is about transforming complex and 
difficult situations into straight forward and routine operations. However, this may be 
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interpreted as simplistic when the reality is that the coordination of multiple organizations in 
a disastrous event encounters a myriad of technological and social complexities to achieve a 
common goal (McMaster & Baber, 2012). Some literature questions the necessity of 
coordination, particularly in the response phase of an emergency event where collaboration 
occurs infrequently and may even be unachievable (Berlin & Carlström, 2008; Helsloot, 2008; 
Scholtens, 2008). For the purpose of this thesis, coordination is defined as aligning one‟s 
actions with those of other relevant personnel and their organizations to achieve a shared goal 
(Comfort, 2007a). In an effort to attain a shared objective, liaison officers involved in multi-
agency coordination arrangements need to make sense of and understand the situation at hand. 
This requires the sharing of information to satisfy the information requirements of the liaison 
officers representing the multiple organizations involved in the emergency management 
arrangements so they can develop their own situation awareness (Curnin & Owen, 2013) and 
develop the shared situational awareness required to facilitate inter-organizational 
coordination.  
2.2.1 Situation Awareness 
There have been numerous attempts to define situation awareness. Endsley (1995) described 
it as a term given to an individual‟s level of awareness of a situation, an operators 
understanding of „what is going on‟. Some theorists have represented situation awareness as a 
static snapshot (Endsley, 1995) and others have represented it as a process (Sarter & Woods, 
1991; Smith & Hancock, 1995). According to Salmon et al (2008), Endsley‟s (1995) three 
level model of situation awareness describes it as a component of information processing as 
depicted in the second stage defined as comprehension of the situation. Bedney and Meister‟s 
(1999) functional model of orientational activity also highlights the importance of 
information in achieving situation awareness. The first stage of this model involves the 
interpretation of the incoming information (Bedney & Meister, 1999).  
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In addition, Taylor‟s (1990) situation awareness rating approach described ten 
dimensions to achieving situation awareness. Two of these dimensions emphasise the 
importance of information quality (Taylor, 1990). The concept of information interpretation 
is important in this thesis because liaison officers tasked with providing linkages between 
organizations in an emergency management event often encounter challenges associated with 
receiving and disseminating information. The preceding definitions of situation awareness 
pertain to a situation where an individual is required to attain situation awareness in a given 
state. However, these individual models are mostly unsuitable for organizations that require 
multiple personnel to gain a situation awareness of the event. Subsequently, there have been a 
number of models that have sought to address the issue of situation awareness in 
collaborative systems.  
2.2.1.1 Team Situation Awareness 
Team situation awareness is described by Salas et al (1995) as the shared understanding of a 
situation among team members at a given point in time. This theory is composed of 
individual situation awareness, team processes, information seeking, information processing 
and information sharing (Salmon, Stanton, Walker, Baber, et al., 2008). Wellens (1993) 
believes that team situation awareness involves “the sharing of a common perspective 
between two or more individuals regarding current environmental events, their meaning and 
projected future”. The composition of this team situation awareness model includes the 
concepts of information space, situation space, action space and a communication bridge 
(Salmon, Stanton, Walker, Baber, et al., 2008).  
Endsley and Roberston‟s (2000) team situation awareness model is an extension of 
the commonly used three level model of situation awareness described by Endsley (1995). 
However, the distinction between these two models lies in the fact that team members must 
not only have an individual situation awareness required for their specific elements but the 
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same situation awareness for those elements that the area shares (Endsley & Robertson, 2000). 
Both Salas et al (1995) and Wellens (1993) highlight the necessity of having the appropriate 
information in achieving adequate team situation awareness. However, it can be argued that it 
is not always a requirement to have the same situation awareness for all the individuals in a 
system. This is especially the case when different organizations may have differing objectives. 
The theory of distributed situation awareness developed by Stanton et al (2004, 2006) can 
address some of the complexities of informing situation awareness in complex and 
collaborative organizations. Distributed situation awareness could be an important component 
to supporting multi-agency coordination in emergency management. 
2.2.1.2 Distributed Situation Awareness 
Stanton et al (2006) suggest that “distributed situation awareness is a product of coordination 
between a system‟s elements and that the system collectively holds the situational awareness 
required for task performance”. Each agent in a collaborative system, such as a liaison officer 
in emergency management, plays a critical role in the development of the situation awareness. 
The view of each agent is unique but compatible (not shared) and thus each agent is 
instrumental in the development and maintenance of other agent‟s situation awareness. 
Agents with limited situation awareness can enhance their situation awareness by interacting 
with other agents. The knowledge of other agent‟s knowledge, described as „meta- situation 
awareness‟ is facilitated when individuals know where to retrieve the required information 
(Salmon, Stanton, Walker, Baber, et al., 2008). This interactive process is fundamental to the 
maintenance of agent‟s individual and distributed situation awareness and ultimately the 
overall network involved (Salmon, Stanton, Walker, & Jenkins, 2009). The concept of 
distributed situation awareness has been applied to a number of complex collaborative 
environments in both the military and civilian settings. 
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Stewart et al (2008) applied the theory of distributed situation awareness in a military context 
to investigate the interactions of human and non-human agents in an airborne warning and 
control system. In this case study one of the findings highlighted that it is was not necessary 
for individuals to share all their separate views of the situation. What was important was that 
the agents within the system have an awareness that is likely to have specific information so 
it can be interpreted and disseminated through the necessary networks to the relevant 
individuals (Stewart et al., 2008). This research reiterates the importance of individual 
situation awareness of one‟s own task and the necessity of the meta-situational awareness of 
the whole systems distributed situation awareness (Stewart et al., 2008).  
 Salmon et al (2008) investigated distributed situation awareness in the energy 
distribution domain. This case study identified that in collaborative systems such as an 
electrical distribution network, it is useful to focus on the coordinated behaviour of the 
system in its entirety rather than on the sharing of individual member‟s situation awareness.  
Salmon et al (2008, p381) concluded that “distributed situation awareness effectively couples 
distributed systems, in that the information comprising distributed situation awareness links 
remotely located agents and structures the communication between them”. This research 
highlighted the importance of ensuring that team situation awareness in complex 
collaborative environments is viewed in its entirety rather than as individual team members 
situation awareness (Salmon, Stanton, Walker, Baber, et al., 2008). 
 Research by Fioratou et al (2010) focused on anaesthetists situation awareness in a 
hospital operating theatre and determined that distributed situation awareness was suited to 
the anaesthetist‟s practice that requires the continuous and mutually altering interaction 
between the anaesthetist and the environment (Fioratou, Flin, Glavin, & Patey, 2010). 
Reviewing a fatality that involved two anaesthetists, Fiorataou et al (2010) highlighted 
failings in the anaesthetist‟s situation awareness and the necessity for the anaesthetists to not 
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only have individual situation awareness but the sharing of individual situation awareness to 
provide an overview of the overall system. In this complex and collaborative working 
environment, Fioratou et al (2010) describes how the approach of distributed situation 
awareness may allow a more comprehensive understanding of the interactions of individuals 
working in an operating theatre and how these interactions could foster anaesthetic practice.   
 The concept of distributed situation awareness has been used in complex and 
collaborative working environments in both military and civilian environments. The concept 
highlights the need for individuals operating in these collaborative systems to ensure that 
situation awareness is viewed collaboratively but with an emphasis on providing the 
individual with the situation awareness that is specific to their needs. Distributed situation 
awareness may be suitable in the emergency management domain where liaison officers from 
multiple organizations have to operate collectively to achieve a common goal. However, it is 
important to understand the potential challenges faced by liaison officers tasked with 
developing their distributed situation awareness in this environment.  
2.2.2 Challenges of developing situation awareness 
Liaison officers involved in multi-agency coordination in emergency management need to 
develop their distributed situation awareness of the event. This necessitates the sharing of  
information between organizations but also an understanding of the possible constraints and 
potential collaborations with other organizations involved in the emergency management 
event (Comfort, 2007b). Developing distributed situation awareness within multi-agency 
coordination in emergency management is challenging and can be linked to four factors (see 
figure 2.1). It is reliant on the timely transmission of accurate and pertinent information. This 
can be compounded by the temporal nature of emergency management and the inherent time 
constraints that can impact information sharing in multi-agency coordination. Challenges 
with technological advancements mean that an insufficiency of information and in some 
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circumstances an overload of information can also be barriers to developing distributed 
situation awareness. Although information technology structures can provide a platform for 
communicating information there are communication challenges identified with emergency 
management events. Finally, the differing organizational cultures of the organizations 
involved in the emergency management event can constrain liaison officers from developing 
their distributed situation awareness.   
Figure 2.1 Challenges of developing distributed situation awareness 
 
2.2.2.1 Temporal constraints 
Mishra, Allen and Pearman (2011) used empirical research to address information sharing in 
multi-agency emergency management incidents. The authors conducted twenty semi-
structured interviews and thirty-five hours of observational studies of multi-agency 
emergency management exercises in the United Kingdom. This research identified that time, 
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social and technological factors were dimensions that affected information sharing. This 
research identified that there was often insufficient time to share information during an 
incident and therefore the information exchanged needed to be concise and succinct (Mishra 
et al., 2011).  
Through the use of group interviews Gryszkiewicz and Chen (2012) explored how 
different temporal aspects of crisis management can be considered in the design of 
information systems for emergency management. The data indicated that the use of timelines 
to understand emergency management events that allow the user to visually comprehend the 
temporal arrangements of an incident can be a huge benefit to the operator (Gryszkiewicz & 
Chen, 2012). When designing information systems for emergency management the designers 
must include the concept of temporal dependencies and the need to incorporate this into 
information technology systems for each of the organizations involved (Gryszkiewicz & 
Chen, 2012). Information technology has been identified as one of the most encouraging 
factors in successfully linking emergency management processes in recent times (Vogt, 
Hertweck, & Hales, 2011). However, using information technology to develop a distributed 
situation awareness of the emergency management event can be challenging.   
2.2.2.2 Technological challenges 
There is a requirement for information systems to be adaptive and encompass advanced 
information technology to support the increased multi-agency coordination efforts in 
emergency management (Bharosa et al., 2011; Comfort, Dunn, Skertich, & Zagorecki, 2004; 
Franke, Charoy, & Ulmer, 2010; Gonzalez, Munkvold, Dugdale, & Li, 2012; Gryszkiewicz 
& Chen, 2012; Janssen et al., 2010; Mishra et al., 2011; Way & Yuan, 2012). There are many 
examples in the literature of information systems that utilise information technology to 
facilitate the sharing of information within multi-agency coordination arrangements (see for 
example Bui & Sankaran, 2001; Coates, Wilson, Hawe, & Crouch, 2011; Johnson, Zagorecki, 
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Gelman, & Comfort, 2011; Koning, Buul-besselink, Hemert, & Paulissen, 2012; Marecki, 
Schurr, & Tambe, 2006; Saoud, Mena, Dugdale, Pavard, & Ben, 2006).  
 However, there are challenges associated with using information technology in an 
emergency management setting. A lack of uniformity in standardizing information systems 
and in particular a lack of a common information technology infrastructure to visualise and 
disseminate information is a continuous challenge (Baber et al., 2007; Ley et al., 2012; 
Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007). Therefore any information system used in 
emergency management has to take into account the information and decision making needs 
of the individuals, including liaison officers, across multiple organizations  (Bharosa et al., 
2011; Van de Walle & Turoff, 2008). Information technology platforms therefore need to 
ensure that there is not an insufficiency of information (National Research Council, 2005; 
Salmon et al., 2011) and must also avoid an overload of information (Gryszkiewicz & Chen, 
2012; Militello et al., 2007) provided to organizations. 
 Furthermore, there is also a requirement for information systems to be incorporated 
into collaborative multi-agency exercises and simulation training (Paton & Jackson, 2002; 
Turoff, Chumer, Hiltz, & Klashner, 2004; Turoff, Chumer, Van de Walle, & Yao, 2004). 
This enables increased familiarity with the system which is often a perpetual challenge in the 
emergency management domain when incompatible information technology platforms are 
often only used in the actual response efforts. Nevertheless, the development of information 
technology and in particular the internet (Liu, 2008) has greatly improved communication 
amongst organizations and with the community. Despite this there are also challenges 
associated with communicating in emergency management events.  
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2.2.2.3 Communication challenges 
Organizations involved with emergency management arrangements can now communicate 
using email, computer supported cooperative work technologies (Mackenzie et al., 2007) and 
dedicated emergency management information systems (Van de Walle & Turoff, 2008). 
These organizations can also communicate with the community using alert based systems by 
means of email (Chiu et al., 2009) or using social software such as public social media 
discussion forums such as Facebook, Wikis or Twitter (Ley et al., 2012; Lu & Yang, 2011; 
Reuter, Marx, & Pipek, 2011). In the event of a disaster requiring multi-agency coordination, 
organizations may have to rely on these technologies alongside the more conventional means 
of communications such as telephones, two way radios, pagers and facsimile (Kapucu, 
2006a). Regardless of the communication channel used in emergency management the need 
for the receipt of the information between organizations is important in an effort to address 
challenges associated with the communication of inaccurate or incomplete information 
(McIntyre & Salas, 1995; Salmon et al., 2011; Schraagen & Van de Ven, 2011).   
During extreme events there will be a greater density of communication to multiple 
organizations This increased flow of communication can cause failures in 
telecommunications as documented in the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States of 
America. (Kapucu 2006a). Recent emergency management events have identified that critical 
infrastructures are highly dependent on each other. The catastrophic failure of an electricity 
structure would most likely render communications networks inoperable (Kruchten, Woo, 
Monu, & Sotoodeh, 2008). Compounding these challenges is the incompatibility of some 
communication equipment between organizations (Kapucu, 2006a; Manoj & Baker, 2007; 
Smith, 2010). Adding to the challenges of communicating and sharing of information 
between organizations are the privacy and security constraints. These barriers can often occur 
between the police and private organizations that may not have the associated security 
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clearance to access the information. Subsequently there is a requirement for legislative 
changes by governments in order address some of these privacy and security obstacles 
(Kruchten et al., 2008; Reddick, 2011; Vogt et al., 2011). The challenges of ensuring 
effective communication in emergency management events is well documented in the 
literature (Aedo et al., 2010; Kapucu, 2006a; Manoj & Baker, 2007; McEntire, 2002; Smith 
& Dowell, 2000; Strom & Eyerman, 2005) and these communication challenges have also 
been highlighted during emergency management multi-agency exercises (Rencrantz & 
Olsson, 2012; Salmon et al., 2011).  
There can be an over reliance on telecommunication and information technology 
platforms that may fail in a disaster. When there are limited telecommunication options 
available in these circumstances, communication often reverts back to face-to face 
communications. In the immediate aftermath of the 2001 World Trade Centre attacks, over 
forty per cent  of communications between organizations was conducted in person (Kapucu, 
2006a). This reliance on personal face to face communication and reduced dependence on 
telecommunications and information technology structures was undoubtedly due to the 
failure of energy networks following the event. However, there was still a necessity to 
communicate between and within organizations. Therefore the role of liaison officers tasked 
with developing their organizations distributed situation awareness within multi-agency 
arrangements is of paramount importance.   
Liaison officers involved within multi-agency coordination in emergency 
management are not only confronted with the temporal, technological and communication 
challenges associated with the timely transmission of accurate and pertinent information in 
developing their distributed situation awareness. These liaison officers are also faced with 
challenges associated with the interaction of other organizations. The integration of these 
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organizations that often have diverse cultures can constrain efforts to achieve multi-agency 
coordination in emergency management (Waugh & Streib, 2006).     
2.2.2.4 Cultural challenges 
The concept of cultural challenges is not comprehensively articulated in the emergency 
management literature. Underscoring the complexities of developing an effective multi-
agency emergency response are the varying organizational cultures and in particular those 
related to the hierarchical governmental organizations such as emergency services (Marcus, 
Dorn, & Henderson, 2006; Waugh & Streib, 2006). Deeply ingrained bureaucratic cultures of 
some organizations can compel an allegiance to their own organization-based independence 
that can foster a culture of rivalry among organizations and was highlighted during the 2001 
terrorist attacks in New York City in an extreme example between the fire and police 
departments (Marcus et al., 2006).  This cultural interplay and associated historical rivalry 
between the two groups highlighted the challenges associated with the sharing of information 
between organizations during a disaster (Iannella & Henricksen, 2007; Marincioni, 2007).  
 Organizational cultures highlight the collectively-held beliefs of the individuals 
within an organization (or unit) and establish the basis for social identity which can generate 
membership of in-groups and out-groups as well as stereotypes (Owen, 2013; Smircich, 
1983). This can have a detrimental effect on information flow where the in-group often 
receive (and share between themselves) more information than those located in the out-group 
(Militello et al., 2007). Another example of the cultural challenges in emergency 
management pertains to the issue of gender. In particular this pertains to the cultural practices 
associated with a social identity of masculinity that can work to shut down communication 
and contribute specifically to the marginalisation of women's voices in the emergency 
management environment (Owen, 2013).  
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The need for organizational interoperability intensifies with the number of private and 
public organizations that become participants in the response operation increases and the 
range of problems they confront widens (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006). The fast action 
requirements of many temporary collaborative working  organizations (Faraj & Xiao, 2006) 
such as those that occur in emergency management means there is often little time to develop 
trust in the traditional ways (Hyllengren et al., 2011). This is especially evident when 
organizations with shared cultural memberships that are based on shared norms such as the 
emergency services, hold a common understanding and set of expectations about what is 
required to establish and maintain a trusting relationship (Dietz, Gillespie, & Chao, 2010). 
This familiarity may not be readily available when engaging individuals from other non-
emergency organizations that often have different organizational cultures which can 
challenge trust from the outset and present cultural constraints (Banai & Reisel, 1999; 
McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1988). In this environment, cultural challenges may be 
addressed if liaison officers are capable of addressing topics pertaining to vulnerability, 
uncertainty, risk and expectations in short-lived temporary organizations (Meyerson et al., 
1996).  
The demands for inter-organizational communication in temporary organizations, 
such as those formed during disasters, increases significantly (Kapucu & Van Wart, 2006) 
requiring more information exchange in ways that are time-critical (Schraagen, Huis, & 
Koning, 2010). Humans are a crucial element in the exchange and communication of 
information in an effort to make sense of the event. Nevertheless, they are faced with 
multiple challenges in trying to build their distributed situation awareness of the event. To 
achieve effective coordination, liaison officers from multiple organizations have to span 
several organizational boundaries to provide linkages that facilitate information sharing and 
cooperation (Harrald, 2006; Janssen et al., 2010). Understanding how liaison officers 
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involved in emergency management multi-agency arrangements span organizational 
boundaries and thus provide linkages between other organizations is critical. This is 
especially important in an emergency event when critical infrastructures such as energy and 
communications are disrupted or destroyed,  reducing the  capacity of information technology 
platforms to function  (Gheorghe et al., 2007). Despite their importance, the role of liaison 
officers and how they perform boundary spanning activities within multi-agency coordination 
in emergency management is not well theorized.  
2.3 Spanning organizational boundaries 
In order to comprehend the activities required to span organizational boundaries in 
emergency management and the subsequent concept of boundary spanning, I initially drew 
upon literature from the open systems theory to explore its historical origins. I then identified 
literature from multiple disciplines in an effort to review the specific activities pertaining to 
boundary spanning. This enabled me to build a picture of the activities required to span 
organizational boundaries. It was envisaged this could then be used in the research process to 
ascertain if the concept of boundary spanning depicted in other domains is applicable to 
liaison officers working in emergency management or if it requires modification.  
2.3.1 Historical origins 
As early as the 1960‟s the boundary spanning role was described as one in which a person 
from an organization is located in a different organizational system (Khan, Wolfe, Quinn, & 
Snoek, 1964). As an organization constantly interacts with its external environment there is a 
need for individuals to provide contact between their organization and external organizations 
(Katz & Khan, 1966). Thompson (1967) identified that the boundary spanners pursue a 
bargaining process that seeks to reduce uncertainties to their organization. Within this process 
the individuals act as mediators for their own organization (Thompson, 1967). This initial 
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view of boundary spanning from the open systems theory perspective led the way for 
empirical research and the development and classification of the activities undertaken by 
individuals tasked with spanning organizational boundaries. 
Early empirical research sought to identify the activities affiliated to spanning 
organizational boundaries in a multitude of disciplines.  Miles (1976) conducted a 
quantitative study involving research and design professionals and identified that all the 
candidates had a common role requirement that involved the coordination of projects across 
intra organizational and inter organizational boundaries (Miles, 1976) . One of these role 
requirements was described as boundary spanning which described representational and 
liaison activities allied to the role (Miles, 1976). Further research also recognized the activity 
of external representation (Aldrich & Herker, 1977) but also the importance of gathering, 
processing and transmitting information to other organizations (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; 
Jemison, 1984; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). However, it is not until research is carried out by 
Ancona & Caldwell (1988; 1992) that the individual activities of boundary spanning are 
theorized.  
In the first of two studies in high-technology companies, the authors describe and 
classify  a set of attributes that link a group to its external environment (Ancona & Caldwell, 
1988). The first stage in this research produced a comprehensive list of fifteen boundary 
spanning activities. However, it is not until their second study that they refined these fifteen 
activities to four boundary spanning activities. In their second study a quantitative approach 
is used to further understand the underlying structure of the previous boundary spanning 
activities. Based on the previous activities identified in the first study, a questionnaire was 
developed and distributed to four hundred and fifty research and development professionals 
in forty-five product development teams. This produced a response rate of approximately 
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eighty-nine per cent. Analysis produced a typology of four boundary spanning activities 
termed: (1) ambassador; (2) task coordinator; (3) scout and (4) guard.  
Ancona and Caldwell‟s (1992) second study investigating boundary spanning 
activities provided a comprehensive description and analogy of each activity. They posited 
that the ambassador activity relies on the boundary spanner to provide access to the power 
structure of the organization. The activity of task coordinator provided access to the 
workflow structure and was aimed at managing horizontal dependence. The activity termed 
scout concerned the acquisition of pertinent ideas and information. The final activity 
designated as guard related to actions that were aimed at avoiding the release of information 
to external parties (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992).  
2.3.2 Boundary spanning activities 
Ancona & Caldwell‟s (1992) typology of four boundary spanning activities are used today 
more than twenty years since its inception to identify how workers span organizational 
boundaries in a number of diverse working environments. This section will review a selection 
of contemporary literature that is aligned to the boundary spanning activities portrayed in 
Ancona & Caldwell‟s (1992) typology. The application of this typology and the associated 
four activities of ambassador, task coordinator, scout and guard, need to be reviewed in other 
settings as a precursor to examining its appropriateness in the domain of emergency 
management.  
2.3.2.1 Ambassador 
Representing is a factor identified with the ambassador activity (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). 
The ability to represent and influence are described in contemporary research on boundary 
spanning activities. One of the most seminal works to date that comprehensively describes 
boundary spanning activities is by Williams (2012). His book is the culmination of over a 
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decade of research exploring the role of boundary spanners in collaborative working practices, 
predominantly in the public sector (Williams, 2002, 2011). Williams presented a typology of 
four boundary spanning activities: (1) reticulist; (2) interpreter/communicator; (3) 
coordinator; and (4) entrepreneur. The reticulist activity can be identified as an individual 
that is skilled in bridging organizations, adept at influencing others by negotiation and who 
are mutually trusted by internal and external organizations to achieve a common goal 
(Williams, 2012). This reticulist activity bears similarities to the representing and influencing 
functions as it involves networking and providing representation across boundaries in order to 
temporarily connect organizations that need to become levers of change (Williams, 2012).  
 The activity of ambassador and in particular the requirement to represent the 
organization is also associated with empirical research in the education industry. 
Investigating the boundary spanning activities of university pro-vice chancellors, Pilbeam 
and Jamieson (2010) interviewed eight pro-vice chancellors from four universities. They 
identified that two vital activities were key features of a boundary spanner: (1) information 
gathering and dissemination, and (2) providing external representation. Facilitating links to 
other institutions, lobbying for resources and enhancing the reputation of the institution were 
key components detected as important aspects of the activity termed providing external 
representation (Pilbeam & Jamieson, 2010). Further examples of activities aligned to a 
representational capacity can be identified in other research conducted in the education 
industry. 
 Weerts and Sandman (2010) identified four distinct boundary spanning activities 
essential in advancing university and community engagement at research universities. The 
authors conducted eighty interviews with campus chief officers, campus engagement leaders, 
and community partners in an effort to compare patterns of engagement activity across 
research institutions (Weerts & Sandmann, 2010). The findings organise the data to articulate 
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four distinct but flexible boundary spanning activities: (1) community based problem solver; 
(2) technical expert; (3) internal engagement advocate; and (4) engagement champion. The 
activity of community based problem solver and that of engagement champion specify that 
the incumbent broker relationships between the host organization and external organizations. 
Within this activity they must also facilitate networks thus representing their own 
organization and create alliances and organizational networks with both internal and external 
stakeholders that are both strategic and symbolic (Weerts & Sandmann, 2010).   
 The stipulation in boundary spanning to provide organizational representation is also 
evident in recent empirical research conducted in the management consultancy industry. 
Sturdy and Wright (2011) examined the activities of forty-eight internal and external 
consultants from twenty-seven companies. From the data three primary activities of the 
internal consultant as an organizational boundary spanner emerged: (1) gatekeeper; (2) 
broker; and (3) partner. The boundary spanning activity of broker can be described as that of 
an intermediary and someone who is adept in bridging cultural boundaries working as 
organizational representatives (Sturdy & Wright, 2011). However, Fleming & Waguespack 
(2007) theorized that the concepts of brokerage and boundary spanning remain theoretically 
distinct. They make a distinction between brokering and boundary spanning and suggest that 
a broker can span boundaries, but not all boundary spanners are brokers (Fleming & 
Waguespack, 2007). Nevertheless, the activity of brokering and associated requirement to 
represent the organization is commonly associated with boundary spanning in numerous 
settings including but not limited to the health industry (Williams, 2011), information 
systems community (Kimble, Grenier, & Goglio-Primard, 2010; Levina & Vaast, 2005; 
Pawlowski & Robey, 2004), engineering (Johri, 2008), and in the business community 
(Johnson & Duxbury, 2010).  
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Johnson & Duxbury (2010) conducted seventy-nine interviews with expatriates 
working within the Canadian foreign ministry and produced a typology of nine boundary 
spanning activities: (1) relationship building; (2) shaping; (3) intelligence gathering; (4) 
delivering; (5) coordinating/negotiating; (6) guarding; (7) information gathering; (8) 
representing; and (9) intermediary (Johnson & Duxbury, 2010). The activity identified as 
relationship building was the single most frequently cited submission of all the boundary 
spanning activities and together with the activities of representing and intermediary depict 
activities associated with a person from one organization representing their organization in an 
external environment.   
 Conversely, in her taxonomy of five types of inter-group knowledge sharing, Hasan 
(2009) characterizes the boundary spanner as someone that can be a legitimate member and 
representative of both the internal and external organizations. However, the example given to 
report this was in a unique setting. The boundary spanner was someone who worked in a 
hospital and who was acting as an intermediary for a family member that was a patient in that 
hospital. The boundary spanner thus had a legitimate claim to membership of both groups 
(Hasan, 2009). Regardless of where the boundary spanning role is practised, either as a 
member of multiple organizations (Hasan, 2009) or  solely representing their own 
organization in an external environment (Johnson & Duxbury, 2010; Pilbeam & Jamieson, 
2010), the role encompasses the activity of coordination.   
2.3.2.2 Coordinating  
The coordination activity of boundary spanning is imperative in stabilizing mutual 
interdependencies between organizations (Harter & Krone, 2001). Coordinating collaboration 
with other external organizations is instrumental in successfully spanning organizational 
boundaries (Lee, Ohta, & Kakehi, 2010; Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006). Nevertheless, this 
aspect of coordination can entail challenges and demands on boundary spanners in terms of 
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managing their time especially when organizing the process of multiagency collaboration 
(Williams, 2012).  
Effective coordination facilitates the coupling of a host organization with external  
organizations thus enhancing the engagement process (Drach-Zahavy, 2011; Weerts & 
Sandmann, 2010). Often the delivery of a specific outcome is dependent upon the 
coordinated actions of many individuals (Kimble et al., 2010; Pilbeam & Jamieson, 2010) 
and therefore intrinsic to the success of the boundary spanning role and the core to enabling 
the work of the organization to be fulfilled is the ability to communicate effectively and 
convincingly with individuals from the external organizations  (Johnson & Duxbury, 2010; 
Pilbeam & Jamieson, 2010). The importance of coordinating collaborative partnerships 
influences the boundary spanners ability to gather information from external organizations.  
2.3.2.3 Scouting for information  
The  activity of gathering information across organizational boundaries is synonymous with 
the role of boundary spanning in current literature (see for examples Carlile, 2002; Drach-
Zahavy, 2011; Gopal & Gosain, 2009; Hasan, 2009; Isbell, 2012; Johnson & Duxbury, 2010; 
Johri, 2008; Lee et al., 2010; Lindgren, Andersson, & Henfridsson, 2008; Pilbeam & 
Jamieson, 2010; Williams, 2011, 2012; Zhang, Viswanathan, & Henke, 2011). Yet the 
activity goes beyond simply gathering information and emphasises the importance of 
disseminating information in response to the demands of the external  organizations (Johnson 
& Duxbury, 2010; Pilbeam & Jamieson, 2010; Sturdy & Wright, 2011; Williams, 2012). The 
gathering and dissemination of information in boundary spanning is consistent with the role 
of informational intermediaries that bridge informational asymmetries in order to achieve a 
common goal (Ebers, 1997; Ipe, Raghu, & Vinze, 2009). Additionally, accessing and 
processing necessary and crucial information that is relevant to the organizations objectives is 
considered a primary activity in boundary spanning (Drach-Zahavy, 2011; Pilbeam & 
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Jamieson, 2010; Zhang et al., 2011). Acquiring knowledge is not only confined to gathering 
information but can include accessing applicable intelligence (Johnson & Duxbury, 2010; 
Williams, 2012).  
Johnson and Duxbury (2010) make the distinction that information that is non-
sensitive and necessary to inform the boundary spanners immediate tasks is not intelligence. 
Intelligence is described as privileged or insider information not available through regular 
channels. Identifying sensitive, privileged and insider information can protect the 
organization and can assist the boundary spanner to remove obstacles of uncertainty for  their 
actual work (Johnson & Duxbury, 2010). What cannot be underestimated with the activity of 
information intermediary is the power that is associated with it. This activity has the 
discretionary power to disseminate information to whoever they deem most suitable 
(Williams, 2012). The activity of scouting for information is reliant on the resource that 
facilitates the procurement of information. In the boundary spanning literature this is often 
referred to as the boundary object (Carlile, 2002; Gopal & Gosain, 2009; Levina & Vaast, 
2005; Lindgren et al., 2008; Star, 1989).  
Boundary objects 
The concept of a boundary object is an item that is shared and shareable across diverse 
environments (Star, 1989). A boundary object can also be described as an  object that 
establishes a shared syntax for individuals to represent their knowledge (Carlile, 2002).  In 
the technological world that organizations invariably operate in, information systems are an 
important boundary object and resource for boundary spanning (Gopal & Gosain, 2009; 
Levina & Vaast, 2005; Lindgren et al., 2008). A critical aspect of information systems is the 
use of information technologies that can act as a key enabler in boundary spanning. Software 
can enable the boundary spanner to automatically acquire and share a broad context of 
information and knowledge (Lindgren et al., 2008). However, the success of the activity 
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associated with gathering information is intrinsically linked to the boundary object that is 
used in the boundary spanning process (Carlile, 2002; Levina & Vaast, 2005; Lindgren et al., 
2008). In addition to disseminating information, boundary objects can facilitate the protection 
or guarding of information between organizations (Levina & Vaast, 2005). 
2.3.2.4 Guard 
Refusing external organizations demands for information can aid in the protection of the 
boundary spanner‟s own organization by preventing boundary exchange (Johnson & Duxbury, 
2010). This guarding activity may also encompasses the demand of the boundary spanner to 
limit actions that may be underhanded by external organizations in their attempts to procure 
information about the boundary spanner‟s organization (Noble & Jones, 2006; Williams, 
2002). In jealously guarding their organization (Johnson & Duxbury, 2010; Stephenson, 
2005), boundary spanners need to have the capacity to feel comfortable with the tension 
implicit in this role (Pilbeam & Jamieson, 2010). This tension could result in the feeling of 
isolation succumbing susceptible to role overload and ultimately role stress  (Friedman & 
Podolny, 1992; Marrone, Tesluk, & Carson, 2007; Pilbeam & Jamieson, 2010; Rigopoulou, 
Theodosiou, Katsikea, & Perdikis, 2012; Singh, Verbeke, & Rhoads, 1996). The increased 
tension that can be associated with boundary spanning can also be related to an increased 
contact between boundary spanners that can lead to an escalation of conflict (Ramarajan, 
Bezrukova, Jehn, & Euwema, 2010).   
 Boundary spanning can encompass an eclectic assortment of activities that are utilised 
in spanning organizational boundaries. The activities that have been reviewed in this section 
are used in varying combinations within multiple working environments. In an effort explore 
the concept of boundary spanning in emergency management it is first necessary to review 
the associated literature in this field.  
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2.3.3 Boundary spanning in emergency management 
The emergency management literature does make several references to the concept of 
boundary spanning. However, this is not in particular reference to liaison officers. The 
boundary spanning activities described in the emergency management literature emphasise 
the importance of information flow. This is often in reference to the notion of multi-agency 
coordination. Within this body of literature the boundary spanning activities are often 
synonymous with the sharing and exchange of information between organizations.  
In their description of role enactment Kreps and Bosworth (1993) make reference to 
the concept of boundary spanning. Kreps and Bosworth (1993) identify three dimensions of 
role enactment: (1) status-role nexus, (2) role links, and (3) role performance. These three 
dimensions were developed from archival materials from the Disaster Research Center 
featuring participants in involved in organized responses during the emergency period of 
disasters. In particular, within the dimension of role links the research makes reference to 
boundary spanning and individuals forming links with the representatives from external 
organizations during an organized response (Kreps & Bosworth, 1993). However, the article 
aims to describe role enactment in an emergency management context and does not go 
beyond this basic description of boundary spanning and the general association with 
providing links to other organizations in disasters.  
Chen et al (2008) proposed a framework to analyse coordination patterns in the 
emergency response arena. This was based primarily on thirty-two interviews with 
emergency response personnel. One aspect of the framework explains that during emergency 
coordination the responder may fulfil a boundary spanning capability to fulfil coordination 
mechanism requirements (Chen, Sharman, Rao, & Upadhyaya, 2008). However, this is the 
only direct reference to boundary spanning in the entire article. Similarly, in his review of 
inter-organizational cooperation that may be required during an emergency event, Granot 
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(1997) makes a single reference to boundary spanning. In this research he defines boundary 
spanning in the context of emergency management and how it may be useful for exchanging 
ideas and information among individuals with similar interests (Granot, 1997).  
Research conducted by McGuire and Silvia (2010) explored intergovernmental 
collaboration in emergency events. Using a data set of more than four-hundred county-level 
emergency management organizations in the United States of America, they investigated how 
public managers are required to work across organizational boundaries in collaborative 
networks during emergency events (McGuire & Silvia, 2010). The article only makes scant 
reference to the concept of boundary spanning but recognizes the importance of spanning 
organizational boundaries in an emergency management scenario.    
It is perhaps Kapucu (2006, 2011) and Kapucu with Van Wart (2006) who makes 
most reference to the concept of boundary spanning in the emergency management literature. 
Kapucu (2006) firstly identifies the boundary spanner as someone who is associated with 
communication and information technologies among organizations in an effort to achieve 
effective decision making in emergency events. Additionally, using empirical data from 
Hurricane Charley in 2004 and the World Trade Centre terrorist attacks in 2001, Kapucu and 
Van Wart (2006) analyse the role of the public sector in dealing with catastrophic disasters. 
In the article, the effectiveness of boundary spanning organizations was one of four areas 
identified as critical for high performance in emergency events (Kapucu & Van Wart, 2006). 
Finally, following a comprehensive literature review, Kapucu (2011) analyses the current 
structure of international disaster management in the context of the United Nations reform 
initiatives and identifies the main actors in the system. Exploring the work of the actors in 
this environment, he associates the concept of boundary spanning by means of developing 
relationships with other institutional members via networks (Kapucu, 2011).  
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Undoubtedly, it is Bharosa, Janssen and Tan (2011) who provide the most 
comprehensive analysis of the concept of boundary spanning in emergency management. 
Based upon observations from field studies, Bharosa, Janssen and Tan (2011) identified the 
role of someone they termed an information orchestrator.  An information orchestrator is 
someone who interacts with multiple organizations taking care of the information 
requirements that are beyond the boundary of a single organization (Bharosa et al., 2011). In 
this research an information orchestrator requires ten necessary capabilities to assure 
information quality in public safety networks. These ten capabilities include: quality auditing; 
boundary spanning; access to information libraries; web-service composition; enrichment; 
anticipation; information categorization; expertise gathering and consultation; reach back; 
and information quality feedback (Bharosa et al., 2011). Nevertheless, this research only 
investigated the concept of boundary spanning in the context of assuring information quality.   
There is a void in the literature that comprehensively investigates the suitability of 
boundary spanning in an emergency management context. Liaison officers are tasked with 
spanning organizational boundaries within multi-agency coordination arrangements. It would 
therefore appear important to investigate the construct of boundary spanning from the 
perspective of the liaison officer. Just as there is no single proven approach to emergency 
management (Wettenhall, 2009), it cannot be assumed that boundary spanning is generic to 
all industries and therefore further research is called for.  
2.4 Summary 
This review concludes that multi-agency coordination in emergency management is complex. 
A major challenge is the ability for individuals, including liaison officers, to build their 
distributed situation awareness of the event. The development of technological systems and 
tools to overcome these challenges are often reliant on human facilitation. Due to the 
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uncertain and dynamic context in which emergency management events often play out, 
reliance on technology cannot be a foregone conclusion. Incompatibility of certain 
information technology systems provides challenges.  Furthermore, the disruption of critical 
infrastructure can mean the most advanced technological systems are rendered useless in a 
disaster. Current approaches for multi-agency coordination in emergency management 
predominantly focus upon the technological aspects of coordination. The importance of the 
human factors warrants further investigation.  
Liaison officers involved in multi-agency coordination arrangements in emergency 
management require distributed situation awareness. This necessitates that they successfully 
forge organizational linkages between organizations and this is achieved by boundary 
spanning. Multi-agency coordination in emergency management is multi-faceted and is 
contingent on multiple elements working in synchronization to ensure effectiveness. An 
element often overlooked in these situations is that of the liaison officer performing boundary 
spanning activities. Thus, in the subsequent chapters, I will explore the activities of liaison 
officers and suggest alternative approaches to address the challenges they encounter in 
accomplishing effective multi-agency coordination in emergency management. 
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3.1 Introduction   
This chapter examines the research methodology I adopted in this project. It first outlines my 
methodological rationale. Next, the ethical considerations are considered. The following 
sections discuss the research approach, qualitative data collection methods I used in the study, 
followed by the methods used to analyse the data. The chapter presents a section on the 
limitations of the research methodology prior to offering a brief conclusion. 
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3.2 Methodological rationale  
My philosophical stance informed the methodological process adopted in this research as 
discussed in previous chapters.  The subject chosen in this thesis was under-researched and 
therefore it was not appropriate to use a theory testing approach which often favours 
quantitative methods to analyse large-scale phenomena as usually adopted with a positivism 
stance (Babbie, 2012; Travers, 2001). Consequently the context meant that a qualitative 
theory-development approach was required. Adopting an interpretivistic stance allowed me to 
observe aspects of the social world based on an individual‟s perceptions and experiences 
(Babbie, 2012; Robson, 2002).  This was important because I needed to better understand 
how the participants make sense of the demands placed on them when they are working 
within the research setting. This approach better captures how, for example, the diverse 
histories, experiences, training and organizational memberships contribute to how people 
make sense of their operating environment and make choices about how to respond (rather 
than making rationalistic assumptions). Therefore, undertaking a qualitative research stance 
was deemed appropriate for this project that endeavoured to provide explanations to the 
research questions described in Chapter 1. Qualitative data can provide a richness that assists 
in locating the meaning of experiences within the social world and thus placing the 
phenomena within their context (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Using qualitative methods also 
enabled the spirit of the participants‟ experiences to be identified and therefore I gained an 
understanding of their experiences through their own perspective (Creswell, 1998). 
Consequently, it would seem appropriate that qualitative research is essential in explaining 
and generating theory about a phenomenon. However, using qualitative research to embark 
upon any social inquiry raises many ethical issues that I needed to address.  
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3.3 Ethics 
The landscape of qualitative research continues to change creating new issues for researchers. 
This is particularly prevalent regarding the ethical dilemmas about how much information to 
disclose, to whom, in what context and the challenges of access to and sharing of this 
information (Miller, Birch, Mauthner, & Jessop, 2012). Additionally, interviewing 
participants involved in emergency management operations could raise sensitive issues for 
the interviewee who may draw upon experiences from traumatic emergency events. There 
was also a potential that participants may disclose something they did not wish to, leading to 
a feeling of vulnerability that may require the participant to implement coping strategies 
(Peterson, 2002). Raising delicate topics and recording these experiences meant there was a 
necessity to provide advice on where to seek additional support and ultimately protect the 
participant‟s confidentiality and anonymity.  
In this project I adopted several measures to address these issues and endeavoured to 
ensure that this research was conducted in an ethical manner. Firstly, the project sought and 
received ethics approval for the individual interviews, observational studies and focus group 
interviews from the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee in 
Australia  (Ethics Ref No:  H0008810) and followed the protocols for provision of 
information and consent. This involved lodging an amendment form for the Social Sciences - 
Minimal Risk Application, along with a copy of an introduction email sent to the participants, 
additional interview questions for the PhD component of the study, project information sheet 
and consent form for the individual interviews, focus group interviews and observational 
study (copies of these documents can be found in Appendix F, G and I). 
Secondly, it was reiterated to the participants in the information sheet and verbally by 
me prior to commencing the interviews, observational studies or focus group interviews that 
participation was entirely voluntary and that the participant could terminate their participation 
Chapter 3 
50 
 
in the interview or observation studies at any time. Participants were informed and given 
documentation advising them that if they felt distressed in any way due to participation in the 
research then they were encouraged to contact relevant support services for counselling that 
were provided in the project information sheets.  
Thirdly, I de-identified the names of the participants following their participation and 
prior to sending the audio file to a professional transcriber. This sought to protect the 
confidentiality and maintain anonymity of the interviewee. Participants were informed that no 
personal information will be sought, recorded or published. The interview transcripts were 
returned to the participants for checking and accuracy (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & 
Spiers, 2002).  Participants involved with the research were informed that the data gained was 
to be securely stored for a period of five years. Following the five-year period all data 
provided by participants will be destroyed. Paper records will be shredded and electronic 
records will be destroyed by reformatting the disk and/or drive or overwriting the data using 
another means that conforms to the University of Tasmania Secure Disposal of ICT 
Equipment Procedure (ICPTR 2.1). This action is imperative as simple deletion is insufficient 
and does not actually overwrite the information until the space is required, meaning that the 
information could still be retrieved for some time.  
Finally, anonymity of all participants involved in the research will be maintained by 
me and the research team. However, if an anonymous quote from the focus group interview 
was used in a publication, there is a risk that a fellow participant involved in the focus group 
interview may recognize the quote and subsequently recognize the interviewee who made the 
quote. Additionally, the inadvertent description of the study setting and events may reveal the 
identity of the participants (Hoonaard, 2003). Therefore, while every effort was made to 
assure anonymity this could not be guaranteed and I explicitly explained these risks to each 
participant prior to participation in the focus group interview. 
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3.4 Research approach 
The methodological stance I adopted in this research is based on an inductive approach  that 
provides for the systematic and inductive generation of theory from data acquired by rigorous 
research methods (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Patton, 1990). Key characteristics 
of the inductive process that was adopted in this research was the regular comparison of data 
analysis, the role of the literature review which situated the challenges of multi-agency 
coordination in emergency management and the current mechanisms in place to address them, 
data verification through theoretical sampling and the development and refinement of 
concepts to explain behaviour and experiences (Glaser, 1978).  In particular, this qualitative 
method was based upon work conducted by Eisenhardt (1989) who argues that theory 
development can be undertaken using a case study design. A case study can be described as 
an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a 
particular group of people that can be used to generate theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Simons, 
2009; Thomas, 2011). 
A case study approach allowed for the interchange of inductive and deductive 
methods of analysis as described by Eisenhardt (1989). This inductive process to analysing 
allowed me to regularly compare theory and data. However, I first needed a suitable 
framework to account for the work occurring in emergency management. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, because of the multifaceted, unpredictable and often temporal challenges that are 
encountered in emergency management multi-agency coordination (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006; 
Janssen et al., 2010; Schraagen & Van de Ven, 2008), I required a methodological framework 
that was appropriate for use in high reliability environments. For the purpose of this research 
a high reliability environment is one where organizations operate in an unforgiving social and 
political environment, an environment rich with the potential for error, where the scale of 
consequences precludes learning through experimentation (Rochlin, 1993). These 
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environments are often found in organizations such as nuclear power-plant operations,  naval 
aircraft carriers, and air traffic control systems (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). 
Subsequently the methodological framework I used to guide theory development in my 
research was core-task analysis.  
This methodology is a conceptual modelling approach for the analysis of empirical 
qualitative data for defining the constraints that a particular domain puts on the actors 
working in it.  Due to the open ended and dynamic system of the research setting, where the 
external environment and subsequent interaction with the workers is decisive, this 
methodological framework appeared suitable for this complex and uncertain domain. In 
addition, I also used the concept of boundary spanning as a mechanism to investigate the 
problems of liaison officers working in multi-agency coordination arrangements. Further 
details of boundary spanning can be located in Chapter 2 and further explanation on the core-
task analysis methodological approach is provided next. 
3.4.1 Core-task analysis 
Core-task analysis is a conceptual modelling approach for the analysis of empirical 
qualitative data for defining constraints that a particular domain puts on its control by humans 
via resources of skill, knowledge and collaboration (Norros, 2014).  This methodological 
framework was chosen due to its previous use and applicability to high reliability 
environments. This framework was developed in studies conducted in several complex and 
dynamic working domains. These include nuclear power plant operations, anaesthesia and the 
navigation of large ships (Norros, 2004). This methodological framework continues to be 
applied in other complex working areas and has most recently been applied in working 
environments involving automated train systems  (Karvonen et al., 2011) and communication 
network operations (Norros, Norros, Liinasuo, & Seppanen, 2012). Thus it would appear that 
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it is suited to researching high reliability environments such as found in an emergency 
management.  
The aim of core-task analysis is to identify the core-task of a specific working 
practice. The concept of the core-task indicates the objectives and the outcome of work that 
should be accounted for by the workers in everyday task performance. Core-task analysis 
adopts a systemic notion of human activity where the situated actions are conceived from an 
ecological, human-environment interaction perspective (Norros, 2004). Core-task analysis 
takes into account three interrelated dimensions that workers must consider to achieve salient 
task outcomes in particular work domains. These are the contextual elements of dynamism, 
complexity and uncertainty. In order to manage these dimensions core-task analysis states 
that the workers need collaboration, skill and knowledge (Norros, 2004). Core-task analysis 
hypothesizes that collaboration contributes to reducing the complexity in dynamic situations 
in an effort to enable proper functioning of a system. This makes it ideally suited to the 
dynamic, uncertain emergency response environment of state level emergency operations 
centres. It also theorizes that skill is a process for coping with uncertainty in a situation that 
requires action to respond to the problem. Finally, core-task analysis hypothesises that 
knowledge and its processes facilitate coping in a complex environment and enable reflection 
on the inherent uncertainties in the environment (Norros, 2004). When dealing with dynamic, 
uncertain and evolving emergency events, knowledge is likely to extend beyond that obtained 
from core organizational training (which does not necessarily include multi-agency crises) 
and expand to bring to the fore people‟s history, experience and relationships. The latter can 
be articulated drawing on a qualitative approach such as core-task analysis. Based on the 
applicability of these dimensions to emergency management it would appear that this was an 
appropriate framework to apply in strategic level emergency operations centres. 
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In Chapter 1 I briefly acknowledged this research project could have used other 
methods such as cognitive task analysis approaches. The methodological approach chosen for 
this research aimed to conceptually model the defining constraints that the work domain in 
the research setting puts on a particular group of humans working in this environment. It was 
envisaged that this would assist in identifying the challenges and ensuing mechanisms 
employed to facilitate multi-agency coordination in the research setting. Consequently the 
research sought an alternative method to traditional task analyses which can be associated 
with action orientated approaches such as hierarchal task analysis (see for examples Annett, 
2003; Marsden & Kirby, 2005; Shepherd, 2001; Stanton & Young, 1999) or cognitive 
approaches as described in cognitive task analysis (see for examples Klein, 2000; Militello & 
Hutton, 1998; Rasmussen, 1986). Application of the core-task analysis methodology 
emphasised a systemic notion of human activity where the situated actions are conceived 
from an ecological and human-environment interaction perspective (Norros, 2004).  
Core-task analysis allowed the identification of the socio-technical and socio-cultural 
complexities of liaison officers operating within the research setting. This methodological 
framework facilitated the exploration  of the tasks performed by the participants in a 
particular environment but importantly  it also sought to improve their ability to manage the 
identified expected and unexpected work situations (Hollnagel, 2014).  Applying core-task 
analysis in the context of an exploratory case study approach was deemed an appropriate 
process to explore a phenomenon that is considered new and innovative (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Complementing the use of the core-task analysis framework in exploring the developing area 
of liaison officers in emergency management was the construct of boundary spanning. 
3.4.1.1 Boundary spanning 
In the literature review (Chapter 2) I outlined two core issues necessary in understanding 
emergency management multi-agency coordination.  The first is the ability to understand the 
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situation and make sense of the events. The construct used in the literature pertaining to 
emergency management arrangements is often termed situation awareness and I provide an 
overview of the associated research in the Chapter 2. The second construct that I explored in 
the literature review are the actions required to enable multi-agency coordination and in 
particular the requirement for liaison officer‟s to cross over between organizational 
boundaries and how this action is executed.  The construct that is useful for this can be 
designated as boundary spanning. Liaison officers involved in emergency management multi-
agency coordination are required to work at the boundaries of their organization and be the 
interface between other organizations and their own in crisis events and do so with 
organizations with whom they may be unfamiliar. Hence it is important to locate a suitable 
construct with which to examine the demands of these workers. The typology of boundary 
spanning activities developed by Ancona & Caldwell (1992) is suited to examine the 
demands of liaison officers in the research setting and is examined in Paper I. In this thesis I 
applied the concept of boundary spanning to a novel and emergent inter-agency context. 
3.5 Data collection  
The study drew upon three complementary qualitative methods. The use of three qualitative 
research methods were used collectively to triangulate the overall findings and to maximise 
validity (Flick, 2004). Incorporating triangulation by amalgamating the findings through 
combining different methods of collecting data of the same phenomenon essentially aimed to 
overcome the challenges associated with validity by mitigating the deficiencies of one 
method with the strengths of other methods (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). In the order they were 
conducted the three qualitative methods were: (1) individual interviews, (2) observational 
studies and (3) focus group interviews. In addition, the study involved a planning stage that 
involved visiting the various emergency operations centres where the liaison officers would 
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work. This preparatory phase allowed me to acquaint myself with the work domain that the 
participants would be expected to work in.  
I joined an existing research team funded through the Australian Bushfire Cooperative 
Research Centre. The global research undertaken by the research team was a project titled: 
Organizing for Effective Incident Management. The specific PhD scholarship that I was 
awarded was to examine how workers in emergency management support effective multi-
agency coordination at a strategic level. In an Australian context, emergency management 
arrangements are often based on three levels: (1) operational, (2) tactical, and (3) strategic. 
These three levels often, but not always, correspond to the following jurisdictional activation 
levels: (1) local, (2) regional, and (3) state and/or federal. An important element of any 
research conducted in collaboration with an Australian Cooperative Research Centre is the 
importance of engaging industry. Australian Cooperative Research Centre programs support 
end user driven research collaborations that address major challenges facing Australia 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2012). Subsequently, the research team included academics 
from the University of Tasmania, Central Queensland University, and industry lead end users 
from a land management organization and the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service 
Authorities Council. The research setting involved three Australian state level emergency 
operations centres.  This setting was chosen because this is where representatives from 
various organizations responsible in managing an emergency event come together to respond 
to the hazard impacting the community.  
3.5.1 Preparatory phase  
The preparatory phase of the study involved visiting the three state level emergency 
operations centres early in the research program. These were the Victoria State Control 
Centre in Melbourne, the Tasmanian State Fire Operations Centre located in Hobart and the 
New South Wales Rural Fire Service State Operations Centre situated in Sydney. These visits 
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allowed me to acquaint myself with the environment that the liaison officers would be 
expected to operate in. This aspect of the preparatory phase allowed me to gain an 
understanding of the work environments and also allowed me to learn about the information 
systems and specific terminology that would be used by the liaison officers.  
During the preparatory phase I regularly met with members of the emergency 
operations centre management teams to discuss the direction of the research. The 
management teams oversee the running of the centre on a day to day basis during routine 
operations and in emergency events. They often provide strategic direction for the centre and 
act as an intermediary between the organizations who would be expected to work in the 
centre during an emergency event. Consequently, their opinions on any research conducted in 
the emergency operations centre are crucial, particularly as the research was to provide 
insight and value to them. All three management teams identified the need to enhance multi-
agency coordination at the state level during large scale emergency incidents and recognised 
the importance and attributes of liaison officers. Subsequently, I utilised their expert 
judgement on the selection of the sample on which organizational liaison officers should 
participate in the research (Teddlie & Yu, 2007).  
This purposive form of sampling was deemed most appropriate as the research sought 
to generate a sample that would address the research questions. Purposive sampling enabled 
me to compare and contrast the roles of the numerous participants. Indeed, the contrast and 
comparative principles are fundamental to qualitative data analysis strategies (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Mason, 2002). In particular, the literature highlighted the often problematic 
coordination associated with critical infrastructure organizations operating in an emergency 
management multi-agency coordination environment. Often research investigating multi-
agency coordination in emergency management predominantly focuses upon the core 
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emergency services that are often limited to police, fire and ambulance agencies (Bharosa, 
Lee, & Janssen, 2010; Chen et al., 2008; Militello et al., 2007; Mishra et al., 2011).  
Instrumental in the selection of participants for this research was guidance provided 
by the three state level emergency operation centre management teams. Advice was sought 
from the management teams as to what organizations were present during the activation of a 
state level emergency operations centre for a bushfire. For example, when there are multiple 
bushfires across multiple areas within the same state that are beyond the capacity of regional 
emergency management arrangements, the state level emergency operations centre will be 
activated. This will require liaison officers from the emergency services to be present and 
usually necessitates that liaison officers from federal government organizations, land 
management organizations and critical infrastructure organizations attend. Consequently, 
participants were selected based on this information. All the participants were senior 
professionals within their respective organizations who would be expected to fulfil the role of 
a liaison officer in a state level emergency operations centre. A pre-requisite was that the 
participants had to have performed the role previously in a state level emergency operations 
centre. This could have been during an actual event or in a multi-agency exercise and allowed 
the participants to draw upon past experiences. For the purpose of this research participants 
were categorized as from the emergency services or non-emergency organizations.  
The group classified as non-emergency organizations was further grouped into critical 
infrastructure or other organizations. For the purpose of this study I adopted the Australian 
Government‟s definition of critical infrastructure, described as essential services that are 
important for everyday life such as energy, food, water, transport, communications, health, 
banking and finance (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). However, I only sought to include 
organizations that would be typically requested to attend a state level emergency operations 
centre during the response phase of a crisis.  Therefore the participants were from energy, 
 Methodology 
59 
 
water, transport, communications, and health organizations as these are regularly called upon 
to be in the state level emergency operations centres.  Participants from the other 
organizations represented federal government, non-government and land management 
organizations. It is noteworthy that a high number of participants from land management 
organizations were selected due to their involvement in Australian bushfires events. 
Ultimately, by incorporating a large number of participants that were from non-emergency 
organizations I sought to enhance the knowledge of these particular liaison officers and thus 
fill a gap identified in the literature.  
3.5.2 Individual interviews  
Qualitative research interviews attempt to understand the world from the participants view 
point by unfolding the meaning of peoples‟ experiences and ultimately uncovering their lived 
world (Kvale, 1996). Encompassing this strategy enabled me to understand the demands of 
the work from the perspective of the interviewee (King, 2004).  Semi-structured interviews 
were chosen due to the inherent flexibility that this method offers combined with the rich and 
highly illuminating material it can yield (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Fontana & Frey, 2005). 
Additionally, the use of individual interviews allowed for the unanticipated and spontaneous 
responses that emerge through open-ended questioning (Babbie, 2012).   
A series of preformulated questions (refer to Appendix F on page 261) for a full list of 
the questions) were guided by a thorough review of the literature pertaining to the topic under 
exploration and developed in consultation with the research team (Jacob & Furgerson, 2012). 
The purpose of this was to focus the discussion of the interview on the project aims (Witzel, 
2000).  Prior to commencing the majority of the interviews, a pilot study was carried out with 
three participants. The three participants were liaison officers who could all be requested to 
work in a state level emergency operations centre. The supervisory team and I deemed that it 
was not necessary to change any of the semi-structured interview questions. Due to the initial 
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quality of the data extracted from the pilot interviews and applicability of the participants to 
the research it was decided that these interviews would be included in the final data collection 
(van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2002). A total of forty-three individual interviews were 
conducted with liaison officers who worked in state level emergency operations centres (see 
Table 3.1). Initially, thirty-nine liaison officers were interviewed. A further four liaison 
officers from critical infrastructure organizations were subsequently interviewed to further 
investigate the cultural challenges specific to these liaison officers. A grand total of forty-
three interviews were conducted between July and October 2012.  The logistical and time 
constraints of conducting in-depth interviews face to face imposed limitations on the number 
of interviews that could be conducted within the time frame of the study.  
Table 3.1 Individual interview participant demographics  
Emergency Services  
(16 pax) 
Critical infrastructure 
 (16 pax) 
Other organizations 
 (11 pax) 
Police – 2 Water services – 3 Land management – 7 
Fire – 7 Energy – 5 Non-government – 2 
Ambulance – 2 Communications – 2 Military -1 
State Emergency Service - 5 Transport – 5 Federal agency – 1 
 Health – 1  
 
This research relied on the active participation of the interviewees and their 
preparedness to disclose and discuss potentially sensitive information about experiences in a 
specified work environment. Tantamount to achieving this was the necessity for me to build a 
good rapport with the participants (Ryan, Coughlan, & Cronin, 2009). Of the total number of 
forty-three participants interviewed, thirty-five interviews were conducted face to face and 
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the remaining eight participants were interviewed by telephone. The advantages of telephone 
interviewing in this project was most notably the logistical challenges of travelling to the 
participant‟s workplace which was often interstate and the subsequent cost implication 
(Holbrook, Green, & Krosnick, 2003). The disadvantage pertains to the non-verbal signs that 
are missed and cannot be explored by telephone. However, the majority of the interviewees 
were interviewed face to face in their work environment or an alternative environment 
deemed most suitable and chosen by the participant. Moreover, the insights gained by both 
methods were not substantially different.  
Of the eight participants that were interviewed by telephone, I had previously met 
four of these participants in person and discussed at length the research. Prior to conducting 
the telephone interviews with the remaining four participants I had extensive telephone 
conversations with the participants about the research project. This informal contact with all 
the participants prior to conducting the interviews fostered a rapport between me and the 
interviewees (Ryan et al., 2009).  The interviews lasted in length from 23 to 61 minutes 
depending on the amount of time the participant was able to commit. This generated 
transcripts between 3,370 and 11,236 words. This resulted in a total of 73 hours and 45 
minutes of individual interviews generating a total data set of 254,273 words. 
3.5.3 Observational studies 
Observational research involves the direct observation of individuals in their natural setting 
(Carlson & Morrison, 2009). Observational studies are common in most fields that study 
people, including medicine, economics, epidemiology, education, psychology, political 
science and sociology (Rosenbaum, 2010). Observation is a highly valued and effective 
research method and can be used in triangulation to validate other qualitative research  
(Caldwell & Atwal, 2005). The rationale for conducting observational studies in this research 
was so I could witness the role of liaison officers in a state level emergency operations centre 
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in an effort to corroborate the findings from the individual interviews. The study sites chosen 
for this observational phase were the three state level emergency operations centres described 
earlier. The observation studies were conducted by me fulfilling the role of observer as 
participant. This stance enabled me to participate in the group activities as desired and 
„shadow‟ the liaison officers allowing attendance at all briefings, meetings and interaction 
with other members in the state level emergency operations centre (Kawulich, 2005).   
Participant observation can be used as a way to increase the validity of the study, as 
the observations allowed me to have a greater understanding of the context and phenomenon 
under study (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002).  This meant that the participants in the environment 
where the observational studies were conducted were aware of my observation activities. My 
"peripheral membership role" allowed me to closely observe and interact with the participants 
whilst they performed their role. It also allowed me to establish an insider's identity without 
participating in those activities that constitute membership of the multi-agency team (Adler & 
Adler, 1994).  
During the observations the participants were asked a series of questions (refer to 
Appendix G) that were later refined (refer to Appendix H). Opportunistic detailed notes were 
also taken during the observational studies and after the event. The challenge with this phase 
of the research was that I sought to investigate the role of the liaison officers specifically at 
the state level. Multi-agency bushfire exercises are often only conducted on an annual basis at 
a state level due to the significant logistics and time required to execute an exercise. 
Subsequently, I was only able to observe the role of liaison officers in three state bushfire 
exercises. Therefore, additional observations were conducted during actual catastrophic 
bushfire events requiring state level multi-agency coordination efforts. I was privileged 
enough to conduct two periods of observational studies in two different states during actual 
bushfires. Over a sixteen month period between August 2012 and December 2013 I had the 
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opportunity to observe a total of fifteen liaison officers from multiple organizations across 
three state level emergency operation centres in a combination of multi-agency exercises and 
actual emergency events culminating in a total of thirty-nine hours of real time observations 
(see Table 3.2).  
A challenge when conducting observations is that it can be viewed as research that is 
conducted with an element of bias. Therefore I had to understand how their theoretical 
methods may affect observation, analysis, and interpretation (Kawulich, 2005). This can be 
overcome by using multiple observers. However, due to logistical constraints this was not 
feasible in this study. Nevertheless I sought to address this challenge by building a solid 
relationship between myself and the participants in order to improve the research process 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2011). I also went into the observations with an open, nonjudgmental 
attitude, and with an interest in learning more about the participants role in the multi-agency 
environment and was subsequently aware of the necessity of been a good listener (DeWalt & 
DeWalt, 2002). 
Table 3.2 Observational study demographics  
Observational 
study 
Scenario Liaison officers 
organization 
Number of 
participants  
(15 pax) 
Duration in 
hours 
(39 hours 
total) 
 
No. 1 Exercise Emergency services  1 4 
 
No. 2 Exercise Emergency services  2 8 
 
No. 3 Exercise Other organization 1 5 
 
No. 4 Bushfire Emergency services  
Critical infrastructure  
Other organization 
2 
7 
1 
 
16 
No. 5 Bushfire Other organization 1 6 
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3.5.4 Focus group interviews 
The rationale for conducting focus group interviews was to further explore the seven 
categories identified as constraints in the data from the individual interview phase. These 
challenges were identified as: (1) temporal constraints of working in the environment; (2) a 
lack of collaborative training; (3) the complexities of working in a multi-organizational work 
domain; (4) the challenges of providing a physical presence in the work domain; (5) the 
cultural challenges associated with the inherently different organizational cultures working in 
the domain; (6) reduced clarification on the organizational roles of liaison officers; and (7) 
challenges of sharing information to inform liaison officers situation awareness. Additionally 
it was used as an opportunity to provide feedback on the existing research conducted in this 
project.   
The sample for the group interviews was drawn from the participants who were 
previously involved in the individual interviews or observational studies. The groups were 
comprised of liaison officers from emergency services and those from non-emergency 
organizations (see Table 3.3). Upon consultation with the research team and emergency 
operations centre management teams it was determined that a mixed group design that may 
not necessarily have frequent contact with each other would facilitate the best discussion. It 
was envisaged that a group environment would enable participants to discuss their 
perceptions, ideas and opinions and thoughts in a non-threatening environment (Krueger & 
Casy, 2000).  
This type of environment can yield important data providing individual perceptions 
on a given topic (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2002). The groups were recruited to consist 
of between six and eight participants. The rationale for this size is based upon the belief that 
the group should include enough participants to provide a diversity of information but not too 
large that the participants feel uncomfortable sharing their beliefs (Baumgartner, Strong, & 
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Hensley, 2002; Langford, Schoenfeld & Izzo, 2002; Onwuegbuzie, Dickinson, Leech, & 
Zoran, 2009) 
Three focus group interviews were conducted between June 2013 and October 2013 
in two different states, two in Victoria and one in Tasmania. When conducting the group 
interviews I undertook the role of the researcher. In addition, a representative from an 
organization involved in the emergency management arrangements acted as a moderator. It 
was decided that for continuity and due to their direct involvement with the study that I 
would participate in all three focus group interviews (Moen, Antonov, Nilsson, & Ring, 
2010). Two moderators were used for the group interviews and chosen because both were 
sufficiently familiar with the topic to understand the responses and to probe effectively. For 
continuity the moderator for the two focus group interviews held in Victoria was the same 
person. Neither of the moderators was involved in the interview phase. The moderator in 
Victoria was a member of the management team for the state level emergency operations 
centre. The moderator in Tasmania was a retired senior officer from the emergency services. 
Both moderators are experienced managers with extensive experience of regulating group 
meetings at a strategic level. Upon discussion with my supervisory team it was determined 
that both moderators were indeed experienced in this field, unobtrusive, non-judgemental, 
had the ability to involve all participants, maintain the ground rules and keep the group 
focused (Stewart et al., 2002). All the group interviews were audio recorded and each 
participant was identified by a pseudonym. This maintained anonymity and confidentiality of 
the participants. The audio recordings were transcribed verbatim by a professional transcriber. 
The group interviews lasted between 70 and 105 minutes generating transcripts between 
12,200 and 15,200 words resulting in a total data set of 39,879 words.  
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Table 3.3 Demographics of group interviews  
Focus 
group 
 
Organizations 
involved 
Number of 
participants 
Duration 
(minutes) 
Transcript word 
count 
No. 1 Emergency services  
Critical infrastructure  
4 
4 
 
105 15,198 
No. 2 Emergency services  
Critical infrastructure  
Other agencies  
2 
3 
2 
 
90 12,210 
No. 3 Emergency services  
Critical infrastructure 
  
2 
2 
70 12,471 
3.6 Data analysis  
Qualitative research needs to display what was performed during the data reduction, 
conclusion drawing and verification processes (Miles & Huberman, 1984). The data was 
analysed using the data analysis software QSR-NVivo 10. This software provides 
transparency and facilitates the analysis of data, theoretical development and presentation of 
findings (Hoover & Koerber, 2011; Hutchison, Johnston, & Breckon, 2010). Firstly, five 
individual interview transcripts were randomly chosen and examined for generic themes and 
were categorised in the language used by the participants. This revealed key words and 
phrases that indicated significant themes based on the participants answers to the individual 
interview questions. This initially yielded a total of six major themes (see Table 3.4) that 
were all interconnected. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the relationships between the various 
themes.  
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Table 3.4 The six major themes  
Number Theme 
1 Attitude towards others 
2 Constraints 
3 Contributes to success 
4 Personal attributes 
5 Purpose of the liaison officer 
6 Roles 
 
Figure 3.1 Interrelationship between the major themes  
 
The next stage involved systematically grouping similar data from the themes  (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998) in an effort to answer the research questions. This created multiple sub 
categories radiating from the six major themes. Figure 3.2 provides an example of the sub 
categories for the theme Roles as displayed in NVivo 10. For the purpose of the first research 
question, Ancona & Caldwell‟s (1992) typology of boundary spanning roles was used as a 
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concept to ascertain if the boundary spanning activities identified in the individual interviews 
could be aligned to this typology of boundary spanning roles. The core-task analysis 
methodological framework was also used to align the boundary spanning activities to one of 
three dimensions identified as creating different types of demands on aspects of the workers 
actions. Paper I elucidates how the data pertaining to the first research question was analysed.  
Figure 3.2 An example of the sub categories for the theme titled Roles 
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The data analysis section in Paper II articulated how the data was analysed to identify the 
constraints faced by the participants in the work domain and the mechanisms they adopted to 
overcome these. Figure 3.4 provides an example of the visual interpretation as displayed in 
NVivo 10 of the seven categories pertaining to the constraints faced by the liaison officers in 
the strategic level emergency operations centre as outlined in Paper II.   Paper IV explicitly 
investigated the cultural challenges faced by critical infrastructure liaison officers that were 
initially identified and presented in Paper II. The data analysis for this particular theme is 
explained in the methodology section in Paper IV.  
Figure 3.3 An example of the sub categories for the theme titled Constraints 
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To optimize validity and reliability I developed a set of coding lists. The coding lists 
contained the specific categories in the chosen theme, a brief description of each category, 
guidelines for how to complete the coding exercise, and examples extracted from the data 
(Saldaña, 2012). A second member of the research team with extensive experience in 
qualitative research methods reapplied the coding instructions as per the particular coding list 
(an example of a coding list can be located in Appendix J). Using Cohen‟s Kappa coefficient 
statistical measurement an inter-rater reliability was achieved and is detailed in the 
corresponding research papers.  
At the commencement of each focus group interview the challenges identified in the 
individual interviews were presented to the group. One of the focus group interview questions 
asked the participants if the findings related to their personal experiences as liaison officers in 
emergency management multi-agency coordination. There was a general consensus from the 
participants that the constraints identified in the data analysis of the individual interviews 
were representative of their experience as liaison officers. The group elaborated on the 
constraints that were identified in the individual interviews and the group responses were 
coded and eleven categories identified. Similar data from these eleven categories were then 
systematically grouped to one of the seven major categories identifying the constraints that I 
developed from the individual interviews.   
The data from the focus group interviews consolidated the findings in the individual 
interviews. An additional question in the focus group interviews asked the participants what 
strategies they believed needed to be established to facilitate effective multi-agency 
coordination at a state level. Analysis of this data revealed most of these strategies could be 
integrated into framework illustrating the mechanisms used to manage the core-tasks of 
liaison officer as illustrated by Figure 2 in Paper II. A commonality between all these 
strategies was the necessity for them to occur in the preparedness or response phase of an 
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emergency management event. This is illustrated in Paper V with Figure 3.7 providing an 
image distinguishing between the activities in the preparedness phase and response phase of 
an emergency event. 
Finally the data from the observational studies was used to consolidate the findings 
from the individual and focus group interviews. In particular, Paper III reveals how the data 
from the observational study was collected and used to corroborate the findings in that 
particular study. Ultimately, the use of these three qualitative research methods were used 
collectively to triangulate the overall findings from the project and develop a theoretical 
framework for facilitating emergency management multi-agency coordination as offered in 
Paper V.  
3.7 Limitations  
It has been documented that there can be a lack of transparency in qualitative research in so 
far that it is difficult to see why and how a researcher reached their conclusions (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). In this chapter I have sought to address this concern by describing the 
methodological rationale, data collection methods and analytical process incorporated in this 
research. The use of QSR NVivo 10 assisted in providing transparency of the data analysis 
phase and was illustrated in the examples given in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 (Hoover & Koerber, 
2011; Hutchison et al., 2010). The strength of this qualitative research is the use of in-depth 
semi-structured interviews as the primary data source. I sought to increase the validity of this 
method by triangulating the findings from the individual interviews by incorporating data 
collected from the focus group interviews and observational studies.  
A limitation of the research is rooted in the observational studies.  The fact I was the 
only person present during the observational studies adds some bias to the data. However, 
due to the collection of „live‟ data that is often extremely difficult to collect during large scale 
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emergency events (McMaster & Baber, 2012), I believe this limitation was acceptable as it 
provided a rare and valuable insight into liaison officers work in the emergency operations 
centre. A second limitation may be the relatively small sample size collected from three 
strategic level emergency operations centres in Australia. However, due to the purposive 
sample methods adopted in this project and the specific inclusion requirements of the 
participants involved in this research, I believe it provides a foundation for replicability in 
future research. In addition, the inclusion of liaison officers from multiple organizations 
provided rich and complex descriptions of the participants investigated in this research that 
may be applicable to other liaison officers in Australia who work in strategic level emergency 
operations centres.  
3.8 Summary 
This chapter examined and provided reasoning for the methodology chosen for this research. 
Firstly, the methodological rationale was explained. Secondly, the ethical considerations were 
given. Next, my research approach was specified and the methodological framework and 
rationale why it was chosen for this project was explained. A description of the data 
collection methods was then given and details of the three qualitative methods I used were 
specified. The followings section elucidated on the data analysis phase of the research. This 
included an explanation of the data application software I used to assist this process. This 
section also sought to cross reference the stages of data analysis with the methodology 
sections in the papers outlined in the following chapter. In an effort to provide some 
transparency with the data analysis phase, two examples of coding were offered representing 
the visual interpretation as displayed in NVivo 10. Finally, the limitations of the research 
were provided. Despite the acknowledgement of the limitations I believe that the findings are 
generalizable to specific audiences and particularly other liaison officers working in strategic 
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level emergency operations centres in Australia. Findings from the analysis of the data are 
provided in the five papers that are introduced next in Chapter 4. 
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4.1 Introduction   
This chapter will endeavour to provide an explanation about how the research questions 
described in Chapter 1 were addressed. This will be demonstrated through the presentation of 
five outlined research papers.  Papers I, II and III have been published. Papers III and IV 
have been submitted and currently under review with a selection of international journals. 
Each of the papers corresponds to one of the research questions as illustrated by Figure 1.2 in 
Chapter 1. The following section provides a brief synopsis of why and how the research 
papers correspond to each of the three research questions detailed in Chapter 1. This is 
followed with the statement of co-authorship. The following sections present the title, authors, 
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abstract as per the journal article and each author‟s contribution for the five papers as they 
appear in Appendices A, B, C, D and E.  Finally, the chapter will offer a brief conclusion. 
4.2 How the papers relate to the research questions 
Paper I established the foundation for the research in this thesis and specifically explored the 
first research question which asked: How do liaison officers responsible for emergency 
management arrangements coordinate their activities in multi-agency arrangements? The 
paper investigated this question and used the concept of boundary spanning to examine the 
actions of liaison officers in the research setting. The paper explained how liaison officers in 
the research domain currently perform their role in multi-agency coordination arrangements. 
The activities that the participants use in this role were aligned to the boundary spanning 
framework defined by Ancona & Caldwell (1992) and discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, an 
innovative typology of boundary spanning activities specific to the research domain was 
developed. These activities were aligned to one of the three resources described in the core-
task analysis methodological framework that the liaison officers must take into account to 
achieve their activities in the work setting: (1) dynamism; (2) complexity and (3) uncertainty. 
The paper endeavoured to answer the first research question by identifying what currently 
constitutes inter-organizational linkages in strategic level emergency management 
arrangements and how the linkages are performed. 
Papers II, III and IV collectively sought to address the second research question that 
stated: What demands and challenges are placed on liaison officers within multi-agency 
coordination arrangements? Initially Paper II set the scene and explored the challenges faced 
by liaison officers operating in a strategic level emergency operations centre using a case 
study design. This paper identified the constraints encountered by the liaison officers 
participating in the research and what mechanisms they used to overcome these challenges.  
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The findings were integrated into the core-task analysis methodological framework as 
described by Norros (2004) that was designed to analyse complex work in risky 
environments and discussed in Chapter 3. The result highlighted the core-task demands of 
liaison officers working in the chosen emergency operations centre. This led me to believe 
that the core-task analysis methodology was well suited to the high reliability environment of 
emergency management. Paper II indicated that liaison officers working in the research 
setting were confronted with information and cultural challenges. These two demands were 
elucidated upon in Papers III and IV. 
Paper III focussed and elaborated on the information challenges identified in Paper II. 
As mentioned previously, I joined an existing research team funded through the Australian 
Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre which meant that existing data sets were available that 
could be integrated into this particular research project.  Therefore this paper used the 
observational data collected by me for this project and also used an organizational survey that 
was distributed under the auspices of the Victorian Office for the Fire Services Commissioner 
in Australia. The survey investigated the information needs of the various personnel working 
in this multi-jurisdictional emergency operations centre. This paper expanded on the 
information challenges identified in Paper II. It investigated the perceived information 
requirements of the participants and identified the mechanisms that they used to facilitate the 
exchange of information in strategic level emergency management multi-agency coordination. 
This paper further contributed to the second research question and reaffirmed the information 
challenges identified in Paper II. In addition, the findings from this paper disclosed that face 
to face communication and specialised information technology applications were the 
preferred choice of communicating information. Nevertheless, a lack of familiarity with the 
software used in the research setting compounded the challenges related to obtaining 
information. This inadequacy with the familiarity of information technology applications may 
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be associated with a lack of inclusion in preparedness phase activities and links to the cultural 
challenges also illustrated in Paper II.     
Paper IV explicitly drew upon the cultural challenge linked to fostering trusting 
relationships in emergency management. This paper examined the role swift trust plays in 
emergency management coordination and how role clarity acts as an enabler within 
temporary organisational configurations Thus, this paper contributed to the second research 
question by depicting a mechanism that may be adopted by liaison officers to manage some 
of the specific core-task demands illustrated in Paper II.  
Finally, Paper V utilised the findings from the previous four papers in response to the 
third research question: What improvements are needed to support liaison officers to fulfil 
their role and enable more effective multi-agency coordination? Paper V presents a 
theoretical framework developed for improving multi-agency coordination arrangements in 
emergency management at a strategic level. This paper considers what activities are required 
to support liaison officers and in which phase of the emergency management cycle they 
should be applied. The article suggests how the framework can be adopted by policy makers 
and ultimately the liaison officers practicing these activities in an effort to enable them to 
cope more efficiently within the work domain and ultimately facilitate multi-agency 
coordination within strategic level emergency management arrangements.   
 As part of the research team I also participated in writing and producing a number of 
reports for the Australian Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre. In addition, I participated in 
two other research contributions. The first was a publication as a result of a presentation at an 
international conference and the second was in a book chapter, though my role in the latter 
was not as first author. These contributions are: 
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Curnin, S., & Owen, C. (2013). A typology to facilitate multi-agency coordination. 
Proceedings of the 10
th
 International Information Systems for Crisis Response and 
Management Conference – Baden-Baden, Germany, May 2013. 
Owen, C., Bosomworth, K., & Curnin, S. (2014). The challenges of change in future 
emergency management: Conclusions and future developments. In Owen, C (Ed), Human 
factors Challenges in Emergency Management, Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
4.3 Statement of Co-Authorship 
The following people and institutions contributed to the publication of work undertaken as 
part of this thesis: 
 
Steven Curnin,  
School of Education, University of Tasmania, Australia = Candidate 
Christine Owen,  
School of Education, University of Tasmania, Australia = Author 1  
Cain Trist,  
Fire Services Commissioner, Victoria, Australia = Author 2 
Douglas Paton,  
School of Psychology, University of Tasmania, Australia = Author 3  
David Parsons,  
Sydney Water, New South Wales, Australia = Author 4  
Benjamin Brooks,  
Australian Maritime College, University of Tasmania, Australia = Author 5 
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We the undersigned agree with the above stated “proportion of work undertaken” for each of 
the above published (or submitted) peer-reviewed manuscripts contributing to this thesis: 
Signed:
Dr Christine Owen Associate Professor Karen Swabey 
Supervisor Head of School 
School of Education  School of Education 
University of Tasmania University of Tasmania 
Date: 15 September 2014 16 September 2014 
4.4 Papers 
The following section introduces the five papers that are located in their entirety in the 
appendices. Papers I, II and III are all replicated as they appear in the journal papers that they 
were published. Alternatively the papers can be accessed in their original PDF format from 
the publisher‟s website. Papers IV and V are formatted in a generic design consistent with the 
style of the thesis.  
4.4.1 Paper I 
Spanning organizational boundaries in emergency management (Curnin & Owen, 2014) 
Multiagency emergency management coordination requires stakeholders to span 
organizational boundaries and facilitate collaboration among other agencies within temporary 
supraorganizations. Multiagency coordination is important in emergency management as 
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disasters often require the collaboration of multiple agencies into temporary 
supraorganizations. However, little is known about the boundary spanning activities that 
influence this collaboration. Based on 39 semi structured interviews with senior emergency 
management practitioners spanning organizational boundaries, this paper proposes a typology 
of boundary spanning activities for emergency management. Embracing these activities may 
address some of the challenges associated with the collaboration of multiple agencies in a 
disaster. 
Status: Published in the International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 37, No 5, pp. 
259 -270  
Author‟s details and their roles: The candidate (80% contribution) was the primary author 
and main writer who conducted the fundamental literature review and collected the data 
according to the method described in the paper. Together with author 1 (20% contribution) 
the candidate performed analysis of the resultant qualitative data. The candidate took the lead 
in developing the typology with author 1. 
4.4.2 Paper II 
Managing the constraints of boundary spanning in emergency management (Curnin, 
Owen & Trist, 2014) 
Stakeholders tasked with boundary spanning in emergency management are fundamental in 
facilitating multi-agency coordination. However, there is a scarcity of research investigating 
the characteristics of emergency management boundary spanners and how they achieve this 
function in the complex environment of emergency operation centres. An exploratory case 
study approach was adopted and applied in a strategic level emergency operations centre.  
The study used three very different but interrelated qualitative research techniques based 
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upon the Core-Task Analysis framework to categorise the work of stakeholders fulfilling a 
boundary spanning role in this setting. The data identified that stakeholders performing 
boundary spanning activities in a strategic level emergency operations centre face a number 
of constraints. These can include unfamiliarity with the work domain, its personnel, and 
structure which can lead to temporal, cultural and information challenges. In order to manage 
these constraints boundary spanners working in a strategic level emergency operations centre 
need to adopt certain characteristics in order to accomplish their activities. A significant 
outcome from the data was the necessity to engage in these important undertakings in the pre-
response phase in an effort to facilitate successful multi-agency coordination in an actual 
emergency event. 
Status: Published in Cognition, Technology & Work, Vol. 16, No 4, pp. 549-563. 
Author‟s details and their roles: The candidate (80% contribution) was the primary author 
and main writer who conducted the fundamental literature review and collected the data 
according to the methods described in the paper. Together with author 1 (15% contribution) 
the candidate analysed the resultant qualitative data. The candidate developed the resulting 
framework with author 1. Author 2 (5% contribution) provided technical expertise and in 
particular wrote the section concerning the research domain. 
4.4.3 Paper III 
Obtaining information in emergency management: a case study from an Australian 
emergency operations centre (Curnin & Owen 2013) 
Stakeholders involved in emergency management multi-agency coordination require 
information to inform their situation awareness to plan and coordinate their response and 
mitigation strategies. This study investigates the perceived information requirements of 
 Research contributions 
83 
 
senior strategic level emergency management personnel and how they obtain this information. 
The results are based on empirical data from two sources: an organizational survey and 
observational study during an emergency event. The findings indicate that the most 
influential cognitive artefacts used to obtain information are in person communication and 
use of specialised application software. However, challenges associated with using the latter 
can result in an increased use of in person communication which can limit the exchange of 
information throughout the system of actors. Understanding the strengths and limitations of 
how these stakeholders obtain information in this Australian emergency operations centre to 
inform their situation awareness is essential in facilitating multi-agency coordination in this 
environment. 
Status: Published in International Journal of Human Factors and Ergonomics, Vol. 2, Nos 2/3, 
pp. 131-158    
The candidate was the primary author and main writer. The candidate (70% contribution) 
conducted the fundamental literature review and collected the observational data according to 
the method described in the paper. Author 1 (30% contribution) collated and analysed the 
data from the organizational survey. The candidate together with author 1 collectively 
analysed the data and formulated the findings and subsequent conclusions.   
4.4.4 Paper IV 
 
Role clarity, swift trust and multi-agency coordination (Curnin, Owen, Paton, Trist, & 
Parsons, 2015) 
The purpose of this paper is to further the understanding of swift trust in temporary 
organizations by examining the role swift trust plays in emergency management coordination 
and how role clarity acts as an enabler within temporary organisational configurations A 
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qualitative interview study was conducted with 32 liaison officers working in 3 strategic level 
emergency operations centres in Australia. Role clarity was identified as an important factor 
in the successful formation of emergency management temporary organizations by 
emergency services and critical infrastructure liaison officers working in multi-agency 
arrangements. By providing role clarity, liaison officers may enable collaborative working 
practices between organizations involved in emergency management and thus facilitate multi-
agency coordination. The function of role clarity in the context of swift trust is largely 
overlooked in emergency management. Therefore this study has contributed to the knowledge 
of swift trust by empirically verifying the impact of role clarity by liaison officers working in 
the research setting. 
Status: Published in the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, DOI: 
10.1111/1468-5973.12072 
Author‟s details and their roles:  The candidate (70% contribution) was the primary author 
and main writer who conducted the fundamental literature review and collected the data 
according to the methods described in the paper. Together with author 1 (15% contribution) 
and author 2 (5% contribution) the candidate performed analysis of the resultant qualitative 
data. Authors 2 and 4 (5% contribution) provided technical knowledge and assisted in writing 
the sections pertaining to their individual expertise.  Author 3 (5% contribution) provided 
input regarding their particular academic expertise and its applicability in the research setting. 
The candidate together with guidance from authors 2 and 4 formulated the discussion and 
conclusion sections. 
4.4.5 Paper V 
Curnin, S., Owen, C., Paton, D., and Brookes, B. (2015) A theoretical framework for 
negotiating the path of emergency management multi-agency coordination 
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Multi-agency coordination represents a significant challenge in emergency management. The 
need for liaison officers working in strategic level emergency operations centres to play 
organizational boundary spanning roles within multi-agency coordination arrangements that 
are enacted in complex and dynamic emergency response scenarios creates significant 
research and practical challenges. The aim of the paper is to address a gap in the literature 
regarding the concept of multi-agency coordination from a human-environment interaction 
perspective. We present a theoretical framework for facilitating multi-agency coordination in 
emergency management that is grounded in human factors and ergonomics using the 
methodology of core-task analysis. As a result we believe the framework will enable liaison 
officers to cope more efficiently within the work domain. In addition, we provide suggestions 
for extending the theory of core-task analysis to an alternate high reliability environment. 
Status: Published in Applied Ergonomics, Vol. 47,  pp. 300-307. 
Author‟s details and their roles:  The candidate (70% contribution) was the primary author 
and main writer who developed the resultant framework. Authors 1 (20% contribution), 3 (5% 
contribution) and 5 (5% contribution) provided guidance and contributed their own specialist 
academic expertise. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter initially put into context how the five papers in this thesis by publication 
specifically relate to the three research questions described in Chapter 1. This chapter then 
provided the names and institutions of the co-authors and statement of co-authorship. I was 
the primary author and main writer for all five of the aforementioned papers. The ultimate 
objective of the chapter was to introduce the reader to the five papers in sequential order as 
they address the three research questions. This was achieved by providing for each paper the 
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title, authors, abstract, status of the article and the author‟s contributions. It is anticipated that 
the papers provided a logical progression in the research process as described in Chapter 3. 
The articles are presented in the appendix. Each of the five papers provide their own 
discussion and conclusion sections. Nevertheless, it is within the following that I will 
elucidate how the five research papers provided a theoretical contribution and input to 
industry. 
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5.1 Introduction  
This final chapter will firstly discuss the concepts illustrated in the five research papers 
introduced in Chapter 4 and how they build upon theory. The theoretical contribution of each 
individual paper will be explained and how they collectively contributed to the final product 
of a theoretical framework to facilitate multi-agency coordination in emergency management. 
The following section will then look at the contribution to industry and in particular the 
liaison officers engaged in this project. Finally, the chapter will suggest direction for future 
research associated with this project and lastly an epilogue will be provided. 
5.2 Theory development  
The aim of a substantial body of research is its originality and contribution to knowledge 
(Winter, Griffiths, & Green, 2000). It is my belief that the five research papers presented in 
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this thesis have contributed to theory development in a number of ways. The following 
sections will explore sequentially each of the individual papers‟ contribution to building 
theory. As I have stated in previous chapters, my PhD was part of an Australian Bushfire 
Cooperative Research Centre project. This project was specifically investigating emergency 
management multi-agency coordination at a strategic level. Consequently, it was necessary 
for me to conduct my research in a suitable setting. As the majority of strategic level 
emergency management arrangements are conducted at an emergency operations centre, I 
used three state level emergency operations centres in Australia for the research setting. 
As I reviewed in Chapter 2, the overwhelming majority of literature investigating 
multi-agency coordination focuses upon the perspective of the emergency services (see for 
examples Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010; Chen, Sharman, Rao, & Upadhyaya, 2008; 
Militello, Patterson, Bowman, & Wears, 2007; Mishra, Allen, & Pearman, 2011). However, 
multi-agency coordination is much more than just the emergency services (Scholtens, 2008). 
This was likewise echoed by the management teams in the research settings. Therefore, I 
chose to examine emergency management multi-agency coordination from the perspective of 
the liaison officers who work at the boundaries of organizations in strategic level emergency 
operations centres. To investigate multi-agency coordination holistically, I selected liaison 
officers from the emergency services (e.g. fire, police, and ambulance services), critical 
infrastructure agencies (e.g. energy, water, communications, transport, and health), land 
management agencies (e.g. environmental, national parks, forestry), non-government 
organizations (e.g. red-cross) and federal agencies (e.g. Australian Defence Force, Bureau of 
Meteorology, and Attorney Generals Department). Once the research setting and participants 
were finalized I could then explore what activities liaison officers used in their working 
practices. 
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5.2.1 Expanded typology of boundary spanning activities 
To theorize the role of liaison officers I used the concept of boundary spanning and examined 
if the activities of liaison officers involved in emergency management could be aligned to 
existing boundary spanning typologies described in the literature. This was described in 
Paper I as a typology of boundary spanning activities enacted by liaison officers working 
within strategic level emergency management arrangements.  Findings from this paper 
answered the first research question: How do liaison officers responsible for emergency 
management arrangements coordinate their activities in multi-agency arrangements? This 
was conducted by constructing a foundation of knowledge to understand how liaison officers 
in the chosen research setting coordinate their activities in multi-agency coordination. The 
thirty-nine individual interviews I conducted with liaison officers from multiple organizations 
who worked in two different emergency operations centres provided a rich and illuminating 
account of the activities they use to perform their work. I was then able to compare the 
activities with the boundary spanning activities presented in other domains as identified in the 
literature review. This allowed me to explore why and how boundary spanning in emergency 
management differed to other non-high reliability environments.  Most notably this was due 
to the complexity, dynamism and uncertainty associated with operating in this environment.  
The data revealed the specific activities liaison officers used in the research setting 
and subsequently a typology of boundary spanning activities of liaison officers working in 
strategic emergency operations centres was developed as illustrated by Table 3 in Paper I. 
With the development of this typology I was able to compare similarities with the boundary 
spanning typology developed by Ancona and Caldwell (1992) as discussed in this paper. 
Significantly, this typology created a theoretical foundation for the work carried out by 
liaison officers in a setting requiring multi-agency coordination and applied the concept of 
boundary spaning to a domain where it had previously had no application. The development 
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of a typology of liaison officer boundary spaning activities provided a foundation for 
embarking on the second specific research question.   
5.2.2 The core-task demands of liaison officers 
With an understanding of the boundary spanning activities performed by liaison officers 
provided in Paper I, I could endeavour to answer the second research question: What 
demands and challenges are placed on liaison officers within multi-agency coordination 
arrangements? To address this I adopted a case study approach using one of the three state 
level operations centres participating in this research project. The particular emergency 
operations centre used for the case study was chosen as the majority of the liaison officers 
interviewed worked in this centre. In addition, it was one of the larger centres and therefore 
the likelihood of activation for an emergency event was greater and thus the opportunity to 
undertake empirical research was more achievable.  As detailed in Paper II, I used three 
complementary qualitative research techniques. Drawing upon the data elicited from the 
individual interviews, observational studies and focus group interviews I was able to develop 
a framework defining the constraints that the work domain puts on the liaison officers and the 
core-task demands that subsequently emerged as illustrated by Figure 2 in Paper II. 
 Significantly, this paper demonstrated the application of the core-task analysis 
methodological framework to an environment where it had not previously been applied. This 
methodological framework was deemed most suitable for this research as it directed 
systematic attention to the particular constraints of the work as bases of defining the demands 
on the liaison officers and mechanisms they enacted  to manage the associated constraints. 
The rich findings produced from the data were portrayed in Paper II. In particular, two of the 
demands identified in this framework, the cultural challenges associated with working in a 
complex multi-organizational environment and the information uncertainty, warranted 
additional investigation. I envisaged that additional exploration of the challenges linked to 
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information uncertainty experienced by liaison officers in the research setting would 
contribute to the situation awareness literature. 
5.2.3 How liaison officers inform their situation awareness 
The findings from Paper III allowed for further articulation in answering the second research 
question and provided an explanation how liaison officers working in an emergency 
operations centre perceived their information requirements and how they acquire this 
information explicitly to inform their distributed situation awareness. These findings 
contributed to building theory in the realm of research examining the use of cognitive 
artefacts to support emergency management multi-agency coordination which is limited. This 
topic provided a deeper theoretical understanding of how personnel working in strategic level 
emergency operations centres use existing cognitive artefacts to support their needs. Findings 
discussed in this paper also indicated that a person‟s location in the research setting affected 
their ability to access certain cognitive artefacts. The location of a liaison officer in the 
emergency operations centre was also perceived as a cultural constraint by participants from 
critical infrastructure organizations. The subject of culture in emergency management is often 
under researched. Therefore I deemed that the cultural challenges identified in the data 
warranted further exploration. 
5.2.4 The emergence of swift trust in emergency management 
Paper IV allowed for the concept of swift trust to be examined in emergency management 
coordination and specifically how role clarity can act as an enabler and also a constraint 
within temporary organisational configurations. Data from the individual interviews 
identified that role clarity was an important factor in the successful formation of emergency 
management temporary organizations by emergency services and critical infrastructure 
liaison officers working in multi-agency arrangements. The facet of role clarity as identified 
in swift trust is similar to another concept identified in emergency management organizations 
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termed Professional Capital. The concept of Professional Capital represents the standards of 
professional performance that demonstrate competence and justify the decisions of managers 
to interact with other stakeholders (Wukich, 2011). This concept has similarities that 
complement the dimension of role clarity as recognized in swift trust. Ultimately this 
particular article has contributed to the theory of swift trust in an emergency management 
context by empirically verifying the impact and importance of role clarity from liaison 
officers working in three Australian strategic level emergency operations centres. 
5.2.5 A theoretical framework for improving multi-agency coordination 
Paper V draws upon the findings and recommendations from Papers I, II, III and IV in an 
attempt to provide answers to the third specific research question: What improvements are 
needed to support liaison officers to fulfil their role and enable more effective multi-agency 
coordination? This ultimately resulted in the development of a theoretical framework 
grounded in human factors and ergonomics that can improve multi-agency coordination in 
state level emergency operations centres. This is illustrated as Figure 2 in Paper V. The 
framework extends my previous work in the research setting and outlines the 
interdependency of the core-task demands of liaison officers and why these activities should 
be implemented in the preparedness and response phases on an emergency event. 
Significantly, this paper builds upon the theory of core-task analysis in the practice of human 
factors and ergonomics. This paper considered how a new issue recently assimilated into the 
core-task analysis methodological framework can be adapted to an alternative high reliability 
environment such as emergency management. Importantly, the development of this 
theoretical framework offers some guidance for industry. 
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5.3 Implications for industry 
I believe that this thesis has enhanced theory as previously discussed and subsequently 
provided research that could be utilised in evidence-based practice in emergency 
management. The concept of evidence based practice is well chronicled in the context of 
health (see for examples Auf der Heide, 2006; LoBiondo-Wood & Haber, 2013; Sackett & 
Rosenberg, 1996; Walshe & Rundall, 2001). Nevertheless, in the context of emergency 
management, developing evidence-based policy and practice for the future based on research 
is to some extent an emerging phenomenon (Arbon & Smith, 2000; McLennan & Handmer, 
2011). As part of an Australian Cooperative Research Centre I endeavoured to contribute this 
research to the requirements of industry (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012).  
As this research was a close partnership with industry it was of paramount importance 
to make available any emergent findings that could be adopted and used in the research 
setting. Consequently, facets of the typology illustrated in Paper I (Table 3) and from the 
frameworks depicted in Paper II (Figure 2) and Paper V (Figure 2) have already been 
adopted by certain organizations within the emergency management industry. Aspects of the 
typology of boundary spanning activities (Paper I illustrated in Table 3) are now 
implemented in operational doctrine by one of the participating state level emergency 
operations centres. The operational doctrine uses aspects of the typology of boundary 
spanning activities to clarify and provide guidance of the expected role of the liaison officers 
working in this multi-hazard state level emergency operations centre (see Appendix K for 
further details).  
Significantly, elements from the typology of boundary spanning activities (Paper I 
Table 3), the core task demands of a liaison officer (Paper II Figure 2) and theoretical 
framework for facilitating multi-agency coordination (Paper V  Figure 2) have recently been 
incorporated into industry training guidelines. Notably, a workshop for liaison officers 
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working in Australian state level emergency operations centres has also been developed and 
this has incorporated a large number of the findings from this research. This has led to two of 
the emergency operations centres who participated in this research to host pilot workshops 
and consequently endorse the workshop as suitable training for liaison officers deployed in 
their centres. This is a significant achievement by all those involved in the research and is a 
true testament of industry and academia working synergistically to develop evidence-based 
policy and practice for the future.  
Although this research has only been adopted by emergency operations centres 
involved with the project it is envisaged that the findings may be applicable to other state 
level emergency operations centres in Australia. Dissemination of the findings of this 
research at industry conferences will assist in targeting a larger audience of professionals and 
organizations involved with providing liaison officers in strategic level emergency operations 
centres.  
5.4 A future research agenda  
The research presented in this thesis should be supplemented with additional analysis and 
thus extended. The following section will suggest a number of possible extensions that I think 
are the most valuable. Firstly is the requirement to investigate whether the theoretical 
framework presented in Paper V is indeed valuable for facilitating multi-agency coordination. 
Therefore it is necessary to explore whether liaison officers from alternate emergency 
operations centres actually engage in the core-tasks described in the specific phases of the 
emergency management process. This could be evaluated empirically and validated in the 
preparedness phase during multi-agency exercising and in the response phase in the course of 
a real-time emergency event. If such research could be conducted successfully I believe much 
could be learned about the strengths and limitations of the theoretical framework.  
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Another valuable way to assess this approach is to gauge the applicability of the 
activities identified in this research to a wider sample. This could incorporate multiple case 
studies using potentially quantitative data techniques to get a broader understanding of liaison 
officer‟s role and ultimately their contribution to multi-agency coordination efforts in an 
Australian context. In addition, due to modification of the core-task analysis framework 
future research can look at other facets affecting the activities of liaison officers involved in 
multi-agency coordination such as dialogic communication. In this context future research 
could be used to explore how organizations differ culturally and if this has an impact on the 
liaison officer‟s role.  
Finally, this research could be expanded to explore the role of liaison officers 
involved with multi-agency coordination at different levels of emergency management 
arrangements. In particular, investigation into the activities at operational and tactical levels 
could reveal if there are differences to those activities we identified at the strategic level. This 
could assist in identifying the specific requirements of liaison officers working within multi-
agency coordination efforts at the differing levels of emergency management and how 
industry need to address these challenges.   
5.5 Epilogue  
To answer the global research question a theoretical framework for facilitating multi-agency 
coordination in emergency management has been offered. This theoretical framework is 
rooted in human factors and ergonomics with attention to the socio-cultural setting in order to 
account for the open ended and dynamic domain of emergency management.  The journey 
that led to this framework is documented in the five sequential research papers introduced in 
Chapter 4 and presented in their entirety in the appendix. This research has already had 
practical application in the emergency management industry. Specifically this is regarding 
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operational doctrine and training pertaining to liaison officers involved with multi-agency 
coordination arrangements. This is testament to the continued involvement of lead end users 
and liaison officers from multiple organizations that have been a constant and instrumental 
component of this research process. I expect that this contribution is also beneficial for other 
high-reliability environments that include dynamic inter-organizational processes such as 
those found in acute health systems and the military. Finally, I hope that this thesis will 
stimulate further innovative research in the area of strategic emergency management multi-
agency coordination. 
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Appendix A: Paper I 
 
Spanning Organizational Boundaries in Emergency 
Management 
 
Steven Curnin and Christine Owen 
Faculty of Education, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia and 
Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre, Australia 
 
Multiagency emergency management coordination requires stakeholders to span 
organizational boundaries and facilitate collaboration among other agencies within temporary 
supraorganizations. Multiagency coordination is important in emergency management as 
disasters often require the collaboration of multiple agencies into temporary 
supraorganizations. However, little is known about the boundary spanning activities that 
influence this collaboration. Based on 39 semistructured interviews with senior emergency 
management practitioners spanning organizational boundaries, this paper proposes a 
typology of boundary spanning activities for emergency management. Embracing these 
activities may address some of the challenges associated with the collaboration of multiple 
agencies in a disaster. 
 
Keywords: boundary spanning, emergency management, emergency operations center, 
multiagency coordination 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern society is becoming increasingly 
susceptible to natural and manmade disasters 
that often necessitate a multi-agency approach 
(Schraagen & Van de Ven, 2008; Van Scotter, 
Pawlowski, & Cu, 2012).  However, a problem 
of multi-agency coordination is complex and 
yet to be solved (Comfort et al., 2004; 
McEntire, 2002; Militello et al., 2007). The 
collaboration of multiple agencies that need to 
interact with each other synergistically to 
achieve a unified approach (Veelen et al., 2006) 
is challenging. Agency stakeholders situated 
within these temporary supra-organizations 
must facilitate collaboration among other 
agencies spanning organizational boundaries 
(McGuire & Silvia, 2010). The complexity of 
multi-agency coordination requires that we 
gain further knowledge about how these 
stakeholders perform these boundary spanning 
activities. 
There is limited empirical research 
investigating the concept of boundary 
spanning in emergency management (Janssen 
et al., 2010) and the suitability of utilising 
existing boundary spanning typologies for this 
complex and dynamic working environment. 
This article seeks to address these limitations 
by providing a qualitative analysis using 39 
semi-structured interviews of senior 
emergency management practitioners who  
 
currently span organizational boundaries in 
emergency management during multi-agency 
coordination. 
This article is guided by the following two 
research questions:  
1. Are the boundary spanning activities 
in emergency management different 
to those identified in other 
environments?  
2. What are the activities of boundary 
spanners operating at a strategic level 
in an emergency management context?  
 
It is expected that this qualitative approach 
will elaborate and extend the current concept 
of boundary spanning and yield a more 
detailed comprehensive picture of the 
boundary spanning activities of agency 
stakeholders typically found in emergency 
management multi-agency coordination. Using 
an established boundary spanning typology 
may also provide the theoretical underpinnings 
required to understand the broader boundary 
spanning activities in emergency management 
and suggest mechanisms for supporting 
agency stakeholders involved in multi-agency 
coordination. The article begins by introducing 
the theoretical concept of boundary spanning 
followed by the research design and the 
findings sections.  The discussion section and 
conclusion will describe the implications for 
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stakeholders involved in strategic level 
emergency management operations and 
provide suggestions for future research 
directions. 
BOUNDARY SPANNING: CONCEPT AND 
DIMENSIONS 
 
The boundary spanning literature contains 
numerous definitions of this concept. The first 
description of boundary spanning has its 
beginnings in open systems theory (Katz & 
Khan, 1966; Khan et al., 1964; Thompson, 
1967) with some of the first empirical research 
to describe boundary spanning from the 
research and design industry (Miles, 1976; 
Tushman, 1977). Further research attempted to 
classify the functions performed by boundary 
spanners in the study of formal organizations 
(Aldrich & Herker, 1977) and the influence of 
boundary spanning roles in strategic decision 
making (Jemison, 1984). However, it is not 
until research is carried out by Ancona & 
Caldwell (1988; 1992) that the individual role 
of boundary spanning is theorized. In the first 
of two studies in high-technology companies, 
the authors describe and classify  a set of 
attributes that link a group to its external 
environment (Ancona & Caldwell, 1988). The 
first stage in this research produced a 
comprehensive list of fifteen boundary 
spanning activities. However, it is not until 
their second study that they refine the 
activities of boundary spanning to the four 
main activities of ambassador, task coordinator, 
scout, and guarding (see Table 1).  
Over the last two decades Ancona & 
Caldwell‟s (1992) typology analysing the four 
boundary spanning  activities is evident in a 
number of recent typologies synthesising the 
boundary spanning activities in a multitude of 
disciplines (e.g. Drach-Zahavy, 2011; Johnson 
& Duxbury, 2010; Pilbeam & Jamieson, 2010; 
Williams, 2012). This typology has stood the 
test of time for the context it has been applied 
but may not be applicable to dynamic and 
complex environments such as emergency 
management. In the literature there are several 
references to the concept of boundary 
spanning in emergency management (Bharosa 
et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2008; Ipe et al., 2009; 
Kapucu, 2006a; McGuire & Silvia, 2010). 
These references emphasise the boundary 
spanning activity associated with the sharing 
and exchange of information between agencies 
and is often in reference to the notion of multi 
-agency coordination (Bharosa et al., 2011; 
Kapucu, 2006a).  
 
TABLE 1 
Typology of Boundary Spanning Activities after Ancona 
and Caldwell (1992) 
 
 
Category of 
activity 
 
Description of activity 
 
 
Ambassador 
 
Represent, promote, communicate the 
progress of your agency internally and 
externally, identify agency threats, 
acquire resources 
 
Task coordinator Coordinate activities, negotiate and 
procure items for your own agency with 
external organizations 
 
Scout Scan the organization internally and 
externally for information relevant to 
your agency‟s goals 
 
Guard Avoid releasing information to others  
 
 
 
Nevertheless, to date there is limited 
empirical research that specifically 
investigates the roles of boundary spanning in 
emergency management. This identifies a gap 
in the research considering the complexity of 
emergency management multi-agency 
coordination.  A lack of partnerships between 
agencies can inhibit collaboration between 
agencies. This can be a result of agencies that 
do not usually have a history of working 
together (Janssen et al., 2010; Waugh & Streib, 
2006) and incompatibility of systems, 
processes and terminology between agencies 
(Ley et al., 2012; Van de Walle & Turoff, 
2008). Subsequently, stakeholders assigned to 
span these organizational boundaries are 
fundamental to the collaborative process. 
Kapucu (2006; 2008; 2011) makes numerous 
references to boundary spanning in the context 
of interagency or collaborative networks but 
does not specifically investigate the particular 
activities of the boundary spanner. It is 
perhaps Bharosa, Janssen & Tan (2011) that 
explore the activities that are most closely 
associated to boundary spanning. They 
describe an information orchestrator who 
interacts with multiple agencies taking care of 
the information needs that are beyond the 
boundary of a single agency. This research 
provides a thorough description of the 
information coordination challenges of 
boundary spanning. However, boundary 
spanning is more than this one activity and 
dictates the consolidation of multiple activities.  
Just as there is no single proven approach to 
emergency management (Wettenhall, 2009), it 
cannot be assumed that boundary spanning is 
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generic to all industries. Therefore, in an effort 
to understand the boundary spanning activities 
in emergency management, further 
investigation is called for. 
Features of Ancona and Caldwell‟s (1992) 
typology of four boundary spanning activities 
can be recognized in subsequent typologies 
conceptualizing boundary spanning in 
numerous disciplines. Recent empirical 
research in the public sector (Williams, 2002, 
2011, 2012), education (Pilbeam & Jamieson, 
2010; Weerts & Sandmann, 2010) and 
business sector (Johnson & Duxbury, 2010; 
Sturdy & Wright, 2011) have attempted to 
conceptualise boundary spanning activities. 
One of the most seminal works to date that 
comprehensively synthesises the activities of 
the boundary spanner is by Williams (2012). 
His book is the culmination of over a decade 
of research exploring boundary spanning 
activities in collaborative working practices, 
predominantly in the public sector (Williams, 
2002, 2011). Williams, in keeping with 
Ancona & Caldwell‟s four stage typology, also 
developed a typology of four boundary 
spanning activities: reticulist; 
interpreter/communicator; coordinator; and 
entrepreneur. Similar to the ambassador 
activity described by Ancona & Caldwell 
(1992), Williams (2012) describes the role of 
reticulist as an individual that is skilled in 
bridging organizations, adept at influencing 
others by negotiation and one who is mutually 
trusted by internal and external organizations 
to achieve a common goal. This typology also 
identifies the activity of coordination as 
acknowledged by Ancona & Caldwell (1992).    
In the education industry both Pilbeam & 
Jamieson (2010), and Weerts & Sandmann 
(2010) propose typologies based upon four 
boundary spaning activities. Pilbeam and 
Jamieson (2010) interviewed eight university 
pro-vice chancellors and identified a total of 
four characteristics related to boundary 
spanning: communicating; networking; 
information conduit; and composure. Weerts 
& Sandmann (2010) conducted eighty 
interviews across six public research 
universities and identified four distinct 
boundary spanning activities essential in 
advancing university and community 
engagement: community based problem solver; 
technical expert; internal engagement 
advocate; and engagement champion. In the 
management industry recent empirical 
research by Sturdy & Wright (2011) 
interviewed thirty-two internal and external 
consultants from twenty-seven companies and 
identified three primary activities of the 
organizational boundary spanner: gatekeeper; 
broker; and partner. Similarities to the 
activities described by Ancona & Caldwell are 
evident in all these typologies, most notably 
the activities of ambassador, coordinator and 
information scout. 
However, it is recent empirical research 
conducted in the business community by 
Johnson & Duxbury (2010) that draws directly 
upon the work of Ancona & Caldwell (1992).  
Johnson & Duxbury (2010) conducted 
seventy-nine interviews with expatriates 
working within the Canadian foreign ministry 
and used Ancona & Caldwell‟s (1992) 
typology as a theoretical framework to extend 
the current conceptualizations of the boundary 
spanner in this field. The data yielded 
numerous similarities to this theoretical 
framework and produced a typology of nine 
boundary spanning activities: relationship 
building; shaping; intelligence gathering; 
delivering; coordinating/negotiating; guarding; 
information gathering; representing; and 
intermediary. Over the last two decades 
aspects of Ancona & Caldwell‟s (1992) 
typology describing four activities of boundary 
spanning can be identified in the description of 
boundary spanning in a multitude of 
disciplines. However, the application of this 
typology to the dynamic and complex 
environment of emergency management is 
limited. Multi-agency coordination in disasters 
is imperative for society‟s wellbeing and 
therefore the boundary spanning activities 
essential for this coordination is vital.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The intention of this qualitative study using 
semi-structured interview data was to yield 
rich and highly illuminating material  (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2005; Fontana & Frey, 2005) about 
the role of senior emergency management 
practitioners currently fulfilling a boundary 
spanning position in emergency management 
multi-agency coordination. Underpinning the 
analysis of the data was a grounded theory 
approach constantly comparing theory and 
data. This approach utilised two pre-existing 
frameworks.  
The first framework was a typology of 
boundary spanning activities developed by 
Ancona & Caldwell (1992). This typology 
follows research in the research and design 
industry that investigated the activities that are 
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performed at the boundary of an organization 
that link a group to its external environment 
(see Table 1). However, as mentioned in the 
preceding section describing the literature on 
boundary spanning, despite its extensive 
application in numerous disciplines there are 
limitations to Ancona & Caldwell‟s (1992) 
typology in emergency management. Ancona 
& Caldwell‟s (1992) typology has 
predominantly been used in relatively stable 
working environments (e.g. Research & 
Design industry, Education, Business). 
Therefore it was appropriate to complement 
Ancona & Caldwell‟s (1992) typology by 
using a theoretical framework that was suited 
to complex and dynamic environments such as 
emergency management.  
 
FIGURE 1   Model of generic environmental constraints 
on action described by Norros (2004).  
 
Subsequently, the second framework was 
based upon a Core-Task Analysis 
methodology. This methodology has been 
applied previously in dynamic, complex and 
uncertain environments such as nuclear power 
plant operations (Norros, 2004), anaesthetist‟s 
clinical practice (Klemola & Norros, 1997) 
and maritime piloting (Nuutinen & Norros, 
2007). Core-Task Analysis is an ecological 
research method focusing on understanding 
the dynamic nature of a system and the 
practitioners actions within that environment 
(Norros, 2004). This theoretical framework 
defines three constraints of modern working 
environments. These are dynamism, 
complexity and uncertainty. Operating in these 
environments creates different types of 
demands on aspects of the workers actions 
(Norros, 2004). These aspects are skill, 
knowledge and collaboration (see Figure 1). 
Elements of this framework are reiterated in 
the theory of Surprise Management that is 
drawn from chaos and transformation theories. 
This theory similarly highlights the uncertainty 
of emergency management events and the 
demands it places on workers to also have 
cutting-edge knowledge and skills required to 
operate in this environment (Farazmand, 2007). 
This research will use the three aspects of 
action as described in the Core Task Analysis 
methodology to categorise the boundary 
spanning activities in emergency management.  
Core-Task Analysis has had limited 
application in emergency management which 
encompasses multiple organizations. As 
boundary spanning is intrinsic to multi-agency 
coordination it was therefore fitting to apply 
these two theoretical concepts to stakeholders 
operating in this environment.  
Senior Emergency Management Practitioners 
Recent research investigating the challenges of 
multi-agency coordination in emergency 
management predominantly focused upon 
stakeholders from the core emergency services 
that were typically limited to police, fire and 
ambulance agencies (Bharosa et al., 2010; 
Chen et al., 2008; Militello et al., 2007; Mishra 
et al., 2011). Subsequently, this research 
sought to use a broader sample of senior 
emergency management practitioner‟s from 
agencies that currently fulfil a boundary 
spanning capacity during an emergency event 
requiring a multi-agency approach (see Table 
2). This purposive sampling was deemed most 
appropriate as the research sought to generate 
a sample that would address the research 
questions (Teddlie & Yu, 2007).  
Forty participants that represent the type of 
stakeholders typically found in multi-agency 
coordination were recruited from two strategic 
level emergency operations centres in the 
Australian states of Victoria and Tasmania. In 
Australia strategic emergency management 
arrangements are often conducted at a state 
level from state emergency operations centres. 
Due to unforeseen circumstances one 
participant had to withdraw, therefore, thirty-
nine semi-structured interviews were 
conducted. There are a number of reasons why 
forty participants were chosen. Firstly, it 
follows guidelines for actual sample sizes 
using grounded theory methodology where 
between twenty to fifty interviews was deemed 
a suitable number (Creswell, 1998; Morse, 
1994). Secondly, the research sought to 
investigate a range of stakeholders from 
multiple organizations from a strategic view 
point. Therefore stakeholders involved in state 
level emergency management arrangements 
were only recruited and stakeholders from 
regional or local emergency operations centres 
were excluded from the sample. However, the 
logistical and time constraints of conducting 
in-depth interviews face to face imposed 
limitations on the number of interviews that 
could be conducted within the time frame of 
the study.  
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The research differed from previous 
empirical studies of emergency management 
multi-coordination (e.g. Chen, Sharman, Rao, 
& Upadhyaya, 2008; Militello, Patterson, 
Bowman, & Wears, 2007; Mishra, Allen, & 
Pearman, 2011) and encompassed not only 
emergency service stakeholders but those from 
non-emergency service agencies. Over half of 
the thirty-nine stakeholders interviewed were 
from agencies that are not technically deemed 
an emergency service but who are nevertheless 
required in a multi-agency coordination 
approach. Table 2 indicates that the 
participants in the study can be categorized 
into three distinctive groups: (1) emergency 
service, (2) critical infrastructure, and (3) other 
non-emergency agencies with key roles in 
emergency management coordination. A pilot 
study was conducted to determine the 
suitability of the interview questions (Baker, 
1994).  
TABLE 2 
Participant demographics 
 
Emergency 
Operations 
Centre 
 
 
Emergency 
Service 
(16) 
 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
(12) 
 
Other Non-
Emergency 
Agency (11) 
 
Victoria 
(31) 
 
Police (1) 
 
Water Services 
(2) 
 
Military (1) 
 Ambulance 
(1) 
Communications 
(2) 
Non for profit 
organizations 
(2) 
 Fire (6) Energy (2) Land 
Management 
Agencies (5) 
 State 
Emergency 
Service (4) 
Transport (4)  
  Health (1)  
    
Tasmania 
(8) 
Police (1) Energy (1) Meteorology 
(1) 
 Ambulance 
(1) 
 Land 
Management 
Agencies (2) 
 Fire (1)   
 State 
Emergency 
Service (1) 
 
  
 
All the interviews were scheduled at times 
and places convenient to the participants 
between July and October 2012. Thirty-four 
interviews were conducted face to face and the 
remaining five were conducted by telephone. 
The names of the participants were de-
identified to protect the confidentiality and 
maintain anonymity. Following agreement 
from the participants, the interviews were 
audio taped and subsequently transcribed 
verbatim by a professional transcriber for data 
analysis. The interviews lasted between 24 and 
61 minutes generating transcripts of between 
3,600 and 11,200 words. The interview 
transcripts were returned to the participants for 
checking and to ensure accuracy (Morse et al., 
2002).   
Analysis of Interview Data 
Qualitative research needs to adequately 
display what was performed during the data 
reduction, conclusion drawing and verification 
processes (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Our 
analytical technique allowed for the 
interchange of inductive and deductive 
methods of analysis as described by Eisenhardt 
(1989). This grounded theory approach to 
analysing allowed the researchers to constantly 
compare theory and data. This approach 
enabled two pre-existing theoretical 
frameworks to be specified (see Table 1 and 
Figure 1). Using theory elaboration permitted 
the study design to derive from pre-existing 
frameworks that were guiding the study 
(Bluhm, Harman, Lee, & Mitchell, 2011). 
Theory elaboration can be beneficial to 
designs where no previous conceptualization 
exists (Lee, Mitchell, & Sablynski, 1999). This 
technique was reported by Johnson & Duxbury 
(2010) who used this technique in an 
exploratory case study which sought to 
elaborate and extend the current 
conceptualization of the boundary spanning 
role of expatriates working within the 
Canadian foreign ministry.  It therefore 
appeared appropriate to use this technique in 
this research in an effort to allow for the 
expansion of boundary spanning theory by 
addressing the specific activities in an 
emergency management context. 
The data was analysed using the data 
analysis software QSR-NVivo 10. This 
software can not only provide transparency but 
facilitate the analysis of data, theoretical 
development and presentation of findings 
(Hoover & Koerber, 2011; Hutchison et al., 
2010). Recent empirical research from 
numerous disciplines identified some traits of 
the boundary spanning activities described in 
Ancona & Caldwell‟s (1992) typology. 
Therefore, this typology was used as an 
orientating framework, in conjunction with the 
Core-Task Analysis methodology, for the 
analysis of the data (see Table 1 and Figure 1). 
Based on elements of the Core-Task Analysis 
methodology, practices of collaboration, skill 
and knowledge were used as categories for the 
activities identified in the data. Firstly, the data 
was examined and first-order descriptions of 
boundary spanning activities were categorised 
in the language used by the participants. This 
initially yielded a total of eighteen activities. 
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The next stage involved systematically 
grouping similar data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) 
which reduced the activities to nine. In 
conjunction with this stage the activities were 
compared with the categories in Ancona & 
Caldwell‟s (1992) typology for similarities. 
The activities were assigned to one of the three 
categories adapted from the Core-Task 
Analysis methodology. Data analysis was 
ceased when it became apparent that all the 
data had been assigned to one of the categories 
and no new themes emerged. To ensure 
validity and reliability a predefined coding 
framework was developed by the initial 
researcher. The second researcher reapplied 
the coding framework to the data and using 
Cohen‟s Kappa coefficient statistical 
measurement and achieved an inter-rater 
reliability of 88%. This indicates a substantial 
or good level of agreement (Fleiss, Levin, & 
Paik, 2003; Landis & Koch, 1977). We 
describe the dimensions in the section that 
follows. 
FINDINGS 
Analysis of the data identified nine boundary 
spanning activities of senior emergency 
management practitioners currently working in 
two Australian state level emergency operation 
centres. These are: representative; 
communicator; networker; legitimate enabler; 
information conduit; information analyst; 
resource coordinator; organizational expert; 
and domain expert (see table 3). These 
activities were systematically associated with 
one of the three categories identified in the 
Core-Task Analysis methodology. The 
analysis of the nine boundary spanning 
activities is structured according to their 
association with one of the following three 
categories: collaboration; skill; or knowledge. 
With respect to each category the analysis 
included the features and association of the 
activity with these categories and any 
association with Ancona & Caldwell‟s (1992) 
typology. 
Collaboration 
Core-Task Analysis methodology 
hypothesizes that collaboration contributes to 
reducing the complexity in dynamic situations 
in an effort to enable proper functioning of a 
system (Norros, 2004). The data analysis 
identified that the following four activities 
were associated to this category: representative; 
communicator; networker; and legitimate 
enabler. Each individual activity will be 
described in the following section. 
TABLE 3 
A Typology of Stakeholder‟s Boundary Spanning 
Activities at the Strategic Emergency Management Level 
 
Category 
 
Activity 
 
Percentage of 
participants who 
described the 
activity 
 
 
Collaboration 
 
Representative 
 
51 
 Communicator 36 
 Networker 46 
 Legitimate enabler 
 
36 
Skill Information conduit 72 
 Information analyst 56 
 Resource 
coordinator 
 
44 
Knowledge Organizational 
expert 
62 
 
Domain expert 38 
 
 
Representative 
The most frequently cited activity described by 
the participants within this category was the 
requirement for the stakeholder to represent 
their agency within the supra-organization. 
The collaboration of multiple agencies in a 
state level emergency operations centre often 
requires an agency representative as the lead 
contact. This representative activity is closely 
aligned to the ambassador activity in Ancona 
& Caldwell‟s (1992) typology. It is also 
consistent with the boundary spanning 
activities in other domains that describe the 
boundary spanners ability to provide external 
representation (Johnson & Duxbury, 2010; 
Pilbeam & Jamieson, 2010) as the following 
participant explains:  
“Now whether it‟s VICPOL (Victoria Police) 
or whether it‟s from one of the TELCOS 
(Telecommunication agencies) or something 
like that, they‟ll come in and they‟re there 
representing their organization.” [Participant 
3, Emergency Services, Victoria] 
Within the representative activity a common 
theme was the ability to ascertain how that 
agency could contribute and assist to the 
situation as described by the next participant: 
“So they need to be able to represent our 
organization in a professional manner and 
understand what the other agencies are 
requiring.” [Participant 18, Other Non-
Emergency Agency, Victoria] 
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The ability of agency stakeholders to assist 
the decision makers in an emergency event 
was reliant on their communication skills. 
Communicator 
Communication amongst agencies in 
emergency management multi-agency 
coordination is essential for effective 
collaboration (Comfort, 2007b; Waugh & 
Streib, 2006). The ability to communicate to 
all levels of personnel in an organization is 
evident as an activity in boundary spanning 
literature (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Pilbeam 
& Jamieson, 2010; Williams, 2012). More 
often and consistent with emergency 
management multi-agency coordination is the 
requirement to communicate with personnel 
both horizontally and vertically with multiple 
organizations (Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 
2010). Having the capacity to communicate 
significant information effectively in the 
dynamic environment of emergency 
management is reiterated by the following 
participant: 
 “You have to be able to deliver important 
messages succinctly and not forcefully, but 
you need to be able to deliver the message so 
that other people are aware of the 
importance of it or the impact on other 
organizations. But in saying that you also 
need to be able to listen to other people‟s 
point of view and be able to relate to that or 
be able to go, oh yeah, I can see where 
you‟re coming from.” [Participant 33, 
Emergency Services, Tasmania] 
The importance and ability to converse 
effectively and convincingly with multiple 
stakeholders in order to present the views of 
the agency is imperative in establishing 
relationships with external stakeholders. 
Networker 
Networking is an important activity in the 
collaboration of multiple organizations 
(McEntire, 2004). There is no direct reference 
to the activity of networking in Ancona & 
Caldwell‟s (1992) typology but the ability to 
network has been identified and included as a 
boundary spanning activity within the 
education industry (Pilbeam & Jamieson, 2010; 
Weerts & Sandmann, 2010). The ability to 
establish networks and build a rapport with 
external stakeholders is described by the 
following participant:  
“The type of person I want to put in the there 
is someone who‟s going to get up, walk the 
room, find out who‟s around, work out what 
they‟re doing, more than what‟s written on 
paper and engage with the people they need 
to get the information from or alternatively 
the people that they should feed information 
to and are going to listen to it.” [Participant 
10, Emergency Services, Victoria] 
However, a recurrent theme in this data 
regarding the activity of networking is the 
requirement to form established networks in 
the pre-response phase in an effort to facilitate 
successful negotiations during the actual 
emergency event. This is described by the 
following two participants: 
“The characteristics of a successful person in 
that position are someone who has those 
networks established pre-incident, I think 
that is the real key.” [Participant 25, 
Emergency Services, Victoria] 
“It‟s very difficult for someone to come in 
cold.  Ideally the person will have 
established relationships with the other key 
players from organizations and will be 
familiar and used to working with them.” 
[Participant 39, Other Non-Emergency 
Agency, Tasmania] 
Legitimate enabler 
Boundary spanning invariably requires the 
incumbent to make decisions on a regular 
basis on behalf of their organization (Pilbeam 
& Jamieson, 2010). However, dynamic 
situations such as emergency management 
require action (Norros, 2004) which invariably 
means there is a necessity for stakeholders to 
make things happen. This activity goes beyond 
the simple decision making function. Instead it 
demands that the stakeholder has the authority 
and empowerment to commit to their agency‟s 
actions or be a direct link to the appropriate 
person who can make a decision on behalf of 
the agency. This is particularly evident in the 
activity of resource coordinator where 
stakeholders are expected to have the authority 
or certainly the ability to access a decision 
quickly regarding the potential commitment of 
their agency‟s assets. This activity has a close 
association with the activities of representative 
and resource coordinator which both require 
the stakeholder to have the delegated authority 
to commit to their agency‟s actions. This is 
echoed by the following two participants: 
“So I think it helps to have some authority.  
It doesn‟t have to be too senior but it has to 
also allow the person to be able to make 
decisions and not afraid to make decisions.  
You know, you then don‟t have to start 
running it past the next person, and the next 
person, which just delays the process.  You 
know, if we put a junior ranked person there, 
they‟d be going, gee I‟m not sure if I can or 
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if I have the authority or the delegation to do 
that, so if you put someone in there that can 
make the decision it just speeds up the 
process.” [Participant 11, Emergency 
Services, Victoria] 
“The person who is the liaison has to have 
enough knowledge about our organization 
and be senior enough to be able to make 
decisions if necessary.” [Participant 8, Non-
Emergency Agency, Tasmania] 
Having the authorisation and subsequent 
empowerment to commit to the agency‟s 
actions or the ability to contact a suitable 
person empowered to make a decision on 
behalf of the agency, are reliant on the 
information available to the stakeholder.  The 
importance of the stakeholder‟s ability to 
access information, transmit information, 
analyse information and coordinate resources 
are described in the following category of skill. 
Skill 
The Core-Task Analysis methodology 
theorizes that skill is a process for coping with 
uncertainty in a situation that requires action to 
respond to the problem (Norros, 2004).  In the 
analysis phase three activities were aligned to 
the category of skill: information conduit; 
information analyst; and resource coordinator.  
These three activities all require skill to create 
possibilities to survive (Norros, 2004) in the 
emergency management environment.  
Information conduit 
The most frequently cited activity described by 
all the participants was that of information 
conduit. The skill of scanning the environment 
inside and outside the organization for ideas 
and collecting information from individuals 
outside of the stakeholder‟s agency is well 
described by Ancona & Caldwell (1992). The 
scouting of information encompasses the 
activity of a conduit that not only collates 
information but also disseminates information 
within an organization and across 
organizational boundaries as the following 
participants explain: 
“They‟re there to gather information.  
They‟re there also to present the issues that 
this might create for their organization or the 
information that they actually need to make 
decisions.” [Participant 1, Other Non-
Emergency Agency, Victoria] 
“One of the key things that we would want 
to know is, where‟s our infrastructure and 
where‟s the fire and where‟s the collision 
path?  You‟re going to have to have access 
to our information to get those answers.” 
[Participant 35, Critical Infrastructure, 
Tasmania] 
The data also reveals the close association 
between transmitting information and the 
analysis of information. 
Information analyst 
Of the entire activities discussed in the data, 
information analyst was the third most cited. 
There is no direct reference of the analytical 
capability to interpret information in Ancona 
& Caldwell‟s (1992) typology. Despite this 
there are numerous references identifying the 
importance of this activity in recent literature 
describing the boundary spanning activities in 
the domains of management and education 
(Johnson & Duxbury, 2010; Pilbeam & 
Jamieson, 2010; Sturdy & Wright, 2011; 
Williams, 2012). This activity requires a skill 
in reducing the complexity of the situation. 
Subsequently this activity was placed in the 
category of skill as many of the participants 
felt that the activities of information conduit 
and information analyst were symbiotic as 
described by the following two participants: 
“…what you end up being faced with is lots 
of information and as all that information 
start swirling, you have to be able to process 
what it really means for the agency that I 
represent or what I know that could make a 
difference to the people that I‟m here 
surrounded by in terms of being able to 
filter.” [Participant 17, Critical Infrastructure, 
Victoria] 
“I‟m pretty practised at working out what is 
a priority and what needs to be said for a 
particular thing to occur or a particular 
action or whatever.  I‟m fairly used to that 
but it is really a skill that you need to have to 
sort out the forest from the trees and to be 
able to pick out, ok that was the key.” 
[Participant 7, Other Non-Emergency 
Agency, Victoria] 
The skill of acquiring and analysing the 
necessary and pertinent information was 
intrinsically associated with the activity of 
resource coordinator.  
Resource coordinator 
Ancona & Caldwell (1992) identified the 
boundary spanners ability to lobby for and 
acquire resources for the team and this was 
also identified in this data. Participants 
identified the skills required in the 
coordination of agency resources. In addition, 
the participants often described the necessity 
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for this activity to assist with external agencies 
resourcing requirements to combat the threat.  
As emergency management often requires a 
multi-agency approach, it is not surprising that 
the activity of resourcing should take into 
account not only the stakeholders own agency 
requirements but those of the supra-
organizations resourcing requests as explained 
by the following participant:  
 “A liaison officer is required at a co-
ordination centre to principally talk about the 
assets that we own or have control over 
within the disaster area.  It‟s also to provide 
resources and maybe comment on the 
process that the co-ordination centre is 
taking with regard to the impact on our 
assets or the use of our assets.” [Participant 
28, Critical Infrastructure, Victoria] 
The activity of resource coordinator 
emphasised not only the skill required to fulfil 
this activity but the knowledge requirements 
necessary for completing the activity.     
Knowledge 
Core-Task Analysis methodology (Norros 
2004) hypothesises that knowledge and its 
processes facilitate coping in a complex 
environment and enable reflection on the 
inherent uncertainties in the environment. The 
final two activities of organizational expert 
and domain expert require the stakeholder to 
have knowledge of their own organization and 
the environment they are operating. However, 
these activities have no association with 
Ancona & Caldwell‟s (1992) typology. 
Organizational expert 
The importance of the stakeholder having 
knowledge of their own organization was the 
second most cited activity in this typology. 
This involved the stakeholder‟s ability to be a 
broad subject matter expert regarding their 
own organizations activities, capabilities and 
strategic aims. The functional purpose of this 
activity encompassed the stakeholder‟s ability 
to provide a rapid and succinct profile of their 
organizations abilities as defined by the 
following participants:  
“You have to be a subject matter expert for 
the whole agency and not just for the area 
that you might be involved in for day to day 
business.” [Participant 19, Critical 
Infrastructure, Victoria] 
“You have to have an understanding, really 
of end to end, how your agency business 
works at a high level.  So you don‟t have to 
be an expert, you don‟t have to have done 
everything but you need a good 
understanding.” [Participant 17, Critical 
Infrastructure, Victoria] 
However, synthesis of the data also identified 
the need for stakeholders to have knowledge 
of the external agencies respective roles within 
the emergency management structure and 
understanding their potential requirements. 
Domain expert 
The stakeholder requires knowledge of the 
multiple external agencies involved during the 
specified emergency event and an 
understanding of what those agencies can 
contribute to the event. The stakeholders do 
not necessarily need to know everything about 
every agency but they do require a broad 
understanding of how those agencies 
complement the emergency management 
structure as the following participants explain: 
“…where other agencies play into that mix 
and having that, you know, very strong 
understanding, not to the point where it‟s 
just superficial and what‟s in the book but 
actually practically understanding how other 
agencies roles and functions play into it and 
where you can draw on that strategic 
resource or where the, I guess, the expertise 
might lie for an unknown situation that 
comes about, which of the agencies can you 
go to actually provide that expertise and 
advice back into the mix.” [Participant 9, 
Emergency Services, Victoria] 
“I would expect, and we put our people 
through training either externally and 
internally, to have an understanding of the 
roles and relationships of control agencies 
and how that works with the emergency 
services, between the police and SES (State 
Emergency Service) and all the responsible 
people because learning on the job in the 
middle of a crisis is not the ideal way to 
respond.” [Participant 14, Critical 
Infrastructure, Victoria] 
 
DISCUSSION 
The aim of this research was to explore the 
boundary spanning activities of senior 
emergency management practitioner‟s from 
agencies that currently fulfil a boundary 
spanning capacity in strategic level multi-
agency coordination. This typology represents 
a number of facets that resonate the boundary 
spanning activities described by Ancona & 
Caldwell‟s (1992) typology and have been 
documented in the recent associated literature 
exploring the concept of boundary spanning in 
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multiple disciplines (Drach-Zahavy, 2011; 
Johnson & Duxbury, 2010; Pilbeam & 
Jamieson, 2010; Weerts & Sandmann, 2010; 
Williams, 2012). However, the four activities 
described in Ancona & Caldwell (1992) 
typology would appear too simplistic for the 
complex and dynamic environment of 
emergency management. Consequently, to 
explore the activities in the emergency 
management domain features of the Core-Task 
Analysis methodology have been used. In 
particular the three different types of demands 
(collaboration, skill and knowledge) described 
in the Core-Task Analysis methodology that 
are placed on the workers actions are used as 
categories.   
This research revealed a comprehensive 
typology of nine activities that are critical to 
the emergency management space.  Four of 
these activities were aligned to Ancona & 
Caldwell‟s (1992) typology: representative; 
communicator; information conduit; and 
resource coordinator. However, five of these 
activities have not previously been analysed: 
networking; legitimate enabler; information 
analyst; organizational expert; and domain 
expert. This research explored these five 
activities to ascertain why there are elements 
of boundary spanning activities that are 
distinctive to the study setting.  
Networking is an important activity of the 
boundary spanner in emergency management. 
Effective multi-agency coordination requires 
the synchronised efforts of multiple 
stakeholders (Van Scotter et al., 2012). These 
stakeholders require the ability to network 
with multiple agencies within a temporary 
supra-organization so that linkages can be 
established resulting in an interdependent 
decision-making team (Harrald, 2006; Salmon 
et al., 2011).  The data identified the 
requirement of networking in the pre-event 
phase due to the temporal challenges 
associated with disasters and the subsequent 
challenges of establishing networks in the 
response phase. 
Over a third of participants indicated that 
the activity of legitimate enabler was 
considered in the remit of the stakeholder‟s 
boundary spanning capacity. The data 
suggested stakeholders involved with strategic 
level emergency management multi-agency 
coordination arrangements were delegated the 
necessary authority and subsequently 
empowered to either commit to their agency‟s 
actions or have a direct link with the 
appropriate agency person who can make a 
decision. An issue reiterated among the 
participants was the requirement to do this 
expeditiously. The necessity to rely on rapid 
decision making reflects the temporal 
constraints of emergency management multi-
agency coordination and is documented in the 
associated literature (e.g. Chen et al., 2008; 
Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Smith & Dowell, 2000). 
The temporal challenges in emergency 
management can also be associated with the 
remaining three activities described here.  
The activity of information analyst was not 
described in Ancona & Caldwell‟s (1992) 
typology but is described in earlier boundary 
spanning literature.  The concept of filtering 
and interpreting information to avoid 
information overload for the receiving 
organization is associated with the boundary 
spanner performing a gatekeeper activity 
(Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Ancona & Caldwell, 
1988; Tushman, 1977). The participants in this 
study made frequent references for the 
obligation to provide succinct and pertinent 
information to multiple agencies in a timely 
manner. This is also identified in the 
associated literature (e.g. Comfort et al., 2004; 
Lindgren, Andersson, & Henfridsson, 2008)  
and reiterates not only the temporal challenges 
(Gryszkiewicz & Chen, 2012) but uncertainty 
(Farazmand, 2001) associated with emergency 
management. The advent of technology in 
disaster management information systems has 
increased the amount of information available 
to stakeholders (Janssen et al., 2010; Mishra et 
al., 2011; Vogt et al., 2011). However, due to 
the potential for information system 
incompatibility (Ley et al., 2012) between 
agencies,  some stakeholders have to access 
information from multiple sources and analyse 
this according to their specific information 
requirements (Van de Walle & Turoff, 2008).  
The final two activities of organizational 
expert and domain expert were identified as 
boundary spanning activities in emergency 
management that required organizational and 
domain knowledge. The complexities of 
emergency management require advanced 
knowledge beyond routine environments of 
governance (Farazmand, 2001, 2007).  There 
was an expectation among the participants that 
stakeholders had expert knowledge of not only 
their own organizations but of other 
organizations operating within this 
environment and the obligations regarding the 
emergency management arrangements in this 
domain. Understanding the organizational 
requirements of multiple agencies can be 
challenging in multi-agency coordination 
when agencies may not have a history of 
 Appendix A 
127 
 
working together (Schraagen & Van de Ven, 
2011).  Again due to the temporal constraints 
stakeholders must be familiar with other 
agencies and emergency management 
arrangements in the pre-response phase and 
not rely on learning these factors in the actual 
event where time is often not a luxury. There 
are many similarities between the boundary 
spanning activities in emergency management 
and other domains. However, the dynamic, 
complex and uncertain nature of emergency 
management places demands on the boundary 
spanners work. These boundary spanners may 
have to adopt particular activities related to 
collaboration, skill and knowledge that will 
enhance their capability to manage their 
actions collectively in temporary supra-
organizations and ultimately facilitate multi-
agency coordination.   
CONCLUSION 
Fundamental to the success of spanning 
organizational boundaries and providing the 
linkages between these often disparate 
organizations is the boundary spanner. 
Stakeholders spanning organizational 
boundaries in emergency management may 
need to adopt unique activities to facilitate 
multi-agency coordination. This research 
aimed to identify the activities of boundary 
spanners operating at a strategic level in an 
emergency management context and ascertain 
if these differed to those activities identified in 
other environments. The findings indicate that 
the principal activities of the boundary spanner 
operating at a strategic level in the emergency 
management environment replicate some of 
the activities described by Ancona & 
Caldwell‟s (1992) typology and those that are 
subsequently documented in the boundary 
spanning literature. However, due to 
inadequate linkages, temporal constraints, and 
system incompatibility associated with 
operating in this dynamic and complex 
environment the participants had to embrace 
additional activities to those documented in the 
existing literature. The research identified that 
the activities of networking, legitimate enabler, 
information analyst, organizational expert and 
domain expert were fundamental to the 
success of boundary spanning in emergency 
management and ultimately in accomplishing 
successful collaboration between multiple 
organizations.  
This research has made a theoretical 
contribution to the public administration and 
emergency management literature by 
proposing a typology of boundary spanning 
activities required by stakeholders operating at 
a strategic emergency management level. 
Nevertheless, despite this contribution the 
research was subject to a number of limitations. 
Firstly, the narrowness of the sample and 
specificity of the study setting yielded 
participants from a very unique field poses 
limitations. However, the reason for these 
choices was not to generalize the findings to 
other industries but to elaborate on existing 
theory and generate theory that can be applied 
to public administrators operating in an 
emergency management environment.  It is 
anticipated that the rich data yielded from the 
research resulting in this typology may be 
applicable to emergency management 
operation centres in other regions within 
Australia and within the international 
emergency management community. A further 
limitation of this research is that the 
information from the participants was not 
observed and therefore the findings have not 
been corroborated.  It was not this study‟s 
intent to observe the interaction between 
stakeholders that boundary span in an 
emergency management setting or ascertain if 
the stakeholders engage in overlapping 
boundary spanning activities and if this 
hinders or facilitates their task. Instead, the 
aim of the research was to explore the 
perceived activities of the boundary spanner 
from those personnel fulfilling this 
requirement. Subsequently, this qualitative 
research sought to allow themes to emerge 
from the participants and thus situate them at 
the core of the study  (Gergen & Thatchenkery, 
1996). 
The implications for public administrators 
operating in the field of emergency 
management are evident. Public administrators 
are essential in the majority of emergency 
management events necessitating multi-agency 
coordination. These personnel are therefore 
instrumental in mitigating the risks of the 
disaster to the community.  There is an 
obligation that these stakeholders adopt unique 
boundary spanning activities that may not be 
required in routine environments. We 
recommend that further research is necessary 
to build upon these findings and investigate if 
these boundary spanning activities overlap and 
how this affects the stakeholders work.  
Additional research is also required to 
understand the challenges faced by 
stakeholders undertaking boundary spanning 
in the complex and dynamic environment of 
emergency management. The boundary 
spanner in emergency management is pivotal 
to multi-agency coordination and is only going 
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to become more instrumental with the 
increased frequency of disasters demanding 
the formation of temporary supra-
organizations. 
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Abstract Stakeholders tasked with boundary 
spanning in emergency management are 
fundamental in facilitating multi-agency 
coordination. However, there is a scarcity of 
research investigating the characteristics of 
emergency management boundary spanners and 
how they achieve this function in the complex 
environment of emergency operation centres. An 
exploratory case study approach was adopted and 
applied in a strategic-level emergency operations 
centre. The study used three very different but 
interrelated qualitative research techniques based 
upon the Core-Task Analysis framework to 
categorize the work of stakeholders fulfilling a 
boundary spanning role in this setting. The data 
identified that stakeholders performing boundary 
spanning activities in a strategic-level emergency 
operations centre face a number of constraints. 
These can include unfamiliarity with the work 
domain, its personnel, and structure which can 
lead to temporal, cultural and information 
challenges. In order to manage these constraints, 
boundary spanners working in a strategic-level 
emergency operations centre need to adopt 
certain characteristics in order to accomplish their  
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activities. A significant outcome from the data was 
the necessity to engage in these important 
undertakings in the pre-response phase in an 
effort to facilitate successful multi-agency 
coordination in an actual emergency event. 
 
Keywords Boundary spanning · Emergency 
operations centre · Multi-agency 
coordination · Liaison officer · Emergency 
management · Disaster management 
 
1 Introduction 
Agencies involved in emergency management are 
faced with many challenges as society becomes 
increasingly vulnerable to disasters. Modern day 
disasters are characterized by complexity that 
frequently requires the coordination of multiple 
agencies (Schraagen and Van de Ven 2008; Van 
Scotter et al. 2012). Coordination in emergency 
management is the way in which different 
agencies or parts of the same organization work or 
act together in order to achieve a common 
objective (International Organization for 
Standardization 2011). This coordination 
necessitates the synchronized efforts of a diverse 
collection of public and private agencies (Van 
Scotter et al. 2012) to achieve a shared goal 
tailored to mitigate the consequences of risk to 
the community (Van  Veelen et al. 2006). However, 
coordination in this environment is complex 
because of communication challenges (McEntire 
2002; Comfort and Kapucu 2006; Manoj and Baker 
2007; Aedo et al. 2010), temporal constraints 
(Janssen et al. 2010; Mishra et al. 2011), 
information system incompatibility (Baber et al. 
2007; Ley et al. 2012), differing agency information 
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requirements (Van de Walle and Turoff 2008) and 
organizational linkages between multiple agencies 
that can be dysfunctional (Janssen et al. 2010; 
Salmon et al. 2011; Harrald 2006). These 
complexities require stakeholders involved in 
emergency management multi-agency 
coordination arrangements to overcome these 
constraints. In the Australian context, stakeholders 
tasked with fostering linkages between agencies 
can be called emergency management liaison 
officers. It is important to understand how 
emergency management liaison officers perform 
this role and how we can assist them to improve 
their capacity to undertake this function within 
emergency management multi-agency 
coordination arrangements. 
One notion that is evident in the literature 
which may assist in understanding the work of the 
emergency management liaison officer is the 
concept of boundary spanning. Boundary spanning 
can be described as an individual from one agency 
who is located in an external organization and is 
tasked with bridging the boundaries between 
these agencies to facilitate a collective objective. 
However, the problem is that the concept of 
boundary spanning is not comprehensively 
articulated in the emergency management 
literature. To understand this concept in the 
context of the emergency management liaison 
officer was the requirement for a suitable 
theoretical framework to investigate the 
constraints they may encounter. Emergency 
management multi-agency coordination requires 
the temporary formation of multiple agencies into 
a supra-organization. Multiagency coordination 
within these supra-organizations is often 
multifaceted, unpredictable and often has 
temporal constraints. Core-Task Analysis identifies 
the core-task of a specific working practice. In 
particular, this concept identifies three 
interrelated dimensions that the workers must 
consider in order to achieve their activities in the 
work domain (Norros 2004). These dimensions are 
described as dynamism, complexity and 
uncertainty. These dimensions are evident in 
emergency management, and the concept has 
been applied in other complex working 
environments. However, there is limited research 
available describing the application of Core-Task 
Analysis in an emergency management setting. 
Core-Task Analysis would therefore appear an 
appropriate framework for this research. An 
interesting facet of this research was exploring 
how the analysis of the emergency management 
liaison officer’s work is viewed through the 
concept of boundary spanning using the Core-Task 
Analysis framework. 
Emergency management multi-agency 
coordination can occur at various levels. In the 
Australian context, states and territories are 
responsible for emergency management 
arrangements occurring within that jurisdiction. 
Within a state or territory, there can be three 
levels of multi-agency coordination at the local 
level (termed operational level), regional level 
(termed tactical level) and the state level (termed 
strategic level). This multi-agency coordination can 
take place informally in temporary locations at the 
incident site or in a structured environment such 
as an established emergency operations centre. 
The focus of this study is on the emergency 
management liaison officers tasked with 
performing a boundary spanning role in the 
complex environment of a state-level emergency 
operations centre. 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
This article is structured as follows: Sect. 2 
provides the context of the study and a synopsis of 
the boundary spanning literature. Section 3 
describes the aims of the study and introduces the 
research questions guiding the study. Section 4 
presents the methodology and theoretical 
framework applied in the research. Section 5 
offers the main results, and Sect. 6 provides some 
answers to the research questions guiding the 
article. Finally, Sect. 7 concludes with 
recommendations for future research. 
 
2 Background 
 
This study is part of the Australian Bushfire 
Cooperative Research Centre project Organizing 
for Effective Incident Management which is 
seeking to better understand how emergency 
management multi-agency coordination at a state 
level can be improved in order to reduce the 
consequences to communities of the emergency 
event. An important aspect of this project is how 
multiple agencies coordinate their activities during 
an emergency event. This is of importance 
because of the complexities involved with multi-
agency coordination working together within a 
temporary supra-organization. A central feature of 
this is the various agency emergency management 
liaison officers who span organizational 
boundaries facilitating the linkages between 
agencies. These emergency management liaison 
officers performing boundary spanning activities at 
a state level in an emergency operation centre 
perform a complex role in a challenging 
environment. Despite the importance of this role, 
there is only a limited amount of research 
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concerning boundary spanning in emergency 
management. 
To understand the concept of boundary 
spanning, we must draw on literature from the 
1960s and its origins in open systems theory. Early 
accounts deemed a boundary spanner as a person 
from an individual organization who is located in a 
different external organizational system providing 
linkages between the organizations (Khan et al. 
1964; Katz and Khan 1966; Thompson 1967). This 
initial view of boundary spanning from the open 
systems theory perspective led the way in the 
1970s for empirical research in formal 
organizations and the research and design industry 
(Keller and Holland 1975; Miles 1976; Aldrich and 
Herker 1977; Tushman 1977). In the 1980s, 
research continued and investigated the 
importance of boundary spanning roles in the 
strategic decision-making process in fifteen 
organizations representing three industries, food 
industry, health industry and financial institutions 
(Jemison 1984). Further research was conducted in 
high-technology companies describing and 
classifying a set of fifteen attributes that link a 
group to its external environment (Ancona and 
Caldwell 1988). These fifteen activities included 
modelling, gathering information and resources, 
scanning, feedback seeking, opening up 
communication channels, information, 
coordinating, negotiating, moulding, allowing 
entry, translating, filtering, classifying, delivering 
and protecting (Ancona and Caldwell 1988). 
However, it is not until research is carried out in 
the 1990s that the individual role as opposed to 
the concept of team boundary spanning is 
theorized (Ancona and Caldwell 1992). This 
research produced a typology of four boundary 
spanning activities: ambassador, task coordinator, 
scout and guard. These four activities continue to 
influence current boundary spanning typologies in 
the literature two decades on. The synthesis of the 
typology of boundary spanning activities defined 
by Ancona and Caldwell (1992) is evident in 
contemporary empirical research that explores the 
boundary spanning roles in a multitude of 
disciplines (see for examples Drach- Zahavy 2011; 
Johnson and Duxbury 2010; Pilbeam and Jamieson 
2010; Weerts and Sandmann 2010; Williams 
2012). However, the majority of this research is 
confined to routine environments, and therefore, 
the findings may not be applicable to the complex 
and dynamic environment of emergency 
management. 
The literature does make several references to 
the concept of boundary spanning in the context 
of emergency management. This is often in 
reference to the sharing and exchange of 
information between agencies, particularly with 
the notion of multi-agency coordination. However, 
the volume of literature investigating this in an 
emergency management context is limited. Kreps 
and Bosworth (1993) identify three dimensions of 
role enactment. These were status-role nexus, role 
links and role performance. These three 
dimensions were developed from archival 
materials from the Disaster Research Center 
featuring 257 participants in 196 organized 
responses during the emergency period of 
disasters. In particular, within the dimension of 
role links, the research makes reference to 
boundary spanning and individuals forming links 
with external agency representatives during an 
organized response (Kreps and Bosworth 1993). 
However, the article aims to describe role 
enactment in an emergency management context 
and does not go beyond this basic description of 
boundary spanning and the general association 
with providing links to other agencies in disasters. 
This research will further explore how emergency 
management liaison officers facilitate these 
linkages and constraints they face in fulfilling this 
role. 
Chen et al. (2008) proposed a framework to 
analyse coordination patterns in the emergency 
response arena. This was based primarily on thirty-
two interviews with emergency response 
personnel. One aspect of the framework explains 
that during emergency coordination the responder 
may fulfil a boundary spanning capability to fulfil 
coordination mechanism requirements (Chen et al. 
2008). However, this is the only direct reference to 
boundary spanning in the entire article. Similarly, 
in his review of inter-organizational and 
cooperation that may be required during an 
emergency event, Granot (1997) makes a single 
reference to boundary spanning. In this research, 
he defines boundary spanning in the context of 
emergency management and how it may be useful 
for exchanging ideas and information among 
stakeholders with similar interests (Granot 1997). 
Contemporary research conducted by McGuire 
and Silva (2010) explored intergovernmental 
collaboration in emergency events. Using a data 
set of more than 400 county-level emergency 
management agencies in the USA, they investigate 
how public managers are required to work across 
organizational boundaries in collaborative 
networks during emergency events (McGuire and 
Silva 2010). The article only makes scant reference 
to the concept of boundary spanning but 
recognizes the importance of spanning 
organizational boundaries in an emergency 
management scenario. 
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It is perhaps Kapucu (2006, 2011) and Kapucu 
and Van Wart (2006) who makes most reference 
to the concept of emergency management 
boundary spanning in the literature. Kapucu (2006) 
firstly identifies the boundary spanner as someone 
who is associated with communication and 
information technologies among organizations in 
an effort to achieve effective decision-making in 
emergency events. Additionally, using empirical 
data from Hurricane Charley in 2004 and the world 
trade centre terrorist attacks in 2011, Kapucu and 
Van Wart (2006) analyse the role of the public 
sector in dealing with catastrophic disasters. In the 
article, the effectiveness of boundary spanning 
agencies was one of four areas identified as critical 
for high performance in emergency events 
(Kapucu and Van Wart 2006). However, this 
description of boundary spanning was in the 
context of team boundary spanning and not that 
of individual boundary spanning. Finally, following 
a comprehensive literature review, Kapucu (2011) 
analyses the current structure of international 
disaster relief organizations and identifies the 
main actors in the system. Exploring the work of 
the actors in this environment, he associates the 
concept of boundary spanning with developing 
relationships with other institutional members via 
networks (Kapucu 2011). However, it would 
appear that it was not the intention of these 
articles to comprehensively explore boundary 
spanning in emergency management. Despite 
making numerous references to boundary 
spanning in the context of interagency or 
collaborative networks, this research does not 
provide any comprehensive description on the 
roles of the boundary spanner in emergency 
management. It is perhaps Bharosa et al. (2011) 
who provide further explanation of the concept of 
boundary spanning in emergency management. 
Based upon observations from field studies, 
Bharosa et al. (2011) identified the role of 
someone they termed an information orchestrator. 
An information orchestrator is someone who 
interacts with multiple agencies taking care of the 
information requirements that are beyond the 
boundary of a single agency (Bharosa et al. 2011). 
In this research, an information orchestrator 
requires ten necessary capabilities to assure 
information quality in public safety networks. 
These ten capabilities include: quality auditing; 
boundary spanning; information libraries; web-
service composition; enrichment; anticipation; 
information categorization; expertise gathering 
and consultation; reach back; and information 
quality feedback (Bharosa et al. 2011). Despite the 
relevance of this article to boundary spanning in 
emergency management, it needs to be 
acknowledged that this research only investigates 
the concept of boundary spanning in the context 
of assuring information quality. Consequently, 
there is clearly a void in the literature that 
comprehensively investigates the multitude of 
boundary spanning roles in emergency 
management. Finally and in reference to the need 
for further research on this topic, Janssen et al. 
(2010), in an introduction to a special issue on 
advances in multi-agency disaster management, 
designate the importance of boundary spanning in 
emergency management. ‘‘In spite of their crucial 
role, little is known about how boundary spanners 
influence cross-agency coordination and their 
effectiveness for disaster management success’’ 
(Janssen et al. 2010, p. 4). 
 
3 Study aims and research questions 
 
A lack of empirical research on boundary spanning 
warrants further investigation of this topic. 
Therefore, this empirical research had to adopt an 
exploratory approach. The main aim of this study 
was to examine and illustrate the work of 
stakeholders fulfilling a boundary spanning role in 
emergency management. In emergency 
management operation centres in Australia, these 
stakeholders can be termed emergency 
management liaison officers. To study this topic 
empirically, we specifically focused upon state-
level multi-agency coordination arrangements 
undertaken in an emergency operations centre. To 
accomplish this objective, we formulated the 
following three research questions: 
 
1. What is the emergency management liaison 
officer’s role when working at a state-level 
emergency operations centre? 
2. What are the challenges encountered by the 
emergency management liaison officers working in 
this domain? 
3. How do emergency management liaison officers 
enact when faced with these demanding 
conditions? 
 
4 Methods 
 
An exploratory case study was undertaken to 
examine and report the content of the emergency 
management liaison officer’s work in a state-level 
emergency operations centre. This research is the 
culmination of over 12-months of work conducted 
in the study setting. This section will describe how 
this exploratory case study was conducted and 
how it is structured. Firstly, the methodological 
framework chosen for this study 
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Table 1 Participant demographics 
 
 
will be outlined. Secondly, an overview of the 
study setting will be presented. Next, the details of 
the three different but interrelated qualitative 
techniques used for the study will be discussed. 
Finally, the data analysis phase will be explained. 
 
4.1 Core-Task Analysis 
 
The approach of this exploratory case study was 
based upon the Core-Task Analysis (Norros 2004) 
framework. The aim of Core-Task Analysis is to 
identify the core-task of a specific working practice. 
The concept of the core-task indicates the 
objectives and the outcome of work that should be 
accounted for by the workers in everyday task 
performance. Core-Task Analysis adopts a systemic 
notion of human activity where the situated 
actions are conceived from an ecological, human–
environment interaction perspective (Norros 
2004). Core-Task Analysis was developed in studies 
conducted in several complex and dynamic 
working environments. These include nuclear 
power plant operations, anaesthesia and the 
navigation of large ships (Norros 2004). The 
methodology has continued to be applied in 
complex working environments involving 
automated train systems (Karvonen et al. 2011) 
and communication network operations (Norros et 
al. 2013). 
Core-Task Analysis takes into account three 
interrelated dimensions that the workers must 
take into account to achieve their activities in the 
work domain, dynamism, complexity and 
uncertainty. In order to manage these dimensions, 
workers need collaboration, skill and knowledge 
(Norros 2004). When each of the dimensions is 
examined through these means the core-task  
 
 
demands of the work become apparent. The red 
dots with accompanying explanations in Fig. 2 
represent the six generic core-task demands. In 
addition, Norros (2014) has recently further 
elaborated on the Core-Task Analysis framework 
so that the connections between the 
environmental constraints and the human 
resources are now explicitly addressed (Norros 
2014). This research utilizes the framework 
described in Norros (2004) which hypothesizes 
that collaboration contributes to reducing the 
complexity in dynamic situations in an effort to 
enable proper functioning of a system. It also 
theorizes that skill is a process for coping with 
uncertainty in a situation that requires action to 
respond to the problem. Finally, Core-Task 
Analysis hypothesizes that knowledge and its 
processes facilitate coping in a complex 
environment and enable reflection on the inherent 
uncertainties in the environment (Norros 2004). 
Based on the applicability of these dimensions to 
emergency management, it would appear that this 
was an appropriate framework to apply in an 
emergency operations centre because of the 
multifaceted, unpredictable and often temporal 
challenges that are encountered in these 
temporary supra-organizations. Furthermore, 
investigating the boundary spanning working 
practices of the emergency management liaison 
officer in this environment draws upon various 
characteristics. Applying the dimensions of 
collaboration, skill and knowledge may also assist 
in exploring the mechanisms adopted by these 
stakeholders in overcoming the constraints they 
face in facilitating emergency management 
multiagency coordination. 
 
 
Qualitative technique  
 
Emergency services  
 
Critical Infrastructure 
 
Other agencies 
 
Individual interviews (31 pax) 
 
Police - 1 
Fire - 6 
SES - 4 
Ambulance - 1 
Water – 2 
Energy – 2 
Transport – 4 
Communications – 2 
Health – 1  
Land management – 5 
Military – 1 
Non-Government 
Organization – 2 
 
Observational studies (12 pax) 
 
Police - 2 
Fire - 1 
Ambulance – 1 
 
Water – 1 
Energy – 2 
Transport – 1 
Communications – 2 
Health – 1  
 
Federal agency – 1 
 
Focus group interviews (15 pax) 
 
Police - 1 
Fire - 2 
SES - 2 
Ambulance - 1 
Water – 1 
Energy – 1 
Transport – 3 
Communications – 1 
Health – 1  
Land management – 2 
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4.2 Study setting 
 
The study setting used for this research was the 
Victorian State Control Centre in Australia. This 
state-level emergency operations centre is the hub 
of eight regional and more than forty local incident 
control centres across the state that supports 
emergency services during major emergencies. 
The emergency operations centre has a multi-
agency and multi-hazard approach to emergency 
events in the state. Upon the highest levels of 
activation, the emergency operations centre will 
routinely operate 24 h a day with up to ninety 
personnel at any one time representing more than 
twenty agencies. The emergency management 
liaison officers are co-located in the emergency 
operations centre. However, due to space 
limitations in the main operations room and the 
subsequent requirement for flexible seating 
arrangements, some emergency management 
liaison officers may be located in an adjacent room. 
This adaptability of seating arrangements ensures 
that emergency management liaison officers that 
are essential at that particular moment of the 
incident are located in the main room versus those 
that are located in the adjacent room that may not 
be as critical at that particular time. This 
adaptability of seating arrangements is dependent 
on the particular emergency event. The 
emergency management liaison officers working 
at the emergency operations centre represent, but 
are not limited to the following three groups of 
agencies. The emergency services such as fire 
agencies, police and ambulance. Critical 
infrastructure agencies such as water services, 
telecommunication and energy agencies. Finally, 
emergency management liaison officers may 
represent a multitude of other agencies such as 
non-for profit organizations, the military and land 
management agencies (Table 1). 
 
4.3 Qualitative techniques 
 
To triangulate the findings from the data, three 
qualitative techniques were adopted. These were 
individual interviews, observational studies and 
focus group interviews. In addition to these 
techniques, the study involved visiting the 
emergency operations centre in the planning 
stages. This preparatory phase allowed the 
researchers to familiarize and acquaint themselves 
with the work domain that the emergency 
management liaison officers would be expected to 
work. This aspect of the preparatory phase 
allowed for the immersion in the work domain and 
also enabled the research team to learn about 
information systems and specific terminology that 
would be used in the emergency operations centre. 
 
4.3.1 Individual interviews 
 
The first qualitative study involved thirty-one 
semi-structured interviews with emergency 
management liaison officers who undertake this 
role within a multi-agency approach at the 
emergency operations centre (see Table 1). As 
described previously, the emergency operations 
centre can accommodate more than ninety 
personnel at any one time representing more than 
twenty agencies. The purposive sampling of 
participants was deemed most appropriate as the 
interviews sought to generate a sample that would 
address the research questions (Teddlie and Yu 
2007). The questions were first piloted to 
determine the suitability (Baker 1994). All the 
interviews were scheduled at times and places 
convenient to the participants. Twenty-six 
interviews were conducted face-to-face, and the 
remaining five were conducted by telephone. The 
names of the participants were de-identified to 
protect the confidentiality and maintain 
anonymity. However, the participant’s agency 
remained visible and was grouped into one of 
three following categories: emergency services; 
critical infrastructure; and other agencies. This 
allowed the different services to be identified. The 
interviews were audio recorded and transcribed 
verbatim by a professional transcriber for data 
analysis. The interviews lasted between 24 and 61 
min generating transcripts of between 3,600 and 
11,200 words. This resulted in a total of 66 h and 
31 min of individual interviews generating a total 
data set of 181,993 words. The interview 
transcripts were returned to the participants for 
checking and to ensure accuracy (Morse et al. 
2002). Any alterations made by the participants 
were changed in the transcript prior to data 
analysis. 
 
4.3.2 Observational studies 
 
The second phase of the qualitative study was the 
observational component conducted under two 
different conditions in the study setting. The first 
was conducted over the course of a day during a 
state-level multi-agency coordination exercise 
where the in-depth observation of two emergency 
management liaison officers was carried out. This 
culminated in a total of 8 h of observations with 
the two participants. The second observational 
study was conducted during activation of the 
emergency operations centre during an actual 
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Fig. 1 Main operations room in the Victorian State Control 
Centre in Australia 
 
large-scale emergency event. The latter 
observations were conducted over 2 days, and a 
total of ten emergency management liaison 
officers were observed. This second stage of the 
observational study concluded in a total of 16 h of 
real-time observations witnessing the emergency 
management liaison officers performing their role 
in a live incident. The observational study allowed 
for the observation of the emergency 
management liaison officers undertaking their 
normal work during operations requiring a multi-
agency coordination approach. Due to privacy and 
security barriers, no video or audio recordings 
were conducted during the observational studies. 
However, comprehensive field notes together with 
a series of questions regarding the emergency 
management liaison officers work were posed to 
all the participants at scheduled times throughout 
the observational period. In conjunction with 
these data collection methods, opportunistic 
conversations with the participants were also 
completed and documented (Fig. 1). 
 
4.3.3 Focus group interviews 
 
The final qualitative technique used in this 
research was a series of focus group interviews. 
The rationale for conducting focus groups was 
twofold. Firstly, they were used to collect 
qualitative data from a small group of participants 
by informal group discussion that focused on a 
particular topic (Onwuegbuzie et al. 2009). 
Secondly, it was used as an opportunity to further 
explore the emergency management liaison 
officer’s work in multi-agency coordination and 
elaborate on any associated constraints identified 
in the individual interviews and observational 
studies. Two focus groups were conducted with a 
total of fifteen participants. The focus group 
interviews were conducted at the study setting 
location. A member of the emergency operations 
centre’s management team facilitated each focus 
group interview with one of the research team 
present to introduce the topic for discussion. The 
sample for the focus groups was drawn from 
previous participants in the study. Due to 
unforeseen circumstances, two participants had to 
withdraw but were replaced by a colleague who 
would also be expected to fulfil the emergency 
management liaison officer role. Both focus group 
interviews were audio recorded, and each 
participant was identified by a pseudonym. This 
maintained anonymity and confidentiality of the 
participants. The audio recordings were 
transcribed verbatim by a professional transcriber. 
The focus group interviews lasted 90 and 105 min, 
respectively, generating transcripts of 12,200 and 
15,000 words. 
 
4.4 Data analysis 
 
The analytical technique used in this research was 
based upon the Core-Task Analysis framework 
(Norros 2004). The data were analysed using the 
data analysis software QSR-NVivo 10 that can 
facilitate the analysis of data and theoretical 
development (Hutchison et al. 2010; Hoover and 
Koerber 2011). The research was exploratory in 
nature, and the study design was derived from a 
pre-existing framework that guided the study 
(Bluhm et al. 2011). Using this grounded theory 
approach allowed for the interchange of inductive 
and deductive methods of analysis (Eisenhardt 
1989). 
The individual interviews asked the participants 
to identify the challenges they faced in their role 
and what they recognized as important tasks for 
the emergency management liaison officer 
working in a state-level emergency operations 
centre. The analysis of the individual interviews 
used the three dimensions workers have to 
consider when operating in the work domain as 
defined in the Core-Task Analysis theoretical 
framework. These were collaboration, skill and 
knowledge and were used when classifying the 
emergency management liaison officer’s task in 
the work domain. Similarly, the dimensions 
defined as dynamism, complexity and uncertainty 
that the participants must take into account to 
achieve their activities in the work domain were 
used as a guide when identifying the constraints of 
operating in the emergency operations centre. The 
structure of Core-Task Analysis can lead to 
identification of the tasks and constraints 
encountered by emergency management liaison 
officers. This phase of data analysis therefore 
examined the tasks and constraints of the 
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participants and focused upon defining 
appropriate categories. Firstly, the individual 
interview data were examined and first-order 
descriptions of boundary spanning tasks and the 
constraints faced in the work domain was 
categorized in the language used by the 
participants. Collectively, these two themes 
identifying the tasks and constraints faced by the 
emergency management liaison officer initially 
yielded a total of thirty-five categories, eighteen 
pertaining to the tasks and seventeen concerning 
the constraints. The next stage involved 
systematically grouping similar data (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998) which reduced the tasks to nine 
categories and the constraints to seven categories. 
In conjunction with this stage, the data were 
examined in the light of the Core-Task Analysis 
framework. Data analysis was ceased when 
saturation was reached, and it became apparent 
that all the data had been assigned to one of the 
categories and no new categories emerged. To 
ensure validity and reliability a predefined coding 
framework was developed by the initial researcher. 
One of the other two authors reapplied the coding 
framework to the data and using Cohen’s kappa 
coefficient statistical measurement achieved an 
inter-rater reliability of 87.5 % indicating a 
substantial level of agreement (Landis and Koch 
1977; Fleiss et al. 2003). 
Data yielded from the observational studies 
were used to consolidate the findings from the 
individual interviews and focus group interviews. 
The focus group interviews asked the participants 
to nominate the constraints encountered when 
working as an emergency management liaison 
officer in a state-level emergency operations 
centre. The data from the two focus group 
interviews were analysed and grouped into the 
categories that emerged from the individual 
interviews. If any data were did not match these 
categories, a new category was created. When all 
the data had been assigned to a category and no 
new categories emerged, then the data analysis 
was concluded. The data from the focus group 
interviews consolidated the findings in the 
individual interviews and presented some new 
areas of interest that are described in the findings 
section. 
 
5 Results 
 
The results section consists of three main 
segments that provide the findings to the research 
questions. These results are based on a 
combination of the three qualitative research 
techniques described earlier. First, the emergency 
management liaison officer’s task in the work 
domain is presented. Second, an overview is given 
of the constraints associated with functioning in 
the work domain. Finally, the techniques used by 
the participants to address the challenges of 
operating in the work domain are explored. 
 
5.1 Emergency management liaison officer’s tasks 
 
Based on the data collected from the studies, it 
was identified that the overarching task of the 
emergency management liaison was providing 
linkages between often disparate agencies. For the 
purposes of this paper, this task shall be called 
boundary spanning. The data indicated that this 
boundary spanning task encompassed nine 
different activities. These included representative, 
communicator, networker, legitimate enabler, 
information conduit, information analyst, resource 
coordinator, organizational expert and domain 
expert. Table 2 provides examples of actual 
participant’s views from the data that were coded 
into the particular categories of the emergency 
management liaison officer activities. The table 
also groups the activities into one of the three 
dimensions, collaboration, skill and knowledge, as 
identified in the Core-Task Analysis framework 
that the participants have to consider when 
working in the emergency operations centre. In 
addition, the table indicates the percentage of 
descriptions that were similar in nature found 
from the interview data. However, as the data 
revealed, the boundary spanning task required by 
emergency management liaison officers in a state-
level emergency level emergency operations 
centre has numerous constraints due to the 
dynamism, complexity and uncertainty that is 
associated with this type of work domain. 
 
5.2 Domain constraints 
 
As described previously in the methods section, 
the Core- Task Analysis framework acknowledges 
that the work domain is intrinsically characterized 
by demands related either to dynamism, 
complexity or to uncertainty. On the basis of the 
data, it was possible to identify and group the 
main categories identified by the participants as 
constraints into one of these three demands. The 
demand described as dynamism related to the 
actual emergency event and in particular the 
temporal challenges that are associated with 
working in this setting. The second demand of 
complexity highlighted the constraints 
encountered by emergency management liaison 
officers when functioning in a temporary supra-
organization that comprised of multiple agencies. 
This included both cultural challenges and the
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Table 2 Boundary spanning activities of the emergency management liaison officer 
 
Dimension Activity Participants 
who described 
the activity (%) 
Function Participant description 
Collaboration Representative 74 Perform an 
ambassadorial role 
on behalf of their 
home organization 
So they need to be able to represent our 
organization in a professional manner and 
understand what the other agencies are 
requiring. (Participant from non-government 
organization) 
 
 Communicator 32 Enabling effective 
communication 
across organizational 
boundaries 
…during disasters we have stakeholder bridges 
and we’ll communicate information so we’re 
getting the latest intelligence on a disaster 
impacted area. 
(Participant from a communications agency) 
 
 Networker 48 Foster effective 
relationships with 
external 
organizations 
…our job is to form relationships with people 
and other agencies in the emergency 
management field and maintain those 
relationships so we’re a better able to deal with 
them…in the event of an incident. (Participant 
from the military) 
 
 Legitimate 
Enabler 
42 Authority and 
empowerment to 
commit to their 
agency’s actions or 
direct link with a 
decision-maker 
…they may not be the most senior person that 
can make a decision but they have to be 
someone that’s senior enough to be able to talk 
to decision makers. (Participant from the state 
emergency 
services) 
 
Skill Information 
conduit 
74 Two-way exchange 
of information across 
organizational 
boundaries 
The core would be…ensuring effective 
information flow that’s relevant to your agency 
and providing information out to the agency 
you’re working with… (Participant from a fire 
service agency) 
 
 Information 
analyst 
58 Interpret information 
into meaningful facts 
for the home 
organization 
Emergency management liaison officers need to 
make a judgement about what information is 
essential to their agency that enables good 
decision-making… (Participant from a land 
management agency) 
 
 Resource 
coordinator 
42 Coordinate 
resourcing requests 
from the supra-
organization 
The key aspects are probably understanding and 
communicating the resources at your disposal 
that may actually assist the control agency. 
(Participant from a fire service agency) 
 
Knowledge Organizational 
expert 
65 Able to provide 
advice on their own 
organizations 
activities, capabilities 
are strategic aims 
So you need to be around the organization long 
enough and understand its structure, its 
capability, its capacity, especially from a tactical 
perspective. (Participant from a fire service 
agency) 
 
 Domain expert 48 Provide expertise to 
home 
organization 
regarding the 
emergency 
management 
framework 
…so a knowledge of the organization structure 
they’re using to respond to that particular 
incident at a State level I think is important. 
(Participant 
from a water agency) 
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participant’s unfamiliarity of working in a multi-
agency environment. The final demand of 
uncertainty acknowledged the multiple 
information challenges associated with working in 
a state-level emergency operations centre. The 
constraints identified in the individual interviews 
were corroborated with the findings from the 
observational studies and focus group interviews. 
 
5.2.1 Dynamism 
 
Findings from the data indicated that due to the 
dynamism associated with emergency 
management events and subsequent fast-action 
requirements, these lead to the participants 
encountering temporal constraints. This was 
characterized by the expectation from the lead 
agencies that emergency management liaison 
officers could provide information promptly and 
also stipulated the requirement to make a decision 
quickly. In this dynamic environment, there was an 
expectation among the participants that if they 
were asked to make a decision regarding their own 
agency’s intent, then they should be able to access 
a decision quickly as described by the following 
participant: 
 
So if police or the fire agency want some 
information, we would have someone to say, 
yes, our agency can do that or no we can’t do 
it now but we’ll be able to provide you an 
update in whatever time frame they stipulate. 
(Participant from a non-government 
organization) 
 
The fast-action requirements necessary to 
work in this environment were compounded by 
the complexity of working in a multi-agency 
environment. 
 
5.2.2 Complexity 
 
The creation of multiple agencies into a temporary 
supraorganizations is complex and consequently 
presented numerous constraints for emergency 
management liaison officers operating in this 
environment. A constraint identified in this study 
was the cultural challenges of working in the 
emergency operations centre. Elements of the 
data revealed that some agencies integrated into 
the temporary supra-organization with less 
challenges than other agencies. The social identity 
of the emergency management liaison officer was 
designated as a limiting factor by participants 
fulfilling this role. Rank and file agencies that 
predominantly wear a uniform often with their 
rank displayed such as the emergency services are 
instantly recognizable to anyone working in the 
environment. This can assist in legitimizing their 
role and presence in the emergency operations 
centre. This was explained by the following 
participant: 
 
… you turn up with a shirt and tie, people 
haven’t got a clue how long you’ve been in, 
what you know or what courses you’ve 
done…whereas if you’re wearing a uniform, 
it’s already inferred. (Participant from a 
transport agency) 
 
Emergency services agencies that may have a 
history of working together in emergency events 
can also have similar working practices compared 
to those agencies that may be requested to assist 
in emergency events less frequently. 
The data highlighted the silo mentality of some 
agencies that do not have an understanding of 
other agencies functions and requirements. 
Emergency services are virtually always present in 
an emergency operations centre during an 
emergency event, often with a 24-h presence. This 
is in contrast with some non-emergency agencies 
that may only be required in the emergency 
operations centre for a limited duration as 
requested. The data highlighted that there was an 
expectation by some emergency services that 
nonemergency agencies would send a stakeholder 
when requested. However, this was not always 
possible in the time frame expected by the 
emergency services due to the human resourcing 
challenges faced by non-emergency agencies that 
often do not have a designated emergency 
management team. Additionally, the physical 
location and in particular the seating 
arrangements within the emergency operations 
centre could pose some constraints. Participants 
representing non-emergency services who were 
occasionally located outside of the main 
operations room, which historically and culturally 
was considered the territory of the emergency 
services, identified not been located in the main 
room as a potential challenge as described by the 
following participant. 
 
…you could be quite resented (when working 
in an emergency operations centre) and that’s 
why we were not on the main floor…however, 
the challenge wasn’t being in the back room, 
the challenge was getting them (the 
emergency services) to understand what we 
can offer. (Participant from a communications 
agency) 
A lack of physical presence in the main 
operations room led to some participants feeling 
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that their presence in the emergency operations 
centre was undervalued compared to other 
agencies such as the emergency services. Some of 
the cultural challenges identified with working in a 
temporary supra-organization could also be 
associated with an unfamiliarity with the work 
domain and subsequent uncertainty of certain 
operational requirements. 
 
5.2.3 Uncertainty 
 
An unfamiliarity with working in a multi-agency 
environment and infrequency of some emergency 
management liaison officers to participate in 
temporary supra-organizations at a state-level 
emergency operations centre presented 
challenges. The most identified constraint 
associated with unfamiliarity of the operating 
environment was associated with information 
uncertainty. Due to the relative infrequency of 
activation, the presence of emergency 
management liaison officers required to 
participate in the multi-agency coordination 
efforts may be sporadic depending on the type 
and duration of the emergency event. The 
emergency services will invariably have more 
exposure to the emergency operations centre than 
other non-emergency agencies. However, 
prolonged events over days and weeks can require 
the continuous attendance of stakeholders at the 
emergency operations centre. These emergency 
management liaison officers may be 
unaccustomed to this work domain and multi-
agency coordination structures, and in particular, 
the information systems used in the emergency 
operations centre. 
The multiple constraints identified in the data 
concerning information often led to information 
uncertainty for some emergency management 
liaison officers. The triangulation of findings from 
the data identified that a lack of familiarity with 
information technology systems within the 
working environment was constraining and led to 
uncertainty regarding the information 
requirements of some participants. The 
emergency operations centre in this case study 
uses multiple information technology systems to 
collate and disseminate information. A lack of 
interoperability of information system among the 
various agencies resulted in some participants 
suffering information insufficiency. This was also 
documented in the observations in the study 
setting conducted during the real-life emergency 
event. Various participants in the individual 
interviews identified a lack of familiarity with 
information technology, and in particular, a lack of 
interoperability as a constraining as defined by the 
following participant: 
 
Information technology is a challenge because 
there’s no interoperability between the 
agencies at all really… we don’t know how to 
operate the sites properly so you see a limited 
amount (of data) but you can’t have a finite 
number of screens operating at the same time. 
(Participant from the police service) 
 
In contrast to information insufficiency, the 
data also highlighted the problem of information 
overload. This could be attributed to a lack of 
understanding of the various emergency 
management liaison officers’ specific information 
requirements with some participants describing 
that much of the information they received was 
not relevant to their needs. Information available 
from the emergency operations centre and 
information disseminated by the emergency 
management liaison officers’ back into their own 
agency’s information systems are crucial. Any 
information uncertainty can impede the 
emergency management liaison officer from 
successfully fulfilling their tasks. 
 
5.3 Mastery 
 
Adopting the expertise necessary to address the 
Core- Task Analysis features of dynamism, 
complexity and uncertainty in the work domain 
required the stakeholders to incorporate 
collaboration, skill and knowledge into their 
working practices (Norros 2004). Stakeholders 
required a combination of collaboration and skill 
to overcome the dynamism associated with 
working in the emergency operations centre (see 
Fig. 2). The data identified that the temporal 
challenges of multi-agency coordination required 
the partnership of numerous agencies that could 
make decisions quickly. These fast action 
requirements often necessitated that the 
emergency management liaison officer located 
within the emergency operations centre had the 
authority and empowerment to access a decision 
to commit to their agency’s actions. Working in a 
dynamic environment also entailed that the 
emergency management liaison officers could 
work under time pressure, a skill that is essential 
when operating in emergency events that are 
often unpredictable and subject to change without 
warning. 
Emergency management liaison officers 
required collaboration to address the complexity 
that was associated with multi-agency 
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Fig. 2 Managing the core-task demands of an emergency management liaison officer 
 
coordination in the work domain. By networking in 
the pre-response phase and establishing linkages 
with the other agencies and particularly other 
stakeholders involved in the multi-agency 
coordination efforts, the participants addressed 
some of the cultural challenges associated with 
functioning in the work domain. In combination 
with collaboration, emergency management 
liaison officers required specific knowledge in an 
effort to address the knowledge of other agencies 
roles that are located in the emergency operations 
centre, and finally knowledge of the emergency 
management structure and arrangements in the 
specified emergency operations centre. 
Addressing the constraint of information 
uncertainty required the emergency management 
liaison officers to draw upon certain knowledge 
and skill. Having previous exposure to the 
emergency operations centre reduced some of the 
information uncertainties. Knowledge of 
information systems gained from prior 
deployment, involvement in multi-agency 
exercising, or prior orientation to the emergency 
operations centre enabled some participants to 
overcome some of the uncertainty related to 
information challenges due to familiarity with the 
information systems. Acquiring the skills of 
collating, disseminating and analysing information 
assisted in addressing the challenges of 
information overload and consistency of 
information. The emergency management liaison 
officer’s ability to analyse information allowed 
them to not only disseminate pertinent 
information to their own agency but to that of 
other agencies requiring the information in the 
emergency operations centre. 
 
6 Discussion 
 
The aim of this research was to investigate the 
work of emergency management liaison officers 
fulfilling a boundary spanning role in emergency 
management. The study explored this from the 
context of emergency management liaison officers 
working in a state-level emergency operations 
centre. The results presented previously provide 
some explanation to the questions that were 
proposed in section three of the article. 
Emergency management multi-agency 
coordination necessitates the collaboration of 
numerous agencies to mitigate the consequences 
of risk to the community. In a state-level 
emergency operations centre, numerous 
emergency management liaison officers from 
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multiple agencies provide linkages to other 
agencies. However, performing the task of an 
emergency management liaison officer in a state-
level emergency operations centre is demanding 
and the role is multifaceted. The concept of 
boundary spanning in an emergency management 
context is related to the first research question 
concerning the emergency management liaison 
officers work in a state-level emergency 
operations centre. 
In an effort to provide an answer the first 
research question, the analysis revealed nine 
activities that are associated with spanning the 
boundaries of multiple agencies in emergency 
management. Some of these activities, such as 
representative, communicator, information 
conduit, networker, information analyst and 
resource coordinator activities, have been 
described in previous boundary spanning research 
(see for examples Aldrich and Herker 1977; 
Tushman 1977; Ancona and Caldwell 1992; Weerts 
and Sandmann 2010; Johnson and Duxbury 2010; 
Pilbeam and Jamieson 2010; Sturdy and Wright 
2011; Williams 2012). However, due to the 
complexity, dynamism and uncertainty associated 
with emergency management, not all of these 
explanations of the activities were directly 
transferable to this environment. Therefore, the 
description of boundary spanning activities in this 
research experienced some modifications to 
previous definitions that were often only 
applicable to stable working environments. In 
particular, the emerging activities of legitimate 
enabler, organizational expert and domain expert 
highlighted some of the unique requirements 
required by boundary spanners working in this 
state-level emergency operations centre. 
Emergency management liaison officers fulfilling a 
boundary spanning role in emergency 
management are crucial in influencing cross-
agency coordination (Janssen et al. 2010). 
However, fulfilling this role within a multiagency 
coordination approach in an emergency 
operations centre has numerous constraints. 
The individual interviews, observational studies 
and focus group interviews revealed some of the 
answers to the second research question 
regarding the constraints encountered by the 
emergency management liaison officers working in 
a state-level emergency operations centre. In 
particular, the temporal constraints of emergency 
management and subsequent fast-action 
requirements of the participants working in this 
domain were considered particularly challenging. 
These findings are aligned to contemporary 
research describing the temporal challenges of 
emergency management multi-agency 
coordination (Faraj and Xiao 2006; Janssen et al. 
2010; Mishra et al. 2011; Gryszkiewicz and Chen 
2012). A further constraint was that cultural 
barriers between agencies can complicate matters 
when functioning in the emergency operations 
centre. Multi-agency coordination is reliant on a 
disparate group of agencies that are often hastily 
gathered to address the emergency event 
(Schraagen and Van de Ven 2011). Some of the 
emergency management liaison officers 
representing these agencies may not have worked 
with each other or in the emergency operations 
centre previously. Some non-emergency agencies 
that may be requested to attend the emergency 
operations centre in an emergency event may not 
operate along the lines of a command and control 
structure as some of the emergency services. 
However, despite the co-location of the 
emergency services and non-emergency agencies 
the silo mentality of some participants from the 
emergency services still impeded boundary 
spanning activities. The organizational silos of 
some agencies were also identified as a problem 
to information sharing and coordination in an 
emergency management context as described by 
Bharosa et al. (2011). These constraints can create 
cultural barriers when operating in this 
environment. Additionally, a lack of working 
together, especially in the operating environment, 
can be associated with unfamiliarity with the 
applicable multiagency coordination arrangements. 
Unfamiliarity of multi-agency coordination 
arrangements in the emergency operations centre 
presented a number of constraints for the 
participants. A lack of familiarity with the 
emergency operations centre led to challenges 
with actually functioning in the physical structure 
of the work domain. Furthermore, a lack of 
familiarity with the work domain led to challenges 
with operating the emergency operations centres 
information systems. The data identified that 
numerous information challenges in the work 
domain included a lack of information system 
interoperability between agencies, inconsistency 
of information, potential information overload and 
finally a lack of understanding regarding other 
agencies information requirements. These findings 
are consistent with research investigating 
information technology incompatibility (Ley et al. 
2012), information overload (Gryszkiewicz and 
Chen 2012), differing information requirements of 
stakeholders (Van de Walle and Turoff 2008), and 
a lack of familiarity with information systems used 
in the emergency management domain (Paton and 
Flin 1999; Saoud et al. 2006; Coates et al. 2011). 
Analysis of the data also revealed that 
compounding these constraints was some 
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emergency management liaison officer’s lack of 
participation in multiagency exercising at the 
emergency operation centre. This could be 
attributed to cultural barriers between emergency 
and non-emergency agencies and the subsequent 
lack of involvement of some emergency 
management liaison officers in exercising. A lack of 
involvement in multiagency exercising could be 
attributed to a lack of familiarity with the work 
domain and in particular the information systems. 
This finding is consistent with other research that 
suggests in order to address some of the 
technological challenges associated with 
emergency management, simulation training with 
the information technology needs to occur in the 
pre-event phase enabling increased familiarity not 
only with information systems but with other 
agencies goals and objectives (Paton and Flin 1999; 
Turoff et al. 2004a, b). 
Finally, important insights regarding the third 
research question corresponding to how do 
emergency management liaison officers prevail 
over the constraints described previously were 
identified. Using the Core-Task Analysis framework 
resulted in a description of the emergency 
management liaison officer’s core-task demands. 
This supported an understanding of how the 
constraints of the work domain were interpreted 
by the participants and how they consequently 
addressed the challenges by means of their 
collaboration, skill and knowledge. Many of the 
core task demands were drawn from the activities 
described in answering the first research question. 
However, an aspect that was described explicitly in 
the focus group interview data and corroborated 
in the observational data that consequently 
underlined the majority of the core-tasks was the 
necessity to accomplish these in the pre-response 
phase. The concept of forging agency alliances and 
acquiring knowledge of the supra-structure prior 
to an emergency event exemplifies the temporal 
challenges associated with emergency 
management events. This highlights the 
requirement to establish practices in pre-response 
training and exercising that facilitate completing 
the core-tasks in the work domain during an actual 
emergency event. 
Emergency management liaison officers 
working in a state-level emergency operation 
centres are expected to overcome an array of 
constraints associated with functioning in this 
domain. The triangulation of the data from the 
three qualitative research methods identified that 
emergency management liaison officers can 
mitigate these constraints. Addressing the 
challenges of operating in this type of environment 
requires a concerted effort by emergency 
management liaison officers performing a 
boundary spanning role to engage in some 
important undertakings in the pre-response phase 
of an emergency event. Personnel fulfilling this 
role need to actively participate in multiagency 
exercising in the emergency operations centre that 
they may be expected to operate. The benefits of 
this are numerous. Firstly, functioning in an 
exercise environment can enable the network and 
fostering of relationships with numerous agency 
stakeholders. This relationship building in the 
multi-agency environment can increase their 
familiarity with other agencies involved in multi-
agency coordination arrangements including their 
roles, requirements and expectations during an 
actual emergency event. This may assist in 
breaking down any cultural barriers between 
agencies and thus overcoming some of the 
complexities associated with operating in a multi-
agency environment. In addition, having a 
comprehensive understanding of the potential 
decision-making expectations that the emergency 
management liaison officers would be expected to 
provide on behalf of their agency in an emergency 
event is important. This may assist the emergency 
management liaison officer in dealing with the 
dynamic setting of a state-level emergency 
operations centre that necessitates fast-action 
requirements. Secondly, regular multi-agency 
exercising can also increase the emergency 
management liaison officer’s familiarity with the 
actual multiagency coordination structure and 
operating procedures. Using the specific 
emergency operations centres particular 
information systems in an exercise situation can 
increase the emergency management liaison 
officer’s familiarity with these information 
technologies that can facilitate their use in an 
actual emergency event and could potentially 
reduce information uncertainty. 
This exploratory research aimed at 
understanding the boundary spanning task of 
emergency management liaison officer’s involved 
in state-level multi-agency coordination. It is 
envisaged that adopting certain boundary 
spanning strategies in the pre-response phase may 
facilitate multiagency coordination within a state-
level emergency operations centre during an 
actual emergency event. This could ultimately 
contribute to mitigating the consequences of the 
risk to the affected communities. Although these 
findings are restricted to one case study, it is 
anticipated that the results may be important to 
boundary spanning in other strategic emergency 
management contexts. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
This case study has explored and described the 
work of emergency management liaison officer’s 
fulfilling a boundary spanning role in emergency 
management. However, research on this topic in 
the area of emergency management is limited, and 
therefore, this study adopted an exploratory 
approach. Core-Task Analysis methodology was a 
successful means to understand the task of 
boundary spanning in a complex work domain. 
From a research perspective, this case study 
contributes to an improved understanding of 
boundary spanning in the context of state-level 
emergency operation centres. Although sharing 
similarities to boundary spanning in other domains, 
the activities required for boundary spanning in 
emergency management has highlighted a number 
of facets that are unique to working in this 
complex, dynamic and uncertain environment. 
However, performing a boundary spanning 
function in a state-level emergency operations 
centre presents many constraints to the 
emergency management liaison officer’s fulfilling 
this role. The constraints of operating in this work 
domain means that emergency management 
liaison officers have to adopt certain 
characteristics to achieve their activities in the 
emergency operations centre. According to the 
data, emergency management liaison officers 
should engage in some of these important 
undertakings in the pre-response phase of an 
emergency event in an effort to facilitate multi-
agency coordination in the emergency operations 
centre during an actual emergency event. The 
main contribution of this research is identifying 
the core task principles required by emergency 
management liaison officer’s performing a 
boundary spanning role in a state-level emergency 
operations centre to successfully function in this 
environment. 
It is envisaged that facets of this research can 
form the basis for specific training intended for 
state-level emergency management liaison officers. 
The suggested core task principles of boundary 
spanning in a state-level emergency operations 
centre would benefit from further validation using 
multiple similar case study settings. In addition, it 
may be of benefit to explore the boundary 
spanning activities of emergency management 
liaison officers at the operational and tactical 
levels of emergency management to investigate 
whether these roles differ from those at 
emergency management arrangements at the 
strategic level. It is acknowledged that this 
research is confined to the study setting used in 
the case study. Nevertheless, it is envisaged that 
the fundamental principles of boundary spanning 
in this particular environment and mechanisms 
incorporated to address the challenges could be 
applied in other complex, dynamic and uncertain 
work domains. Irrespective of the working 
environment, collaboration between human 
factors researchers and practitioners is critical 
(Nemeth et al. 2011) in developing a new 
knowledge base to shape the physical, 
technological, and informational and social 
structures of the chosen work domain (Norros 
2014). 
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Abstract: Stakeholders involved in emergency management multi-agency 
coordination require information to inform their situation awareness to plan and 
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1 Introduction  
As society becomes increasingly susceptible to disasters, emergency management practitioners 
are faced with multiple challenges. Modern day disasters are characterised by complexity and 
uncertainty that frequently require the coordination of multiple stakeholders (Schraagen & Van de 
Ven, 2008). This complexity can be attributed to multiple elements including, but not limited to, 
temporal constraints (Janssen et al., 2010; Mishra et al., 2011), communication challenges (Aedo 
et al., 2010; Comfort & Kapucu, 2006; Manoj & Baker, 2007; McEntire, 2002) dysfunctional 
organizational linkages between multiple agencies (Janssen et al. 2010; Salmon et al. 2011; 
Harrald 2006) and information challenges. Information challenges can include system 
incompatibility (Baber et al. 2007; Ley et al. 2012), differing agency information requirements 
(Van de Walle & Turoff, 2008) and a lack of familiarity with different agency information systems 
(Coates et al., 2011; Paton & Flin, 1999; Saoud et al., 2006).  
The international standard for emergency management defines coordination as “the way in 
which different organizations (public or private) or parts of the same organization work or act 
together in order to achieve a common objective” (International Organization for Standardization, 
2011). Effective coordination necessitates the synchronised efforts of a diverse collection of public 
and private agencies with specialised skills and knowledge (Van Scotter et al., 2012).  In order to 
facilitate such synchronised efforts, individual agencies (or personnel from different parts of the 
same agency) have to transition from being autonomous entities (in non-crisis situations) into 
interdependent decision-making teams (Janssen et al., 2010). The temporary supra-organization 
collaborations that are formed will then comprise of stakeholders from multiple agencies who span 
the boundaries between agencies and facilitate linkages so that actions to mitigate the disaster and 
to facilitate community recovery can be efficiently coordinated (Pasquero, 1991). Boundary 
spanning is critically important in these situations to explore the ways in which multiple 
stakeholders share their information (Kapucu, 2006a). Fundamental to the success of boundary 
spanning is the requirement for stakeholders to obtain adequate information to inform their 
situation awareness of the event (Salmon et al. 2011); engage in team decision-making (Salas et al., 
2007) and effectively coordinate their activities. 
In order to improve emergency management coordination it is important to understand the 
challenges of operators in developing and maintaining situation awareness so that decision making 
and coordinating activities may be effective. The problem of how disparate stakeholders come 
together to achieve this is not well understood and certainly not well theorised. 
The importance of coordination in emergency events is, more often than not,  highlighted by 
coordination failure (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006; Lutz & Lindell, 2008; Moynihan, 2007; Reid, 
2006; Teague et al., 2010; Wise, 2006). In the literature it has been found that there is frequently a 
deterioration of quality information in large scale emergency events (Bharosa et al., 2011) that can 
lead to impaired understanding. In addition, the demands for interagency communication increases 
significantly (Kapucu & Van Wart, 2006) requiring more information exchange in ways that are 
time-critical (Schraagen et al., 2010). However, some literature questions the necessity of 
coordination, particularly in the response phase of an emergency event where collaboration occurs 
infrequently and may even be unachievable (Berlin & Carlström, 2008; Helsloot, 2008; Scholtens, 
2008).  
Situation awareness is a term given to an individual‟s level of awareness of a situation, an 
operators understanding of „what is going on‟ (Endsley, 1995) and is an indicator of safety in 
highly complex socio-technical systems. Some theorists have represented situation awareness as a 
static snapshot (Endsley, 1995) and others have represented it as a process (Smith & Hancock 
1995). The view preferred here is that of Sarter and Woods (1991, p. 52) where situation 
awareness is the “accessibility of a comprehensive and coherent situation representation which is 
continuously being updated in accordance with the results of the recurrent assessments”. 
Maintaining situation awareness in dynamic, complex and collaborative environments is reliant on 
the timely transmission of accurate and pertinent information (Salmon et al. 2011; Militello et al. 
2007; Bharosa et al. 2011; Mishra et al. 2011). However, the flow of information (in terms of its 
quantity and quality) needed to provide continuous situation awareness can cause increases in 
cognitive workload which can be problematic (Tsang & Wilson 1997; Raj et al. 2011). It is also 
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important to note that situation awareness is based on sensation perception and differs from 
situation understanding which results from a sense-making process (Raj et al., 2011). Through 
team processes, both situation assessment and sense-making feed into the development of shared 
mental models, an important construct in teamwork coordination (Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & 
Kendall, 2006; Owen et al., 2013). For the purposes of this paper, situation awareness involves not 
only an understanding of the current emergency incident but also forecasting how it could evolve 
to provide advance warning of impending threats and to facilitate the planning of response and 
mitigation strategies (D. Johnson et al., 2011). In this respect it involves perception, sense-making 
and sense-giving. 
In contemporary organizations distributed situation awareness is supported through a range of 
information systems that act as cognitive artefacts to aid or enhance people‟s cognitive abilities 
(Norman, 1991). The use of cognitive artefacts allows information to be available in the system in 
its entirety rather than just to selected human actors within this environment (Salmon et al. 2011). 
The use of artefacts to store and represent information, to support reflection and reinterpretation, to 
cue activity and to communicate action, provides a mechanism by which distributed groups may 
be aware of an unfolding situation and the activities of others to achieve their outcomes in a 
coordinated way (McMaster, Baber, & Duffy, 2012). The exploration of cognitive artefacts is well 
documented in the literature investigating complex environments such as the health sector (Wilson 
et al. 2007; Wears et al. 2006; Laxmisan et al. 2006; Xiao 2005), and may be an important enabler 
in the development and maintenance of situation awareness in the emergency management 
environment.  
However, the research examining the use of cognitive artefacts to support emergency 
management coordination is limited (see Lutz & Lindell 2008, Salmon et al. 2011 for some 
exceptions). Moreover, given the complexity of the environment and the multiple challenges 
associated with this it is unlikely that insights gained from similarly complex domains will be 
directly transferrable. What is needed is a deeper understanding of how personnel working at a 
strategic coordination level in emergency management use existing cognitive artefacts to support 
their needs. 
Knowing what activities emergency management personnel are engaged with in order to 
ascertain how cognitive artefacts may support their distributed situation awareness is therefore 
critical. This led to the following questions to guide this research: 
 
 What problem-solving activities are emergency management personnel engaged 
with that require coordination? 
 What artefacts do they currently use when engaged in those problem solving 
activities? 
 What are the information requirements to inform their situation awareness and 
how might artefacts better support these in an emergency management event? 
 
1.1 Analysing situation awareness and the use of cognitive artefacts  
There are a number of different models that can be applied to analyse the role of cognitive 
artefacts and their implications for distributed situation awareness and emergency management 
coordination. There are, for example, formal models of articulating human-machine interaction 
and operator needs through the processes of hierarchical task analysis (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 
1992); others that consider the socio-technical system as a joint cognitive system between human 
and no-human agents in terms of cognitive process engineering (Hollnagel, 2001), work domain 
analysis (Vicente, 1999) and cognitive work analysis (Stanton et al., 2009).  
Hollnagel (2011) makes the point that these models have been historically based on a number 
of assumptions that, due to complexity and interdependency, are becoming increasingly irrelevant. 
These assumptions are that (1) system boundaries can be well defined; (2) internal and external 
interactions of the system are similar; and (3) that humans and machines operating within these 
systems are reactive to stable inputs from their external environments. He goes on to argue that 
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these are reasonable assumptions for systems that are tractable and which are relatively 
independent and only loosely coupled to their environment. However, they are not tenable for 
systems that are more open-loop and are more tightly coupled to their environment. Increasingly, 
human-machine systems are interdependently complex and needing to adjust to changes in their 
environments. It is this type of domain that emergency management coordination best represents. 
According to Hollnagel (2011) the design (and here – the analysis of) such systems needs to be 
more global in perspective; because the goals change from maintaining local stability to one of 
persistence – defined as the ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain an effective 
relationship with the external environment.   
In keeping with Hollnagel‟s (2011) critique therefore, the approach taken here is to investigate 
the problem solving activities undertaken by emergency management personnel to better 
understand the challenges they face and how various cognitive artefacts are used to acquire the 
information they need to better support their emergency management coordination goals. This 
approach acknowledges the argument made by scholars working within the Naturalistic Decision-
Making frameworks (see for example Klein et al. 1993; Zsambok & Klein 1997; Todd & 
Gigerenzer 2001):  that activities associated with sense-making and situational awareness should 
be studied in their real-life domains rather than in a laboratory. In keeping with this premise it was 
important to try to understand the challenges faced from the point of view of the practitioners as 
they go about their activities. While there were a number of potential conceptual frameworks that 
could be chosen to guide the study (see for example Flin & Arbuthnot 2002; Salas & Klein 2001; 
Vicente 1999), the one employed here was developed by Rasmussen (as cited by Boy 2011, page 
3). Rasmussen‟s framework has been used to analyse a range of complex environments because of 
its focus on dynamic and highly interdependent work activities in managing unpredictable events 
and in particular the role of the design of information systems such as those reported here. It has 
been further developed by Hoc (1996) and others (Millot, Debernard, & Vanderhaegan, 2011). 
According to Rasmussen (as cited by Boy 2011) the stages involved in managing unpredictable 
events includes tasks associated with: 
1. Abnormal event detection, which includes searching for information; 
2. Engaging in risk and situation assessment; 
3. Task execution including goal and target definition and enacting, and procedures to 
complete execution;  
4. Predicting and assessing consequences, planning for the future. 
Hoc (1996) added a fifth stage, which involved activities associated with evaluating the progress 
of the goals and making adjustments. Given the emphasis on the need for system review and 
monitoring discussed in post emergency event inquiries such as the Victorian Bushfire Royal 
Commission (Teague et al., 2010) in Australia, evaluation will also be included here. 
 
1.2 Study setting 
State governments in Australia are responsible for managing emergency events. The activation of 
a state emergency operations centre occurs if there is an emergency event that has the potential to 
affect multiple communities or is so significant that it requires a state level response. In the 
Australian state of Victoria, the State Control Centre fulfils this obligation. The role of the Centre 
is to act as the hub of eight regional and more than forty-seven local incident control centres across 
the state that supports emergency services during major emergencies. The Centre is a multi-agency 
and a multi hazard state level emergency operations centre. The Centre is staffed every day of the 
year with a core skeleton of staff but increases depending on the activation level (i.e., depending 
on the seriousness of the event). During the highest level of activation which is described as Tier 3 
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activation, the Centre will routinely operate 24 hours a day with up to ninety personnel at any one 
time representing multiple agencies co-located in the Centre. Agencies involved include, for 
example, fire services, police, ambulance, primary industry and critical infrastructure (e.g., water 
and energy). Stakeholders representing these agencies are required to span organizational 
boundaries providing linkages between the agencies. These linkages facilitate the stakeholder‟s 
ability to obtain information to inform their situation awareness that is been continuously 
reassessed specific to their agencies requirements. It also allows the stakeholder to assist with the 
needs of collaborating agencies situation awareness in an effort to assist in the planning of 
response and mitigation strategies for the emergency event. 
The Centre currently has two areas where stakeholders may be located: in the operations room 
of the Centre with the command and control (e.g., fire and police) agencies, centre support staff 
and some stakeholder agency representatives; and in a designated room adjacent to the operations 
room (see Figure 1). There is a range of data applications available in the Centre that provides 
information about the event (See Table 1). This information is available from numerous sources in 
the operations room including several visual display units and permanent computers located at 
each work station that the stakeholders can access. As the operations room can only accommodate 
a limited number of stakeholders, additional stakeholders are located in the adjacent room. Due to 
the geographical location of the adjacent room there is no direct view of the operations room. In 
this room stakeholders are expected to provide their own laptops which mean they are currently 
unable to access all the data applications in use at the Centre. There is one visual display unit in 
the room.  
Figure 1 Participants location in the emergency operations centre
 
Table 1 Artefacts available for emergency management personnel 
Verbal Data Map Video Photos Text 
In person 
 
PC application Printed Camera MMS (via 
phone) 
SMS / pager 
Telephone Agency 
(intranet) web 
site 
Map book Live 
streaming 
(e.g. CCTV 
or Web) 
 
camera 
(PC) 
PDF / DOC 
Agency 
radio 
Website / social 
media 
Agency 
application/intranet 
TV Online  
Broadcast 
radio 
 Public website    
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2 Methodology 
This study is based on empirical data from two sources, an organizational survey and an 
observation conducted during an actual emergency event. Both forms of data collection received 
ethics approval from the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee in 
Australia and followed the protocols for provision of information and consent.  
2.1 Organizational survey 
The organizational survey was distributed under the auspices of the Victorian Office for the Fire 
Services Commissioner in Australia. The aim of the survey was to investigate the information 
needs of the various stakeholders working in this multi-jurisdictional centre. Humans would often 
prefer too much information rather than too little information when constructing a comprehensive 
picture (O‟Reilly, 1980; Russo, 1974). However, in emergency management the abundance of 
information might not actually be required for the functions the stakeholders have to perform. 
Therefore it has to be acknowledged that the findings from the survey may only give an insight 
into what information the participants would like to have and not necessarily what information 
they require to perform their role. This is why undertaking a second phase in this study was 
important; and forms the rationale for making it an observational study. Nevertheless, a survey 
was considered the most appropriate way to efficiently gain some overall insights into the work 
being undertaken. 
Table 2 Sample for survey and observations 
Functional areas in Centre Personnel Survey N (%) Observation 
Centre management support staff 31 16 (52%)  
Command and Control agencies (includes 
urban fire services, rural fire services, 
police land management) 
43  29 (67%) Yes 
State Emergency Service 21  14 (67%) Yes 
Health /Ambulance 14 8 (57%) Yes 
Critical infrastructure (e.g., Water, 
communications utilities, electricity, Gas) 
28 17 (61%) Yes 
Other state government 15 
 
8 (53%) Yes 
Total 
 
152 92 (61%)  
 
The study was piloted with three subject matter experts in the industry and adjustments made to 
clarify the wording of some questions. The organizational survey was distributed toward the end 
of 2011 to 104 fire and emergency services personnel who had recently worked in the Centre. A 
stratified sample was used to ensure good coverage of the main roles performed in the Centre (see 
Table 2). Ninety-two surveys were returned yielding a response rate of 61% which is above the 
typical response rate for organizational surveys (Baruch & Holtom, 2008). Part of the survey 
requested that participants nominate the role they most commonly performed in an incident and to 
list the most important decisions and/or actions they made when in that role. In the survey 92 
participants responded to this question and provided 160 separate comments. These comments 
were then coded against the problem-solving framework outlined earlier by Rasmussen (as cited 
by Boy 2011) and Hoc (1996). This framework was employed as a departure point for the analysis 
of the various demands and challenges discussed and because it has previously been employed to 
build a formative picture of decisions undertaken, and information needs in the context of systems 
design (see for example Jenkins, Stanton Salmon, Walker and Rafferty 2010). The framework 
provided a useful way of grouping the data, however thematic modifications were needed to 
represent the emergency management domain. Sub-categories were then developed inductively. 
Once the coding framework had been developed by the initial researcher the second researcher 
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reapplied the coding framework to the data. An inter-rater reliability Kappa of 75% was achieved 
indicating a substantial or good level of inter-rater agreement (Fleiss et al., 2003; Landis & Koch, 
1977). The modified problem-solving activities and examples from the data are presented in Table 
3.  
Table 3 Problem solving model including activities and examples from the data 
Problem solving activity Examples from the data 
Problem detection including situation 
assessment, size up – current assessment of 
risk 
Assessing incident criticality 
Ascertaining correct and up to date information on the 
incident 
Identifying & managing risk 
 
Execution of tasks, includes resource 
management 
Dispatch and deployment of aircraft to fires and 
emergencies 
Where your resources are established on the scene 
Deployment of resources 
 
Anticipation/planning/prediction Assessment of likely flood impacts 
Exposures - Strategies to protect life and property 
What is the likely fire behaviour 
 
Interpretation and sense-making – 
consequences for system goals - development 
of strategy 
 
Information to the community - website/warnings 
Which information to pass on to the public and how might 
it be communicated to ensure a clear message 
What is the extent of damage and implications? 
 
Evaluation in relation to system constraints - 
quality assurance measures 
Making sure statutory obligations are being met and 
compliance with procedures 
Processes of transfer of Control from the field are followed 
Ensuring Commander / Controllers Intent at all levels are 
implemented 
 
2.2 Observational study 
The second source of data reported in this paper is an observation study conducted when the 
Centre was at tier 3 activation during a series of large complex bushfires early in 2013. Tier 3 
activation is the highest level of activation in the Centre. Direct observation of individuals in their 
natural setting is a highly valued and effective research method (Caldwell & Atwal, 2005; Carlson 
& Morrison, 2009) and provided the opportunity to triangulate the kinds of challenges discussed in 
the survey and to identify the artefacts in use. The researcher adopted an observational stance 
where the group under observation was aware of the researcher‟s observational activities (Gold, 
1958). This allowed for the researcher‟s participation in the group activities as desired thus 
generating a more complete understanding of the participant‟s activities (Kawulich, 2005).  
We recognised that the observation needed to be non-intrusive and did not impose upon the 
participants or the organization‟s response efforts. Under these circumstances it was decided with 
the Centre management that only one researcher would be present to undertake the observational 
studies. The authors recognised that this may introduce an aspect of observer bias but felt that it 
was necessary during these conditions (Kawulich, 2005). Field notes, recording and self-reports 
from those observed were the primary forms of data collection as audio and video recording was 
considered too intrusive in this sensitive environment. An observation protocol had been 
previously developed and piloted in two state bushfire simulation exercises with modifications 
made to the protocol based on feedback (see Table 4). 
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Table 4 Observational study protocol guidelines 
 Time of observation 
Question  0800 1000 1200 1400 
Having ascertained their perception of the 
situation awareness they needed: how would 
you rate your current situational awareness of 
the event? 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
 
Do you feel the information you receive for 
your agencies decision making process is…? 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
Descriptors Comments Comments Comments Comments 
Receiving information:  
(Describe how the participant is receiving 
information: briefings, data applications, 
visual displays, informal communication, 
using telecommunications, etc. Are there any 
challenges related to performing this task) 
 
    
Disseminating information:  
(Describe how the participant is disseminating 
information: briefings data applications, 
informal face communication, using 
telecommunications, etc. Are there any 
challenges related to performing this task) 
 
    
Modality of information: 
(Describe what modes of communication the 
participant is using and identify if there are 
there any challenges related to performing this 
task) 
    
 
For the observation of a real-time emergency event ten stakeholder personnel were selected for 
observing. These represented the key agencies involved (see Table 5). A summary of the personnel 
involved and some of their demographic information is presented in Table 6. The names of the 
participants in the observational study were de-identified to maintain anonymity and 
confidentiality. The majority of the participants were from critical infrastructure and there was an 
even distribution of participants located in the operations room and the adjacent room. All 
participants had considerable industry experience. Two of the participants had not performed this 
role in a previous emergency event and three participants had not performed the role specifically at 
this emergency operations centre. In terms of experience within their existing role at a senior state 
level, two participants had undertaken the role for more than five years and six had between one 
and five years‟ experience. There was an even distribution of participants who had received formal 
training for the role and those who had received no training (see Table 6). For the remainder of the 
findings, the details of the specific agencies represented are de-identified to protect the 
confidentiality of the participants. 
Due to the predicted workload of the participants it was determined by the researcher and the 
Centre management team to observe a maximum of five participants per day with a combination 
of participants located in the operations room and the adjacent room. Each participant was asked 
the questions included in Table 4, every two hours over the period of the shift. Two consecutive 
day shifts were observed. If the participant was not at their location during this observation period 
they were recorded as absent. The questions commenced with the first participant on the hour with 
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a fifteen minute interval between each subsequent participant. This fifteen minute time allocation 
allowed the researcher to note the predominant activity occurring and the modalities in use, and 
provided the opportunity for discussion with the participant. This protocol also meant that the 
researcher could participate in the scheduled briefings and observe the participants at these 
briefings. During the time between asking questions the researcher also wrote up field notes and 
partook in opportunistic conversations with other participants. Immediately following each day the 
researcher completed detailed field notes.  
Table 5 Participants agency and location in emergency operations centre 
Agency Tranche Location in the centre 
Police Emergency Services Main room 
Federal Government Other Main room 
Telecommunications Critical Infrastructure Side room 
Energy Critical Infrastructure Side room 
Transport Critical Infrastructure Side room 
Telecommunications Critical Infrastructure Main room 
Health Critical Infrastructure Main room 
Ambulance Emergency Services Main room 
Energy Critical Infrastructure Side room 
Water Services Critical Infrastructure Side room 
 
Table 6 Participants experience in the role 
Participant Performed role 
previously in an 
emergency event? 
Performed role 
previously in this 
emergency 
operations centre?  
How many years 
have they been 
performing the 
role? 
Have they received any 
formal training to perform 
the role? 
1 Yes Yes >5 Yes 
2 Yes Yes <1 No 
3 Yes Yes <1 No 
4 No No 1-5 Yes 
5 Yes No 1-5 Yes 
6 Yes Yes 1-5 Yes 
7 Yes Yes >5 No 
8 Yes Yes 1-5 No 
9 No No 1-5 Yes 
10 Yes Yes 1-5 No 
 
2.2.1 Limitations of the observation study 
The study has some limitations. One limitation is the prospect of introducing observer bias as 
previously noted, particularly as only one researcher physically performed the observations. As the 
observational study was performed in a real-time emergency event this placed caveats on the 
research which was in no way to obstruct the operations. Hence, the research team decided a sole 
researcher conducting the observations would be less imposing in this environment. Another 
limitation is that the study is restricted to one emergency operations centre thus restricting the 
generalisation of the findings. Nevertheless, no emergency operation centre can be characterised as 
typical (Sommer & Njå, 2012), therefore how stakeholders obtain information to inform their 
situation awareness in this research may also be relevant for other practitioners operating in 
alternative emergency operation centres.  
Bushfires, together with earthquakes, landslides, avalanches, storms, floods, volcanic eruptions 
and tsunamis, can be categorized as rapid onset natural hazards (Bernard et al., 1988; Omelicheva, 
2011). Bushfires can evolve over an extended timeframe or can be fast moving as seen in the 
Black Saturday Bushfires in Australia (Cruza et al., 2012). However, this can be in contrast to 
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other natural disasters such as flash flooding or earthquakes that often provide no warning. In these 
disasters time pressures can be perceived as more challenging. Therefore, as the observational 
studies were conducted during a bushfire event it should be acknowledged that any findings from 
this data may be difficult to generalise specifically to other types of disasters.  
 
3 Findings 
The findings are based upon the organizational survey and the observational study and endeavour 
to inform the reader how emergency management personnel perceive their need for information 
and how they access this information to inform their situation awareness. The findings are divided 
into three sections based upon the three questions guiding this research as described in the 
introduction. The first section will draw upon the survey data and provide an outline and 
description of the five problem solving activities that emergency management personnel are 
engaged with. The next section will utilise the survey data to describe what artefacts the 
emergency management personnel used when engaging in the nominated problem solving activity. 
The final section will use data collected from the observational study and identify the two most 
commonly used cognitive artefacts used to gain information amongst stakeholders in the centre 
during an actual emergency event. 
3.1 Problem solving activities of emergency management 
To address the first research question, what problem-solving activities are emergency management 
personnel engaged with that require coordination, the survey data were coded into different 
problem solving activities that were analysed. Table 7 outlines the survey comments coded at each 
of the categories as well as providing an outline of the sub-categories emerging from the data. 
Table 7 Problem solving activities 
Problem solving activity SCC case study 
Problem detection including situation assessment, size up – current assessment 
of risk. Included sub-categories of: 
 Establishing communication flows 
 Situation assessment 
 Intelligence gathering 
34 (18%) 
Execution of tasks includes resource management. Included sub-categories of: 
 Managing resources 
 Managing competing priorities 
 Managing systems 
43 (27%) 
Anticipation/planning/prediction. Included sub-categories of: 
 Scenario building and testing 
 Determining potential impacts 
 Developing strategic plans 
25 (16%) 
Interpretation and sense-making – including issuing warnings and development 
of strategy. Included sub-categories of: 
 Developing a mitigation strategy 
 Providing meaning for different stakeholder groups 
45 (28%) 
Evaluation in relation to system constraints- quality assurance measures. 
Included sub-categories of: 
 Monitoring safety health and enactment of goals 
 Quality assurance 
13 (8%) 
Total 160 
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3.1.1 Problem detection 
Activities associated with problem detection comprised the second largest volume of decisions 
and/or actions reported, and gaining an appreciation of the incident was the most common concern. 
This was reported as being challenging in events that were rapidly developing and dynamic in 
their changes. In the Centre it is important for personnel to gain an initial assessment of the 
impacted areas and an assessment of the level of damage so that they may begin a process of risk 
assessment and consequence management. However, personnel on the incident ground are 
sometimes not easily able to provide this information if they are in the midst of an emerging 
situation due to temporal constraints. This can create challenges for both situation assessment and 
gathering intelligence to feed into further strategic incident management processes.  
3.1.2 Task execution 
The activities related to the execution of tasks focused on decisions and/or actions involving 
resource management. Personnel reported being engaged in procuring and managing logistical 
issues. In some cases this was particularly challenging for those agencies needing to procure and 
roster additional volunteers. It is when engaged in these activities that difficulties in the interfaces 
of Computer Aided Dispatch systems with both dispatch and deployment responsibilities become 
visible and add to the complexity of task execution. In addition, participants reported that the 
duplication of processes requiring repeated manual handling of the same information slows down 
the capability for action. 
3.1.3 Anticipation 
Within the anticipation, planning and prediction category personnel operating in the Centre used 
their emerging situation awareness to determine potential impacts and develop strategy. Part of the 
challenge here related to the frequently reported problem of accessing resources to be able to 
perform certain tasks, as well as the need to develop predictions with incomplete or inconsistent 
information. 
3.1.4 Sense-making 
A number of participants were focused on ensuring that warnings were appropriately conveyed to 
different groups, including affected communities. Others were involved in ensuring that key 
stakeholder groups were engaged and had a clear understanding of the issues and their potential 
consequences. Participants needed to make sense of the implications for their agency and 
frequently manage political and community expectations. In this respect, boundary spanning roles 
are particularly important as are other mechanisms to bridge different positions, intentions, needs 
and interests, including aligning strategic intent with existing and sometimes contradictory 
government policy goals. Providing updates and meaning with situational advice for stakeholder 
groups was reported as particularly important. 
3.1.5 Evaluation 
There were also reported decisions/actions associated with assessing and evaluating the safety 
health of the emergency management arrangements. This included for example, assessing 
information collated to ascertain if statutory obligations were being met and that there was 
compliance with procedures.  
3.2 Artefacts in use for situation awareness 
To address the second research question, what artefacts do stakeholders currently use when 
engaged in problem solving activities, participants in the organizational survey were asked about 
what artefacts they used when engaging the nominated decisions and actions. The cognitive 
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artefacts available in the Centre are summarised in Table 1. These results were cross tabulated 
against the reported various problem solving categories developed to ascertain the preference for 
cognitive artefacts (see Table 8).  
Table 8 Problem solving activity and information systems interfaces used 
Problem solving activity Most important Second most 
important 
Third most 
important 
Problem detection including 
situation assessment, size up - 
current assessment of risk 
 
Data - PC 
application 
Map - agency 
application / 
intranet 
Verbal - in 
person 
Execution of tasks, including 
resource management 
 
Verbal - in person Verbal - 
telephone 
Data - agency 
(intranet) 
website 
Anticipation / planning / prediction 
 
Data - PC 
application 
Verbal - in 
person 
Map - printed 
Interpretation and sense-making - 
consequences for system goals - 
development of strategy 
 
Verbal - telephone Map - agency 
application / 
intranet 
Data - agency 
(intranet) 
website 
Evaluation in relation to system 
constraints - quality assurance 
measures 
Data - PC 
application 
Verbal - 
telephone 
Verbal - in 
person 
 
For problem detection activities the most important cognitive artefact was found to be specialised 
application software. For task execution and resource management activities the most important 
cognitive artefact reported was verbal communication in person. For anticipation, prediction and 
planning activities the most important cognitive artefact is application software, particularly for 
modelling purposes and/or for examining the models emailed from specialists. For interpreting and 
sense-making activities the most important form of cognitive artefact used is verbal 
communication by telephone. This may demonstrate the external orientation of much of this type 
of work in needing to coordinate with other agencies. Lastly, evaluation and quality assurance 
activities are most commonly supported by application software. 
3.3 Situation awareness and artefact used in a real-time event 
To address the third research question, what are the information requirements to inform their 
situation awareness and how might artefacts better support these in an emergency management 
event, an observational study was conducted at an emergency operations centre during the 
2012/2013 Australian bushfire season. During the two days of observation in the state of Victoria, 
the centre was at the highest activation level and operating 24 hours a day. The weather outlook 
over the observational period was for hot, mostly dry, freshening winds with ratings of severe fire 
danger potential on both days. There were two large fires already active in the state: the first was 
over 2,500 ha in size and the second over 65,000 ha. The public fire rating was considered very 
high for the entire state and total fire bans was in force for over seventy-five per cent of the state. 
These severe conditions warranted the attendance of stakeholders from multiple agencies at the 
emergency operations centre. 
Stakeholders require situation awareness in emergency management multi-agency coordination 
so they can collectively mitigate the consequences of risk to the community. In the Australian 
context some bushfires are deemed too dangerous to risk fire-fighter‟s lives and are left to burn. 
The flow of information within an emergency operations centre and how stakeholders within this 
environment access this information is important. If an uncontrollable fire was to impact a critical 
infrastructure asset (such as electricity, water or telecommunications etc.) that may result in a loss 
of this utility to a community,  then access to crucial information could help the agencies mitigate 
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against the risk of loss or damage to ensure the continuity of these services to the community. 
Similarly, for example, if an elderly residential care facility was in the path of an uncontrollable 
fire, ambulance, police and road traffic agencies would require vital information to plan for the 
safest and most expeditious evacuation of the facility. As the observational study was conducted in 
a state level emergency operations centre, the emphasis is on strategic emergency management 
arrangements and the information requirements of stakeholders to acquire information to inform 
their distributed situation awareness.  
Table 9 Participants definition of situation awareness 
Participant Definition of situational awareness 
1 “Current overview of significant fire events and from this information identifying the 
significant issues concerning my agency. Also ensure correct information is disseminated both 
ways from my agency‟s operations centre to the here and to other agencies as deemed 
appropriate.” 
 
2 “What is happening in the state right now and what issues are affecting Victoria and are there 
any major concerns that are upcoming that may affect my agency.” 
 
3 “Knowing where the fires are going and if it affects my agencies assets and disseminating this 
information to my agency.” 
 
4 “What the scope of operations is and where the issues are and how significant they are to my 
agency overall and if these will impact towns and the general public.” 
 
5 “Learning and understanding what is going on in the event that is relevant to my agency”. 
 
6 “It‟s a case of finding out what is happening and where it‟s happening and the impacts of any 
predictions that is out there”. 
 
7 “What is currently happening in the event and what is the projection for the event and how 
does it impact our agency”. 
 
8 “Current awareness of the incidents occurring across the state, the current plan and strategic 
outlook for the state”. 
 
9 “Understanding where the fires are and how they might impact our assets and letting the 
appropriate agencies know and disseminate information back here as to what assets may be 
affected and the potential consequences”.  
 
10 “Linked into what is happening in here and what information is pertinent to my agency and 
what is pertinent from my agency to this centre”. 
 
 
At the commencement of the observation period the participants were asked to define situation 
awareness and their situation awareness needs (see Table 9). This was important in order to 
understand the participants‟ perceptions and to use their own definition as a benchmark for the 
ratings they provided for the questions asked during the observations. It can be seen from the table 
that there is an overall consistency in the purposes for which situation awareness is needed. The 
definitions all include a need for information about what is happening now (e.g., “what is 
happening right now” #2) as well as a need to project these to better understand the implications 
for the future (e.g., “how this might impact on our assets” #9). These definitions represent 
perception as well as sense-making. Only one participant reported a definition that included sense-
giving (e.g., “what is pertinent from my agency to this centre” #10). 
Table 10 offers some illustrations of how the observation data were recorded from the 
participants own definition of situation awareness and the observer‟s field notes during the 
observation period. 
Paper III 
162 
 
Table 10 Example of observational data collection 
Participant Time 
Answers to situation 
awareness questions 
Observational Descriptors 
Question 
1 
Question 
2 
Received 
Information 
Disseminat
ed 
Information 
Modality of Information 
 
2 
 
1015 
 
Absent 
 
Absent 
 
Not applicable 
 
Not 
applicable 
 
Not applicable 
 
1215 Excellent Good Speaking with 
intelligence & 
planning sections 
 
Not at 
present 
Verbal in person 
1415 Good Good Speaking with Fire 
Commissioner & 
Military regarding 
need for Federal 
assistance 
 
Updating 
own agency 
Verbal in person, data 
applications 
1615 Good Good Stated that briefing 
provided clear 
information 
 
Not 
observed 
Verbal in person 
 
4 
 
 
1045 
 
Average 
 
Average 
 
Struggling with 
unfamiliarity with 
intranet email 
 
 
Not 
observed 
 
Data applications 
1245 Average Average Unsuccessful 
attempt to access 
mapping 
 
Not 
observed 
Data applications 
1445 Good Good Using intranet 
email, states briefing 
was informative  
 
Liaising 
with media 
section 
Data applications, verbal in 
person 
1645 Good Good Now successfully 
accessing mapping 
application 
Using 
agency 
email to 
update own 
agency 
 
Data applications 
 
5 
 
1100 
 
Poor 
 
Poor 
 
Struggling with 
unfamiliarity with 
intranet email 
 
 
Not 
observed 
 
Data applications 
1230 Average Average Stated briefing was 
good 
 
Not 
observed 
Verbal in person 
1500 Average Average Liaising with 
stakeholders in other 
locations 
 
Using 
agency 
email to 
provide 
update to 
own agency 
Verbal in person, data 
applications 
1700 Good Good Received mapping 
advice and 
information from 
stakeholder in 
another location 
 
Informing 
own agency 
of potential 
impacts to 
agency 
assets 
Verbal in person and telephone, 
data applications 
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The observation data were analysed across the two days of observation for collective themes. 
Our analysis revealed a number of cognitive artefacts that facilitated information sharing and 
contributed to stakeholders informing their distributed situation awareness of the unfolding events. 
The most frequently observed cognitive artefacts employed for this included gleaning pertinent 
information from scheduled briefings, opportunistic informal conversations, access of the intranet 
email system, and specialised application software such as fire mapping programs. This is 
consistent with the survey data. The two most commonly used cognitive artefacts were people 
communication and use of information technology systems.  
3.3.1 People communication 
People communication involved one-to-many briefings as well as one-to-one and face-to-face 
conversations. During tier 3 activation, there will be, on average, four scheduled briefings per day. 
In addition there may also be unscheduled briefings at any time, however none of these were 
observed by the researcher. Briefings take place in the operations room. The daily morning 
briefing, for example, was approximately 30 minutes in duration. It involved a formal presentation 
of the day‟s outlook by the Centre‟s duty manager, resident meteorologist and fire behaviour 
analyst. Information presented was displayed on multiple visual display units throughout the room, 
complimenting the audio commentary. Throughout the day were a number of shorter briefings 
(e.g., 10 minutes) providing updates to all personnel in the Centre. All the participants in the 
observational study attended the briefings with many taking paper notes. The Centre‟s 
management team encouraged comments from all agencies present but during the observation 
period only one participant made a comment and requested information that was pertinent to their 
agency‟s needs. All participants reported that they valued the briefings for obtaining information 
of the event.  
The most frequently observed form of sharing information relied on one-to-one and face-to-
face communication. This was regardless of their location in the Centre. Informal one-to-one 
conversations to share information were observed on multiple occasions and by all participants 
over the two days. One example of this was from a participant located in the adjacent room who 
regularly networked with multiple personnel from various agencies in the entire complex sourcing 
information relevant to their agency‟s needs. However, it was also noted during the observations 
that the participants located in the operations room were privy to casual information that circulated 
around this room by word of mouth. One example of this involved someone informing the 
participants in the operations room by giving them a verbal heads up about a fire situation change. 
The researcher did not observe this person passing on the same information to the participants 
located in the adjacent room. When the researcher asked if any of the participants in the adjacent 
room were aware of this information, all specified they had not been informed. This may be a 
simple case of merely passing on information that would soon be uploaded and disseminated to all 
participants via the internal email system. However, those located in the main room had received 
an earlier warning.  
In addition, the operations room is the main thoroughfare for personnel operating in the Centre. 
Therefore the participants located in this area are on view and easily accessible to other 
stakeholders as well as Centre management staff. Thus, for participants present in the operations 
room it was observed that a higher amount of opportunistic information was conveyed during the 
emergency event. This is confirmed by one of the participants located in this area who commented 
that it was beneficial to have other stakeholders in close proximity as information could freely be 
exchanged in an ad hoc and relaxed manner. Another participant located in this area stated that 
they often listened out for any extra information that might be useful for their agency. Indeed, the 
observation of participants „overhearing‟ information and subsequently receiving this information 
was evident on multiple occasions by the researcher, involving all the participants in the 
operations room. During the emergency event it was observed that the clustering of stakeholders 
into smaller groups promoted the exchange of information between other stakeholders. The 
exchange of information between the participants located in the operations room and those in the 
adjacent room was less frequent. It seems likely that this physical separation of the participants 
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into two distinct areas could contribute to a reduced synergy between the groups of collective 
stakeholders located in the Centre. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that an increase in the 
exchange of information does not necessarily lead to effective multi-agency coordination. Not all 
information is relevant for all stakeholders. Stakeholders must therefore access information that is 
pertinent to their specific requirements which can then enhance their distributed situation 
awareness.   
These findings indicate that stakeholders may have an overreliance on face-to-face 
communication, rather than using data applications, which was also consistent with the findings of 
the survey. This raises two problems. First, it may indicate that the time taken to share information 
is potentially prolonged. Second, it indicates that information may not be available to others who 
may also find it pertinent.   
The above also highlight the reliance that stakeholders have on extracting information from the 
Centre to send it out to other stakeholder agencies. The way in which stakeholders might be able to 
push information into the Centre and to inform its own operations was also limited. It was 
observed by the researcher that the management team provided clear explanations to the 
participants that if they felt they had any agency information that may be potentially relevant to the 
event they could inform a member of the Centre‟s staff at any time. Once again this may result in 
prolonged information sharing times as well as a loss of intelligence that the Centre may gain from 
information available to its stakeholders. 
Informal sharing of information between stakeholders was also observed. An example of this 
was when a participant in the adjacent room provided information to a member of the mapping 
section as requested. A further example involved a participant located in the operations room 
visiting another participant who was located in the adjacent room to pass on some information that 
they deemed may be advantageous for that participant‟s agency. Both these examples meant that 
the participants had to walk to another location in the Centre to share this information. Although 
this is labour-intensive it did provide confirmation of receipt of the information for the participants 
involved.  
3.3.2 Information technologies 
For operational emails the Centre utilises a single intranet email system used by all agencies 
working in the Centre. During an emergency event this email system also disseminates regular 
situation reports about the event to all agency representatives located in the Centre. The system is 
based upon a standard email format used by many data applications and is thus relatively 
straightforward to function. It was observed that this method provides invaluable information to 
the stakeholders that can be accessed and analysed accordingly. The observations revealed that 
once the information was analysed, the participant typically forwarded a brief synopsis of the 
information relevant to the agency‟s needs to their parent organization. This allowed stakeholders 
operating outside of the Centre to develop their own situation awareness of the event. All 
participants stated that this approach provided them with some element of the information required 
to inform their situation awareness of the event. For example, two of the participants found that the 
predictive mapping information attached in the emails contributed to their situation awareness. In 
particular this information allowed them to identify if any of their agency‟s assets were at risk so 
they could respond accordingly in an effort to mitigate any further risks to the community. 
Nevertheless, contributing to the participants‟ sense making activities involved a familiarity with 
the application software. Three participants had never performed the role in the centre prior to the 
event and thus had no experience operating the intranet email system (see Table 6). This 
contributed to a reduced understanding of the events as evidenced by the self-reported poor or 
average initial rating for the participants‟ situation awareness. Nevertheless, at the end of the 
observational period these three participants perceived that this had improved to a rating of 
average or good. This would suggest that familiarity with this particular application software 
contributed to an increased situation awareness of the event.  
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Again during the observations many of the participants commented they were not specifically 
required (or invited) to feed any information into the Centre‟s intranet email system. Therefore, 
how this application software may be used to share information from the agency representatives 
with each other or with Centre staff was not apparent to the researcher.  
Despite the positive unified nature of a single internet-based email system and the ability to 
share information, the observations identified that there were challenges utilising application 
software. In order for stakeholders to acquire information to inform their distributed situation 
awareness of an event it is important that the application software used in the Centre is accessible. 
It was observed that a number of the participants located in the adjacent room had unsuccessful 
attempts at accessing particular application software. For example, none of the participants in the 
adjacent room could access the fire predictive mapping application software. All these participants 
felt that this application software would be important in identifying the fires proximity to their 
agencies assets and would thus improve their distributed situation awareness. During the 
observation period this was rectified by the Centre management team who provided temporary 
computer access on a visual display unit situated within the room. An impromptu overview of the 
software and its capabilities together with a rudimentary teaching session was given to all 
participants collectively if interested. Prior to this, participants in the adjacent room had to 
physically relocate to the operations room to view this information on one of the numerous visual 
display units.  
 
4 Discussion  
Our findings indicate how stakeholders involved in an emergency operations centre perceive their 
information requirements and how they acquire this information to inform their distributed 
situation awareness.  However, this can be complex for these stakeholders working in a temporary 
supra-organization during an emergency event in a strategic-level state emergency operations 
centre. The most common problem-solving activities involved interpretation and sense-making 
about the implications of the event for stakeholder agencies and their assets. The second most 
common activities involved procuring and managing resources. Yet for these and all other problem 
solving activities, the most predominant artefact in use emphasised personal communication.  
For problem-solving activities such as task execution and managing resources this seems both 
labour-intensive and possibly inefficient. Moreover, the full gamut of potentially available 
artefacts such as fire predictive mapping application software was not employed; with reliance 
mostly on the intranet service. These findings in the survey were triangulated in the observations 
and raised issues of how and why these artefacts were being used in a real emergency event 
Verbal communication in person is not uncommon in emergency events. In the immediate 
aftermath of the 2001 United States World Trade Centre attacks, over forty per cent of 
communications between agencies was conducted in person (Kapucu, 2006a). The survey results 
indicated that only task execution in the problem solving activities in emergency management 
specified that verbal communication in person was the most important interface. However, 
findings from the observations revealed an increased reliance on verbal communication in person 
during the emergency event. This could be attributed to data applications not having the ability to 
reduce the operator‟s workload and stakeholder unfamiliarity with certain application software. 
However, findings from the observational study also identified that formal briefings were seen as 
important artefacts in acquiring information to inform stakeholder situation awareness. The 
observations identified that all participants attended every formal briefing with many stating the 
importance they associated with this artefact. Nevertheless, formal briefings were not the only 
method of personal communication that was identified in the observations. Informal conversations 
amongst personnel in the centre elicited information that may not be immediately available at 
formal briefings or on application software. The observations identified numerous occasions when 
information was either picked up or given to the participants casually in a passing comment.  
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The use of cognitive artefacts in facilitating stakeholder‟s ability to acquire information to 
inform their situation awareness in an emergency event is not only dependent on the type of 
artefact used but on the stakeholder‟s physical location in the emergency operations centre. There 
is a necessity to ensure that all stakeholders in an emergency operations centre have access to the 
full complement of cognitive artefacts crucial in providing information about the event (Militello 
et al., 2007). However, findings from the observations indicate that the participant‟s location 
within the Centre often contributed to their capacity to access data applications. Within the study 
setting participants not located in the operations room often had difficulties accessing data 
applications and missed out on information from informal conversations.  
There are a number of challenges that can inhibit emergency management personnel to acquire 
information to inform their distributed situation awareness in the emergency operations centre. 
The use of application software was highlighted as the most important interface used in three of 
the problem solving activities and was deemed the most appropriate for modelling purposes such 
as fire predictive mapping application software. However, the stakeholder‟s lack of familiarity 
with the software is a perpetual challenge in emergency management. Subsequently, there is a 
requirement for disaster management information systems to be incorporated into simulation 
training to increase familiarity with the system (Turoff, Chumer, Hiltz, et al., 2004; Turoff, 
Chumer, Van de Walle, et al., 2004). The observational study identified challenges with the 
unfamiliarity of data applications. This was apparent in the first few hours of observations when 
stakeholders unfamiliar with the intranet email software cited this as a reason for their poor or 
average situation awareness. According to our findings, stakeholders had difficulty accessing some 
of the application software required in the acquisition of information. Other than the intranet email 
systems, selected data applications were not available to stakeholders using non-emergency 
operations centre information technology structures. A further challenge regarding the use of data 
applications is a lack of financial resources and deficiency in collaboration between agencies, 
particularly regarding privacy and security barriers. These have been identified as obstacles to the 
adoption of a collaborative approach to data applications in emergency management (Kruchten et 
al., 2008; Ley et al., 2012; Reddick, 2011). Finally, data applications need the capability to reduce 
the operator‟s workload. Any artefact providing information needs to be sufficiently flexible and 
able to ensure that relevant information reaches the appropriate agencies in a valid format and in a 
timely manner to facilitate effective action (Comfort et al., 2004). Findings from the observations 
indicated that because the Centre intranet email system had limited capability to input information 
from stakeholders, the participants used verbal communication in person to fulfil this task.   
 
5 Conclusion  
Acquiring adequate information in an emergency management event is challenging for those 
involved due to the uncertain and dynamic characteristics of emergencies. The formation of a 
temporary supra-organization in emergency management to address meta-problems is faced with 
multiple complications. The findings indicate how stakeholders perceive their need of information 
using cognitive artefacts and how this is actually achieved. The data reveals a reliance on verbal 
face to face communications in these circumstances. This has inherent risks and limitations for 
stakeholders obtaining information to inform their distributed situation awareness. There is a need 
to understand why certain cognitive artefacts are not exploited. The problem solving activities 
identified as task execution and sense-making emphasise a dependence on verbal face to face 
communications. Supporting these activities with specialised cognitive artefacts such as 
designated disaster management information systems may be beneficial. These cognitive artefacts 
are designed to specifically increase the efficient and timely exchange of information (Comfort et 
al., 2004). This would allow more time to be devoted to other problem solving activities such as 
strategic planning. A further challenge with relying on verbal face to face communications is that 
information flow is predominantly one way and taken from the Centre and not fed into the Centre 
from the stakeholders. The data suggest there is an assumption that the purpose of the Centre is to 
disseminate information outwards towards the organizational boundary. However, the core Centre 
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management team, which consists of units such as planning and intelligence, are reliant on 
information that is systematically fed from the organizational boundary into the Centre. Cognitive 
artefacts that solely rely on users to store the information, such as verbal face to face 
communications, face the risk of information remaining with that particular user and not available 
on a shared systems platform. This can result in delayed information and a potential deterioration 
of distributed situation awareness. We recommend that further research is necessary to understand 
why some cognitive artefacts such as data applications are not utilised more frequently in 
emergency operation centres. Exploring how such artefacts may be better aligned with user needs 
to obtain information for stakeholders involved with emergency management multi-agency 
coordination are also required. These issues are important to the future of emergency management 
with disasters often requiring the involvement and coordination of multiple agency stakeholders in 
temporary supra-organizations. 
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Appendix 
 
Organizational survey questions 
 
Demographics 
1 Please tell us about yourself 
 Name: 
 Organization: 
 Position: 
 Location: 
 State: 
 E-mail: 
 
Your role 
 
2 What sector or group do you most represent? 
3 What is the type of incident or emergency is your main responsibility? 
4 What is your most senior role during an incident? 
5 What incident management team section do you work in? (Pick your most senior role here) 
 Controller 
 Operations 
 Public information 
 Planning 
 Logistics 
 Other 
 
6 For how many years have you been in this role? 
 
Information for decisions 
 
7 What are the most important decisions/actions you make in your role as [Q4] 
8 What is the key information you use for making these decisions? 
 
Obtaining information in emergency management 157 
9 Where do you get this key information from? 
 
(Here we are asking you what information you need to enable you to make the decisions you make 
and where you get it from. Please select the top three answers to each question) 
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Information formats 
 
10 In what form, and how important, is the key information you currently use in your [Q3] 
activities? PART I 
 Verbal in person 
 Verbal telephone 
 Verbal agency radio 
 Verbal broadcast radio 
 Text SMS/pager 
 Text PDF/DOC 
 
11 In what form, and how important, is the key information you currently use in your [Q3] 
activities? PART II 
 Data PC application 
 Data agency (intranet) website 
 Data website/social media 
 Map printed 
 Map book 
 Map agency application/intranet 
 Map public website 
 
12 In what form, and how important, is the key information you currently use in your [Q3] 
activities? PART III 
 Photos MMS (via phone) 
 Photos camera (PC) 
 Photos online 
 Video Camera 
 Video Live streaming (e.g. CCTV or Web) 
 Video TV 
 
(For the above three questions please rate as: not important; slightly important; somewhat 
important; very important; and extremely important) 
 
Information sharing 
 
13 What is the most important information do you share with others during an incident? 
 
(Here we are asking how much you share data with others and the issues associated with sharing. 
Please list the top three answers) 
 
14 How do you currently share data and information with others during an incident and how 
important is it? 
 Voice in person 
 Voice telephone 
 Voice teleconference 
 Voice agency 
 Voice broadcast radio 
 Video broadcast TV 
 Video conference 
 
(For the above question please rate as: not important; slightly important; somewhat important; 
very important; and extremely important) 
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Appendix D: Paper IV 
 
Title  
Role clarity, swift trust and multi-agency coordination 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to further the understanding of swift trust in temporary 
organizations by examining the role swift trust plays in emergency management 
coordination and how role clarity acts as an enabler within temporary organisational 
configurations A qualitative interview study was conducted with 32 liaison officers 
working in 3 strategic level emergency operations centres in Australia. Role clarity was 
identified as an important factor in the successful formation of emergency management 
temporary organizations by emergency services and critical infrastructure liaison officers 
working in multi-agency arrangements. By providing role clarity, liaison officers may 
enable collaborative working practices between organizations involved in emergency 
management and thus facilitate multi-agency coordination. The function of role clarity in 
the context of swift trust is largely overlooked in emergency management. Therefore this 
study has contributed to the knowledge of swift trust by empirically verifying the impact 
of role clarity by liaison officers working in the research setting. 
Keywords - Swift trust, Emergency management, Liaison officer, Emergency operations 
centre, Role clarity 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Disasters of any magnitude will require government to mount a response that will 
invariably require an emergency management multi-agency approach involving not only 
the traditional emergency services but also non-emergency organizations including 
critical infrastructure agencies, the military and non-for profit organizations (Scholtens, 
2008; Schraagen & Van de Ven, 2008; Van Scotter, Pawlowski, & Cu, 2012). 
Stakeholders representing their organization are often called liaison officers (Wolbers & 
Boersma, 2013). In the absence of prior inter-agency development, liaison officers 
involved with  emergency management multi-agency arrangements can encounter 
increased conflict and confusion (Paton & Auld, 2006; Paton, Johnston, Houghton, & 
Smith, 1998; Paton & Owen, 2013). This can be particularly challenging for 
organizations that are not emergency services, such as critical infrastructure organizations, 
which may not regularly work in an emergency management environment and are often 
culturally different from their emergency services counterparts. Trust is often vital in 
securing sustainable relationships among these disparate organizations and is especially 
evident in ambiguous situations characterized by uncertainty as experienced in 
emergency management. However, developing and maintaining trust between culturally 
dissimilar organizations is a formidable challenge.  
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Liaison officers from different organizations can bring conflicting cultural beliefs, 
behaviours and assumptions which can prevent successful interaction and collaboration 
(Dietz, Gillespie, & Chao, 2010). The emergency services often have similar command 
structures and work together in routine operations as well as collaborating in crises. 
Consequently, the familiarity that is gained over time between emergency services, that 
can include the crucial factor of understanding other agencies roles,  can foster a sense of 
trust among these different personnel (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). In contrast, liaison officers 
from non-emergency services such as those from critical infrastructure organizations may 
not have the luxury of building relationships over time and thus do not have the 
opportunity to learn and understand each other‟s roles. Consequently, this could lead to 
these liaison officers facing challenges associated with gaining trust in emergency 
management arrangements. The importance of considering trust derives from its function 
in determining understanding and performance in circumstances characterised by high 
uncertainty in which people become highly reliant on others for information and for 
decision making (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). This makes it an important construct 
when developing multi-agency relationships and makes its consideration crucial when 
opportunities to develop it prior to events. Without trust, teams focus on task demands, 
not teamwork, reducing their effectiveness to meet the emerging needs during a disaster 
(Pollock, Paton, Smith, & Violanti, 2003). Due to the dynamic and temporal nature of 
emergency management, liaison officers not from the emergency services may need to 
adopt alternative ways of developing trust. 
A different method that may be suited to emergency management is the concept of 
swift trust. Swift trust has less emphasis on the traditional form of trust building that often 
develops and strengthens over time which is based primarily on personalities and 
interpersonal relationships (Kramer, 1999). In contrast, swift trust is characterised by 
actions that are not necessarily constrained by time and are driven by the generic features 
of the setting rather than personalities. In these settings trust in temporary teams is 
enhanced by role clarity and by people dealing with each other more as roles than as 
individuals (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). Consequently when there is no time to 
engage in the usual forms of confidence-building activities that contribute to the 
development and maintenance of trust, providing clarity of the individuals specific role as 
identified in swift trust, may be an alternative form of trust building suited to temporary 
organizations (Meyerson et al., 1996) such as those typically found in emergency 
management multi-agency coordination.  
Therefore, the aim of this article is to further the understanding of swift trust in 
emergency management temporary organizations by exploring if role clarity acts as a 
means to improving multi-agency coordination.  
 
2. Swift trust 
A significant amount of research has been conducted by a diverse range of disciplines 
exploring the definition of trust (see for example Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1995; Pollock et al., 2003; Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). In 
organizational science trust has been described as an expectancy held by an individual 
that the advice offered by another individual or organization can be relied upon (Rotter, 
1980). Other definitions describe trust as a set of expectations shared by all individuals 
involved in an exchange (Zucker, 1986) or as an agent-principal relationship (Shapiro, 
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1987). However, there appears to be a consensus that trust is highly beneficial to the 
functioning of organizations (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). This understanding of trust in 
organizations is often regarded as something that develops and strengthens over time 
(Kramer, 1999; Mayer, Davis, & Schhorman, 1995). However this may not always be 
possible in temporary groups that comprise of a set of diversely skilled people who are 
expected to work collaboratively on a complex task often under time constraints 
(Goodman & Goodman, 1976).  
In emergency management events, liaison officers from multiple organizations who do 
not often work together are expected to operate synergistically. Nevertheless, due to the 
often cultural differences between these organizations, the configuration of temporary 
supra-organizations in time critical environments such as emergency operations centres is 
challenging. Research conducted by Goodman and Goodman (1976) identified that some 
temporary groups that do not have a history of trust development display behaviours that 
presuppose trust. This was an important finding as trust has been identified to influence 
an organizations intention to collaborate (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). The fast action 
requirements of many temporary collaborative working organizations (Faraj & Xiao, 
2006) means there is often little time to develop trust in the traditional ways (Hyllengren 
et al., 2011). This led to a new form of trust described by Meyerson, Weick and Kramer 
(1996), as swift trust. This concept may be more suited to temporary organizations such 
as those that operate in emergency management.  
Swift trust has been defined as a practice that involves the collective perception and 
ability to relate matters that are capable of addressing topics pertaining to vulnerability, 
uncertainty, risk and expectations in short-lived temporary organizations (Meyerson et al., 
1996). Embedded in swift trust are systems and temporary organizational configurations 
that are evident in emergency management multi-agency coordination. The requirements 
for swift trust to occur in temporary organizations necessitate that the individual involved 
apply specific roles. In their pivotal research describing the concept of swift trust, 
Meyerson et al (1996) posited that what was important  in temporary organizations is the 
requirement to „get things done‟ influenced by the ability to develop shared 
understanding of (evolving) situations and the respective roles of the different 
stakeholders involved. This highlights the avoidance of personal disclosure strategies that 
are evident in traditional forms of trust building over a prolonged period of time, in 
favour of a reliance and absorption in the task driven by the generic features of the setting 
(Meyerson et al., 1996). Therefore, we are including the concept of trust in this context 
and particularly the dimension of providing role clarity, as it has been found to be a 
valuable idea in temporary organizations such as the short term supra-organizations found 
in strategic level emergency management arrangements.  
Research regarding swift trust is limited in the emergency management literature. 
However, the concept of swift trust has been applied extensively to the working practices 
of global virtual teams that epitomize the temporary organizations and requirements for 
adopting this concept (see for examples, Coppola, Hiltz, & Rotter, 2004; Crisp & 
Jarvenpaa, 2013; Robert, Denis, & Hung, 2009; White, Plotnick, Addams-Moring, Turoff, 
& Hiltz, 2008).   But for this study we drew upon literature that acknowledges the 
importance of swift trust in a military context. Military combat units and emergency 
response teams are often formed of complete strangers from different branches and 
organizations that must perform immediately, frequently in life or death situations 
(Wildman, Fiore, Burke, & Salas, 2011).  Therefore due to the similarities between the 
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military and emergency management, we explored emergent literature in this domain to 
further explore the dimension of role clarity in swift trust.  
In the military, professional competency is built upon role clarity (Paparone, 2002). In 
a review of the literature exploring the development of interpersonal trust, Adams and 
Webb (2002), explored its application within small military teams. They posited that in a 
military context, competence and in particular expert knowledge of the soldiers role, were 
important factors influencing person-based trust (Adams & Webb, 2002). In addition, 
providing clarity of a soldier‟s role capability could promote trust in small military teams. 
The importance of role clarity is further explored in the following research projects 
conducted with soldiers involved in temporary military groups. 
Hyllengren et al (2011) conducted a questionnaire with 591 Norwegian and Swedish 
military leaders that were at differing stages of their careers that sought to illuminate 
factors that benefited or inhibited the development of swift trust in the leaders of 
temporary military groups. In a model of factors contributing to swift trust, individual-
related characteristics based on experience and competency, highlighted that specialist 
knowledge was a contributing factor to developing swift trust. It appears that clarification 
of the persons specialist knowledge and therefore subsequent role in the team resulted in 
an acceptance of that persons competency and ultimately the formation of trust building 
(Hyllengren et al., 2011). Lester and Vogelgesang (2012) also examined the concept of 
swift trust in military leaders. Among the factors identified in initiating swift trust was the 
officers expertise and knowledge in their role (Lester & Vogelgesang, 2012). The 
importance of understanding other people‟s knowledge and capabilities in small military 
teams was also identified by Ben-Shalom, Lehrer and Ben-Ari (2005). A qualitative 
anthropological study that was conducted in the Israeli Defence Force during the Al-
Aqsa-Intifada between 2000 and 2001, sought to study the importance of swift trust in 
temporary military groups. Data from interviews conducted with 130 combat soldiers 
revealed that troops often interacted with “roles” rather than personalities. Consequently, 
during the first meeting role clarity was crucial in terms of developing swift trust as the 
soldiers had to trust that the other soldiers they worked with had a clear understanding 
how to perform their own job (Ben-Shalom, Lehrer, & Ben-Ari, 2005).  
The importance of role clarity is also identified in research investigating the 
challenges of forming trusting relationships in multinational military forces. In a 
theoretical analysis of previous findings investigating United Nations peace keeping 
operations, Elron, Shamir and Ben-Ari (1999), identified the value of swift trust including 
the importance of role clarity. The authors found that soldiers of multinational forces 
have repeatedly had to learn to work together “on the job” as there was often little time 
for the development of integrated force culture. Therefore  contributing to swift trust in 
this setting was the shared professionalism of the soldiers that involved a clear 
understanding between parties of their particular tasks and roles (Elron, Shamir, & Ben-
Ari, 1999). Similarly, using survey data collected from a European Union military 
mission in Bosnia-Herzegovia, Maniscalco, Aubry and Rosato (2008) revealed some of 
the contributing factors associated with the dynamics of cooperation in multicultural and 
multinational forces. A survey conducted with 551 soldiers based in Mostar representing 
the countries of Spain, France, Italy and Germany, revealed that in large scale 
multinational work units, role clarity was one of the fundamental elements for the success 
of complex military organizations (Maniscalco, Aubry, & Rosato, 2008). The literature 
investigating the concept of swift trust in the military is still in its infancy (Hyllengren et 
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al., 2011), nevertheless, preliminary research conducted in this environment has clearly 
indicated the importance of role clarity. 
 
3. Methodology  
The participants in this study were part of a larger interview schedule that was aligned to 
a project investigating how liaison officers in emergency management use boundary 
spanning activities in temporary supra-organizations to facilitate multi-agency 
coordination. The findings from the aforementioned research project are published in four 
papers (names deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process). The interview data 
used in this article was collected from thirty-two participants that were from two groups, 
the emergency services and critical infrastructure organizations. All participants work 
within multi-agency arrangements in one of three strategic level emergency operations 
centres in the Australian states of New South Wales, Victoria or Tasmania. Ethics 
approval was received from the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics 
Committee in Australia (Ethics Ref No: H0008810) and followed the protocols for 
provision of information and consent.  
The interviews were all audio recorded and transcribed verbatim by a professional 
transcriber prior to data analysis. The interviews lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes 
generating transcripts of between 3,500 and 11,000 words. The interview transcripts were 
returned to the participants for checking and to ensure accuracy with any alterations made 
by the participants changed in the transcript prior to data analysis. Underpinning the 
analysis of the data for the entire research project was an inductive approach (Charmaz, 
2006; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This phase was completed with the aid of the data 
analysis software QSR-NVivo 10. The data for the entire research project yielded a total 
of six major themes: (1) attitude towards others; (2) challenges; (3) contributes to 
success; (4) attributes; (5) purpose; and (6) roles. For the purpose of this study the data 
was re-examined in relation to the issue of interest which were the participant‟s reference 
to the topic of role clarity. This ensuing data was linked to two of the major themes, 
challenges and contributes to success. Two sub themes for this study were subsequently 
generated. Firstly, how role clarity was associated with the challenges of facilitating 
multi-agency coordination. Secondly, how role clarity could be used as a mechanism to 
facilitate successful multi-agency coordination. To ensure validity and reliability a 
predefined coding framework was developed by the initial researcher. Two of the co-
authors reapplied the coding framework to the data and using Cohen‟s Kappa coefficient 
statistical measurement achieved an aggregate inter-rater reliability of 72.5% indicating a 
substantial level of agreement (Fleiss, Levin, & Paik, 2003).  
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Table I. Participant demographics  
Group Specific agency (number of participants) 
Critical infrastructure (16 pax) 
 
Energy (5) 
Water (3) 
Transport (5) 
Communications (2) 
Health (1) 
 
Emergency services (16 pax) 
 
Police (2) 
Fire (7) 
Ambulance (2) 
State Emergency Service
2
 (5) 
 
4. Findings  
Interestingly, the two sub themes pertaining to role clarity that emerged from the data 
could be sub-divided into two groups. Firstly, in their experiences the critical 
infrastructure liaison officers all associated role clarity in a negative context and as a 
barrier or challenge to facilitating multi-agency coordination. The second group consisted 
of liaison officers from the emergency services who deemed that role clarity was 
imperative to the success of multi-agency coordination efforts.  
Role ambiguity 
Data from the interviews indicated that critical infrastructure liaison officers perceived 
that personnel from the emergency services did not fully understand their role within the 
emergency operations centre. This role ambiguity was perceived as a challenge to 
fostering trusting relationships and ultimately facilitating multi-agency coordination. This 
is echoed by the following participants: 
„So we‟re right alongside the emergency services right from the very start.  We 
have a really good understanding of what they do. However, they don‟t necessarily 
have a good understanding of our role.‟ Health liaison officer  
„Quite often some of the emergency services don‟t really understand our business 
or role. For example, we can‟t just open a road after clearing debris following a 
landslide, we also have to make sure it‟s structurally safe, sometimes they don‟t 
understand that‟. Transport liaison officer 1  
„I suppose it‟s an issue across people who work in emergency operations centres 
that they need to have a common understanding of roles and responsibilities (of 
other organizations), so they can contribute to the emergency outcomes and also 
the decision making process.‟ Transport liaison officer 3  
„One of my experiences was that clarity of who we were, why we were there, and 
what we were there for (our role). This wasn‟t clear to everybody so I must have 
                                                          
2
 The State Emergency Service (SES) is a predominantly volunteer organization responsible for 
responding to flood and storm hazardous events. 
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re-explained myself to fifty different people during the event.‟ Energy liaison 
officer1 
„Three times I had our liaison officer say to their (emergency services) controller, 
“just sit down, where are you going, how can we help you, we don‟t want anything 
from you, we want to help you”. It was a big difference in culture, they‟re 
obviously of the opinion that everyone always comes in and they always want 
something from them. So I guess the point is that different organizations have 
different maturities of understanding what our role is.‟ Communications liaison 
officer 2 
“I think it works both ways, we are aware of the information they (the emergency 
services) want but we need to ensure that the emergency services understand the 
seriousness (of our information) and ultimately our role because we might see a 
situation that we think threatens the community.” Water liaison officer 2 
Data from the critical infrastructure participants revealed a deficit of interagency 
knowledge by the emergency services. This lack of understanding by the emergency 
services of the critical infrastructure liaison officer‟s role in the research setting often led 
to a lack of recognition. Given the complexity of the emergency services, personnel 
within these organizations often rely on a pre-existing knowledge base and the 
requirements of the other emergency services workers, a concept referred to as 
interpositional knowledge (Ford & Schmidt, 2000). However, critical infrastructure 
liaison officers might not frequently interact with the emergency services and therefore 
may not have the opportunity to profit from interpositional knowledge. The participants 
from critical infrastructure organizations identified that a deficit in role clarification by 
emergency services personnel was a constraint when working in emergency management 
arrangements.  
Role clarity as an enabler 
Corroborating the importance of role clarity in the research setting was data from the 
emergency services liaison officers. The following examples from the raw data indicated 
that the emergency services personnel believed that liaison officer‟s required clarity of 
their own role and also the roles of liaison officers from other agencies. This was 
considered as an important contributing factor to the success of multi-agency 
coordination when working in a strategic level emergency operations centre. This is 
described by the following emergency services participants: 
„So to ensure that you get the job done you actually need people (liaison officers) 
to know the facility, understand what the other organizations have to offer and they 
have to know their roles.‟ Police liaison officer 1 
„At the moment what can happen, and we‟ve had it in the past with energy 
personnel, liaison officers sit at the computer and they didn‟t really know their 
roles.‟ Fire services liaison officer 2 
„It is a work in progress to understand how each of the organizations work…they 
(other organizations) need to understand what they do and then form those 
relationships which make it easier to actually manage an emergency to a successful 
conclusion.‟ Fire services liaison officer 4 
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„So they (the liaison officers) really need an in-depth knowledge of the types of 
roles that they can play, what they can do, what they can‟t do, the equipment that 
they‟ve got, and all those sorts of things‟. State Emergency Services liaison officer 
2 
The importance of role clarification is evident in the data and expressed by participants 
from critical infrastructure organizations and those representing the emergency services. 
Nevertheless, based on this data there is an obvious disconnect between the two groups 
with one group perceiving role clarity as a barrier and the second group identifying role 
clarity as an enabler in facilitating multi-agency coordination. However, the findings did 
not disclose how role clarity should be clarified between liaison officers.  
 
5. Discussion  
The evidence presented from the participants in this study suggests that role clarity is an 
important mechanism in facilitating multi-agency coordination in a strategic level 
emergency operations centre. It is noteworthy that participants from the emergency 
services specified that role clarification was a contributing factor to the success of liaison 
officers working in strategic emergency operations centres. In contrast, liaison officers 
from critical infrastructure organizations identified that a knowledge deficiency or lack of 
understanding regarding their role by emergency services personnel was deemed a 
constraint when working in a strategic level emergency operations centre.  
The contrasting negative and positive views of role clarity elicited from participants 
representing both groups would indicate that there is a disconnect between the two. The 
data found that both groups understood the importance of role clarity in the formation of 
temporary organizations. However, there was an expectation from the critical 
infrastructure liaison officers that the emergency services personnel should have an 
existing understanding of their role. The view from the emergency services participants 
was that other organizations should clearly understood their own role as this would 
contribute to the success of working within multi-agency coordination arrangements. 
Clearly there is an expectation by all the participants in this study that role clarity is 
imperative in strategic level emergency operations centres, but it was unclear whose 
responsibility it was for attaining clarity of the role.  
Liaison officers working within temporary organizations that are often formed in 
strategic level emergency operations centres require complete comprehension of their role. 
We posit that it is essential that this is explained to personnel from all organizations 
succinctly upon first contact, particularly in the response phase of a disaster. The 
importance of rapid role clarification between personnel from different organizations has 
been acknowledged in the literature investigating swift trust in a military context (Ben-
Shalom et al., 2005; Hyllengren et al., 2011; Lester & Vogelgesang, 2012; Paparone, 
2002). Furthermore, this also raises the possibility that scenario planning could be used 
by the emergency services and critical infrastructure organizations to more clearly 
articulate non-routine operating parameters and relationships. Even if the respective 
organizations do not have the scope to work together, scenario planning/concept mapping 
could increase recognition of the potential roles and relationships that are required and so 
help create a context in which swift trust could occur (Anderson et al., 2006; Schoemaker, 
1995). 
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This study has confirmed the importance of role clarity in the rapid formation of 
temporary organizations. Other research on swift trust seems to imply this but to the best 
of our knowledge it has yet to examine this in the complex and dynamic environment of 
emergency management. Therefore this study has contributed to the knowledge of swift 
trust in an emergency management context by empirically verifying the impact and 
importance of role clarity from liaison officers working in three Australian strategic level 
emergency operations centres. 
 
6. Potential limitations 
We acknowledge the limitations of the small sample size and the fact that the participants 
represented only three strategic level emergency operations centres in Australia. 
Nevertheless, despite the relatively small sample size, we believe that specifically using 
data from participants that are not traditionally the focus of emergency management 
research (which is predominantly dominated by the emergency services) provided us with 
the opportunity to focus on not only the emergency services liaison officers but also the 
unique requirements of critical infrastructure liaison officers involved in multi-agency 
coordination arrangements.   
 
7. Implications for industry 
The concept of swift trust has substantial implications for practice. Emergency 
management multi-agency coordination is characterised by the rapid formation of a 
temporary supra-organization requiring liaison officers from an often disparate group of 
organizations each with their own organizational cultures. The collaboration required for 
the success of these temporary supra-organizations often requires differing organizational 
liaison officers involved to have a trusting inter-personal relationship. De-personalising 
the working relationship and providing role clarification can mean that the trustor can 
make a judgement on other colleagues ability based on the fact that they have specialised 
knowledge required to fulfil a particular role (Kramer, 1999). Enacting a dimension of 
swift trust termed role clarity may enable collaborative working practices between 
organizations thus facilitating emergency management multi-agency coordination.  
 
8. Conclusion 
We suggest that there is clear potential for role clarity in the context of swift trust to be 
embraced by liaison officers involved in emergency management multi-agency 
coordination arrangements.  Clearly, further research regarding the concept of swift trust 
in an emergency management context needs to be performed. Nevertheless, while 
emergency management arrangements continue to necessitate a multi-agency approach, 
liaison officers involved in these arrangements will be required to build trusting 
relationships swiftly.  
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 Multi-agency coordination represents a significant challenge in emergency management. The 
need for liaison officers working in strategic level emergency operations centres to play 
organizational boundary spanning roles within multi-agency coordination arrangements that 
are enacted in complex and dynamic emergency response scenarios creates significant 
research and practical challenges. The aim of the paper is to address a gap in the literature 
regarding the concept of multi-agency coordination from a human environment interaction 
perspective. We present a theoretical framework for facilitating multiagency coordination in 
emergency management that is grounded in human factors and ergonomics using the 
methodology of core-task analysis. As a result we believe the framework will enable liaison 
officers to cope more efficiently within the work domain. In addition, we provide suggestions 
for extending the theory of core-task analysis to an alternate high reliability environment. 
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1. Introduction  
Managing disasters in the context of 
environmental change represents an increasing 
global challenge (Comfort and Kapucu, 2006; 
Van Scotter et al., 2012). Disasters are 
becoming increasingly regular occurrences that, 
if not managed well will continue to disrupt 
and threaten individual lives, communities, 
organizations and indeed economies. Modern 
day disasters require agencies to transition from 
independent agencies and assemble into 
temporary supra-organizations (in which their 
“routine” expertise evolves to encompass a 
multi-agency management capability and in 
which routine and emergency actions need to 
be combined and applied appropriately to 
respond to situational demands that change 
over time) that collectively address problems 
that are beyond the capacity of any single 
agency (Janssen et al., 2010; Meyerson et al., 
1996). These temporary supra-organizations 
operate in an environment that is inherently 
complex and dynamic (Walker et al., 2014). 
This supra-organization typically includes 
members drawn from many tens of public and 
private agencies who never or very rarely 
interact together. This involves not only the 
traditional emergency services but also non-
emergency agencies including the military, 
non-government organizations and those form 
critical infrastructure such as energy, water, 
communications and transport agencies 
(Scholtens, 2008; Schraagen and Van de Ven, 
2008). Not only must members of these diverse 
agencies interact with people, roles and areas of 
expertise that they are unfamiliar with, they 
have to do so  (i.e., when disaster strikes) under 
high risk, high stress conditions. The crucial 
role these emergent supra-organizational 
agencies play in facilitating effective and 
expedient disaster recovery highlights the 
importance of systematically researching the 
factors that influence the development of 
effective multi-agency actions and using this to 
inform the creation of effective comprehensive 
emergency management. This issue takes on 
even greater significance when key 
organizational contributions are made by 
agencies not typically regarded as emergency 
response agencies (e.g., critical infrastructure 
agencies).  
These agencies with differing social 
histories, organizational cultures, operating 
practices, crisis management experience and 
areas of expertise come to have a role in 
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disaster response because the demands of the 
situation require their expertise (e.g., lifeline 
companies and building contractors collaborate 
with emergency management agencies to 
support response and recovery). However, 
relationships of this nature are not the norm and 
if a disaster brings together diverse agencies 
this means that, in the absence of prior 
development activities, they are likely to act in 
an autonomous manner. This increases the 
likelihood that their interaction will be 
characterized by frequent conflict (e.g., as 
cultures and operating practices collide) 
regarding objectives because organizations act 
based upon their particular needs and ways of 
operating and not the collective management of 
complex multi-faceted needs (e.g., Paton and 
Auld, 2006).  
To counter this dysfunctional outcome and 
achieve effective coordination (that will be 
required over weeks or months) agencies have 
to span several organizational boundaries to 
provide linkages that facilitate information 
sharing,  cooperation and decision making 
(Harrald, 2006; Janssen et al., 2010). 
Information sharing is a necessity to satisfy the 
information requirements of the multiple 
agencies involved in the relief efforts in a 
struggle to inform the situation awareness 
essential for agency interpretation of 
information from diverse sources (Curnin and 
Owen, 2013) in order to develop the shared 
situational awareness required to facilitate 
inter-agency cooperation in complex, multi-
faceted environments.  Particular agency 
stakeholders are fundamental to the success of 
agencies informing their situation awareness 
and facilitating the linkages across 
organizational boundaries.  These stakeholders 
working at the boundaries of organizations are 
often deemed to be practicing „boundary 
spanning‟ activities. In emergency management 
these stakeholders are habitually called liaison 
officers (Helsloot, 2005; Perry, 2003; Wolbers 
and Boersma, 2013). However, multi-agency 
coordination in emergency management and 
specifically the role of liaison officers is 
problematic due to a myriad of social, 
organizational and technological complexities 
(McMaster and Baber, 2012). 
Globally, both natural and man-made 
disasters such as the World Trade Centre 
attacks in 2001, the European heat wave in 
2003, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Haiti 
earthquake in 2010 and the Fukishima nuclear 
incident in 2011 give prominence to the 
vulnerability of society to suddenly-occurring 
events whose scale, complexity and duration 
transcend the management capability of any 
one organization. In an Australian context and 
as one of the most bushfire  prone areas in the 
world, Australia has also been affected by 
recent disasters such as the 2009 Black 
Saturday bushfires in the state of Victoria. 
Being able to manage the devastating impact of 
these complex, multi-faceted long-duration 
disasters is of paramount importance due to the 
increased susceptibility of societies to 
experiencing such events (Comfort et al., 1999). 
Crucial to this process are the lifelines (e.g., 
utilities, roads etc.) that can be disrupted or 
damaged by hazard events.  
Communities have an increasing reliance on 
the effective functioning of public services to 
maintain a quality of life and encourage 
economic growth (Boin and McConnell, 2007). 
However, this dependence is impacted during 
disasters when significant damage to critical 
infrastructures (e.g., loss of power, water, 
sewerage, telecommunications, etc.) deprives 
citizens of basic services, and thus their 
capacity to recover normal functioning, often 
for considerable periods of time. In an effort to 
mitigate the impact of these disruptions on 
affected communities, and facilitate societal 
response and recovery form hazard 
consequences, agencies involved in emergency 
management arrangements require a 
coordinated approach to facilitate recovery 
from events that have created widespread loss 
of utilities, infrastructure and services. 
However, the problem of multi-agency 
coordination in emergency management is not 
well understood and certainly not well 
theorised. The lack of rigorous, systematically 
developed theory has meant that response 
management has tended to be ad hoc.  
A consequence of the ad hoc nature of 
response has been that the importance of 
coordination in emergency events is more often 
highlighted by coordination failure. Several 
articles  (see Comfort & Kapucu, 2006; Wise, 
2006) and  post-event inquiries (e.g. Moynihan, 
2007; Teague, McLeod, & Pascoe, 2010) have 
highlighted these problems and identified the 
need for improvements to multi-agency 
coordination in emergency management.  
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1.1 Multi-agency coordination 
Emergency management multi-agency 
coordination can occur concurrently at several 
hierarchical levels within organizations to 
address operational, tactical and strategic 
demands (Paton and Owen, 2013). Australian 
emergency management arrangements follow 
similar concepts used in other countries such as 
the National Incident Management System 
(Walsh et al., 2011) used in the US and the 
gold–silver–bronze command structure (Pearce 
and Fortune, 2006) adopted in the UK. In an 
Australian context the operational level 
typically occurs locally and activation ensues at 
the onset of an incident. The tactical level will 
result at a regional level and is often invoked 
for multiple incidents within the same locality. 
Finally, strategic arrangements transpire at a 
state or national level for multiple incidents 
over numerous jurisdictions and offer critical 
direction to the overall emergency events. 
Multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional issues 
arise at all these levels.  
Multi-agency coordination in emergency 
management can take place informally in 
temporary locations at the incident site (e.g., 
between fire, police and critical infrastructure 
representatives) or in a structured environment 
such as an established emergency operations 
centre. At a strategic level temporary supra-
organizations invariably assemble at a 
designated emergency operations centre. This 
theoretical framework has focused on strategic 
level emergency operations centres as a 
deficiency in the situation awareness of 
agencies at this strategic level can filter down 
and affect a decision making capability which 
can impact actions at the tactical and 
operational level. Ultimately strategic 
emergency management arrangements are 
instrumental in facilitating and safeguarding 
community welfare and mitigating the 
consequences of risk to the affected citizens 
(over the whole recovery and reconstruction 
phases of disaster response). Mitigation 
strategies can only succeed with effective 
multi-agency coordination among the diverse 
agencies involved. Because effective 
coordination requires a comprehensive 
overview of what has happened and what will 
happen and that will need to be responded to, 
liaison officers at a strategic level are therefore 
crucial in facilitating the prescribed multi-
agency coordination efforts and sustained them 
over time against a backdrop of changing 
demands and organizational involvement. 
Liaison officers are a key enabler in 
fostering functional linkages between 
organizations that are required to gain situation 
awareness of complex, multi-faceted events 
(Harrald, 2006; McGuire and Silvia, 2010). In 
spite of this crucial role little is known about 
how liaison officers are selected, trained or 
how they influence inter-agency coordination 
or what factors and capabilities they contribute 
to the effectiveness of disaster management 
(Janssen et al., 2010).  
In fostering linkages across organizational 
boundaries liaison officers are confronted with 
a conglomerate of constraints in the multi-
agency environment. These include but are not 
limited to role clarity and cultural differences 
between agencies (Marcus et al., 2006), 
information uncertainty (Doyle et al., 2014; 
Van de Walle and Turoff, 2008), fast action 
requirements (Janssen et al., 2010), and inter-
organizational (Harrald, 2006) and inter-
jurisdictional complexities (Paton and Auld, 
2006). These challenges can be associated with 
the dynamic, complex and often uncertain 
domain where multi-agency arrangements are 
undertaken in a strategic level emergency 
operations centre. Therefore exploration of this 
phenomenon required an appropriate 
methodological framework suited to high 
reliability environments. 
1.2 Core-task analysis 
Core-task analysis adopts a systemic notion 
of human activity where the situated actions are 
conceived from an ecological, human-
environment interaction perspective with the 
aim of identifying the core-task of a specific 
working practice (Norros, 2004). Core-task 
analysis takes into account three interrelated 
dimensions that the workers must take into 
account to achieve their activities in the work 
domain: (1) dynamism; (2) complexity and (3) 
uncertainty. In order to manage these 
dimensions workers require collaboration, skill 
and knowledge. The core-task analysis 
framework described by Norros (2004) has six 
core-task work demands as a result of the 
interaction of collaboration, knowledge or skill 
with any two of the three dimensions.  
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This methodological framework has been 
applied in other high reliability domains such 
as nuclear power plant operations and the 
piloting of large vessels. Consequently, for this 
theoretical framework it was deemed a suitable 
methodology to apply the activities of liaison 
officers in emergency management multi-
agency arrangements. The development of this 
theoretical framework specifically drew upon 
the three types of resources that human actors 
can respond with to manage the environmental 
constraints. These resources are illustrated in 
the core-task analysis methodology as 
collaboration, skill and knowledge. The 
activities suggested in this theoretical 
framework were aligned to one of these three 
resources in respect to how the activity was 
associated with collaboration, skill or 
knowledge.  
This paper will propose a theoretical 
framework based on earlier empirical data 
collection and analysis that will be briefly 
outlined next. The following section will also 
provide the rationale behind our framework and 
describe the individual activities, their 
interdependencies and rationale why they may 
facilitate multi-agency coordination. Finally the 
paper will comment on the recent elaboration 
of the core-task analysis methodology and in 
particular a new issue that was characterized as 
dialogical communication (Norros, 2014). The 
paper will define how this may be adapted to 
emergency management and particularly 
hastily formed groups involving multiple 
agencies with differing objectives.  
2. A theoretical framework for facilitating 
multi-agency coordination 
Our earlier empirical research was 
conducted over a two year period within three 
strategic level emergency operations centres in 
Australia and is documented in four other 
papers (Curnin and Owen, 2014, 2013; Curnin 
et al., 2014a, 2014b). The empirical data 
collected included forty-three individual 
interviews, thirty-nine hours of observational 
studies and three focus group interviews across 
three states. Significantly twenty-two hours of 
observations were conducted during real-time 
catastrophic bushfire conditions that required 
the activation of a strategic level emergency 
operation centre. This collection of „live‟ data 
that is often extremely difficult to collect 
during large scale emergency events 
(McMaster and Baber, 2012) provided a rare 
insight into liaison officers work in the 
emergency operations centre. The 
aforementioned four papers each contain a 
detailed methodology section encompassing 
comprehensive explanations of the specific 
samples chosen, analytical techniques 
performed and inter-rater reliability testing as 
to ensure validity of the results. A synopsis of 
the four papers is provided in Table 1.  
2.1 Preparedness phase activities 
In the preparedness phase of an emergency 
management event liaison officers may have 
the opportunity to be involved in multi-agency 
exercises or undertake orientation visits to the 
emergency operations centre where they may 
be deployed. Drawing upon the activities 
linked to collaboration and knowledge and 
applying them in exercising and/or orientation 
visits to the emergency operations centre can 
assist to initiate inter-agency collaboration. It 
can also address some of the socio-technical 
complexities encountered in this domain. 
2.1.1 Engagement champion  
Liaison officers have to actively engage in 
multi-agency exercising and orientation visits 
to the emergency operations centre in an effort 
to forge organizational linkages with other 
agency liaison officers. In addition, experience 
gained from previous operational deployments 
can assist with creating networks between 
agencies.  
2.1.2 Forging organizational alliances  
Fostering relationships with stakeholders 
from other agencies can commence trust 
building between the parties involved. 
Performing this activity in the preparedness 
phase can lay the foundations for trust building 
and provide legitimacy for the liaison officer 
that is often difficult to attain within hastily 
formed temporary organizations, especially in 
the response phase of a disaster. Trust building 
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Table 1  A summary table mapping the four previous papers utilised in this theoretical framework 
Paper Aims Study  Findings Association with theoretical framework 
Curnin and 
Owen, 2014 
Develop a foundation of knowledge 
to understand how liaison officers 
in two strategic level emergency 
operations centres coordinate their 
activities in multi-agency 
coordination. 
Individual 
interviews (n=39) 
Proposes a typology of nine boundary 
spanning activities that liaison officers 
enact when working in multi-agency 
coordination arrangements within two 
strategic level emergency operations 
centres. 
The boundary spanning activities of Representative and Networking 
are aligned to Forging Organizational Alliances. The boundary 
spanning activities of Resource Coordinator, Organizational Expert 
and Domain Expert are affiliated with Mastery of Emergency 
Management Structures. The boundary spanning activities of 
Information Conduit and Information Analyst are synonymous with 
Information Expert. Lastly, the boundary spanning activity of 
Legitimate Enabler remains the same. The activity of Communicator 
is linked to negotiation skills required as a Conflict Resolver. 
 
Curnin, Owen 
and Trist, 2014 
Establish a framework defining the 
constraints that the work domain 
puts on the liaison officers and the 
mechanisms they adopt to manage 
the challenges faced in the work 
domain.  
Individual 
interviews (n=31) 
Observational 
studies (24 hrs) 
Focus group 
interviews (n=15) 
Presents six core-task demands that 
identified the key content of a liaison 
officers work practice from the point of 
view of generic work demands that 
need to be fulfilled when accomplishing 
their role in a strategic level emergency 
operations centre. 
 
Four of the core-tasks: Forging Organizational Alliances; 
Engagement Champion; Lateral Thinker; and Legitimate Enabler 
remain the same as the activities described in the theoretical 
framework. The core-task described as Knowledge of Supra-structure 
can be identified with Mastery of Emergency Management 
Structures.  
 
Curnin and 
Owen, 2013 
Investigate the perceived 
information requirements of 
stakeholders (including liaison 
officers) in a strategic level 
emergency operations centre and 
explore how they obtain this 
information.  
 
Organizational 
survey (n=92) 
Observational 
study (16 hrs) 
Data indicated that multiple cognitive 
artefacts were used to obtain 
information in the strategic level 
emergency operations centre depending 
upon the urgency of the information.  
 
The perceived information requirements of the participants and how 
they accessed the information can be linked to the activity of 
Information Expert. Their knowledge of the information also 
influences the activity of Legitimate Enabler. Additionally, the 
urgency and how they acquire the information can be associated with 
the activity of Lateral Thinker.   
 
Curnin, Owen, 
Paton, Trist and 
Parsons 
(Manuscript 
submitted for 
publication) 
Explore emergent data entrenched 
in the cultural constraints 
confronted by critical infrastructure 
liaison officers working in three 
strategic level emergency 
operations centres.   
Individual 
interviews (n=16) 
Observational 
study (16 hrs) 
 
The findings revealed that two facets of 
swift trust evident in the data may be 
suitable for critical infrastructure liaison 
officers to manage the complexities 
associated with cultural challenges 
when forming inter-personal trusting 
relationships in multi-agency 
coordination arrangements. 
 
Liaison officers exerting Role Clarity can ensure other agencies 
understand their limitations and what they can contribute thus 
influencing the activities of Legitimate Enabler and Information 
Expert. Liaison officers emphasising Future Interaction may assist in 
Forging Organizational Alliances thus providing the opportunity to 
become an Engagement Champion. 
                                        
 
Paper V 
 
192 
 
 
is challenging during emergency management 
multi-agency coordination as it invariably 
involves agencies from public and private 
sectors that differ socially and structurally. 
Emergency services are often structured 
hierarchically and operate within command and 
control arrangements. This is in contrast to 
non-emergency agencies that may operate 
along the concept of horizontal management 
among subordinates as opposed to vertical 
management between superiors. 
Typically in an emergency event one 
agency will be the lead agency such as the 
police or fire service. These agencies are 
structurally hierarchical in nature with a clear 
command and control arrangements. This is 
often in contrast to agencies that do not 
perceive emergency management as a core 
function (e.g., critical infrastructure agencies) 
and do not typically operate within a command 
and control environment and may use decision 
and management processes and procedures that 
are flatter, more organic, and less prescriptive. 
Subsequently, in temporary supra-organizations 
with multiple public and private organizations 
striving to collaborate, networking with other 
agencies will allow the opportunity for liaison 
officers to clarify their and their agencies role 
within the emergency operations centre. Parting 
with this knowledge requires mastery of the 
emergency management structures and in 
particular a comprehensive understanding of 
the liaison officers own agency‟s intent and 
limitations in an emergency management 
context. 
2.1.3 Mastery of the emergency management 
structures  
Having mastery of the emergency 
management structures incorporates three 
facets: (1) knowledge of the liaison officers 
own agency; (2) knowledge of other agencies; 
and (3) knowledge of the work domain 
arrangements. If liaison officers have a 
comprehensive understanding of their own 
agency‟s structures and intentions in an 
emergency management context then they can 
provide a clear explanation of their practices 
and limitations when forging organizational 
alliances. Knowledge of their own agency can 
aid in legitimising the liaison officers presence 
in the temporary supra-organization and 
enhance trust building and subsequent 
collaboration. This is a necessity in this domain 
where the emergency services often work 
together in routine operations thus attaining 
familiarity that is gained over time which can 
foster a sense of trust. This is in contrast to 
non-emergency agencies that may not have 
worked with each other or operated in an 
emergency management context previously and 
therefore have to swiftly establish a basis for 
trust (Meyerson et al., 1996). The preparedness 
phase of emergency management is an 
appropriate environment to initiate inter-agency 
collaboration.  
Knowledge of other agencies intents, 
limitations and potential resourcing 
requirements can be gleaned from forging 
organizational alliances but also assist in the 
activity of legitimate enabler as will be 
described in section 2.2.4. An understanding of 
the structural arrangements in the work domain 
can assist the liaison officer to „think outside 
the box‟ as defined in section 2.2.2. Knowledge 
of the specific work domain arrangements and 
in particular increasing the liaison officer‟s 
familiarity with the various information 
systems can address the technical complexities 
associated multi-agency coordination and 
impacts the activity of information expert that 
will be discussed in section 2.2.1 and also 
occurs in the response phase.  
Nevertheless, during prolonged emergency 
events and based on operational requirements 
there may be a need to rotate multiple liaison 
officers through the emergency operations 
centre due to fatigue management issues and 
potential workforce limitations within agencies. 
Consequently it may not be possible for all 
liaison officers to have engaged in 
preparedness phase proceedings such as 
exercises or orientation visits to the emergency 
operations centre. Therefore liaison officers 
may not have had the opportunity to forge 
organizational alliances which allows for the 
transfer of knowledge between agencies and 
ultimately assists with mastering the 
emergency management structures. In these 
circumstances liaison officers may have to 
initiate activities associated with the 
preparedness phase „on the fly‟ in the response 
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phase. Quickly forging linkages in the response 
phase requires the liaison officer to provide 
clarity of their practices and emphasize the 
likelihood of future interaction with other 
agencies during networking which may assist 
in fostering problem-solving relationships in 
the future.  
2.2 Response phase activities 
In the response phase stakeholders need to 
legitimize their presence and consequently 
facilitate multi-agency coordination in the 
temporary supra-organization. This requires 
activities based upon skill and collaboration. 
2.2.1 Information expert 
Liaison officers need to fulfil the activity of 
information expert to provide timely and 
relevant information across organizational 
boundaries so the agencies involved in the 
response efforts can share their coordination 
needs. Liaison officers must draw upon their 
skills to accurately collate, analyse and 
disseminate information within their agency 
and to other agencies within the temporary 
supra-organization. There is a requirement for 
all agencies involved in multi-agency 
coordination to have a situation awareness of 
the event. However, it is not always a 
requirement for agencies to have the same 
situation awareness for all the elements in a 
system and the development of shared situation 
awareness is important within the supra-
organizational context. This is especially the 
case in complex and collaborative temporary 
supra-organizations when different agencies 
may have differing objectives. In these 
circumstances liaison officers seek to inform 
their and therefore their agency‟s distributed 
situation awareness of the event. The concept 
of distributed situation awareness is applicable 
to strategic level emergency operations centres 
as each agency‟s awareness is unique but 
complementary (not shared) and thus each of 
the liaison officers are instrumental in the 
development and maintenance of other 
agencies situation awareness (Salmon et al., 
2008). The complexity of this activity clearly 
highlights the need for training and 
organizational development the preparedness 
phase. This reinforces the benefits of including 
a feedback loop from the response phase to the 
preparation phase as illustrated in Fig. 2. It will 
be difficult to anticipate all the issues that need 
to be accommodated in distributed situation 
awareness prior to events, but learning from 
events can expedite this process. This process 
can also be facilitated by information experts. 
The activity of the information expert is 
intrinsically linked with the activity we term, 
mastery of emergency management structures. 
The liaison officer requires knowledge of their 
own agency‟s intent and limitations as well as 
that of other agencies involved in the response 
efforts to inform their own agency‟s distributed 
situation awareness and that of other agencies 
involved in the multi-agency coordination 
efforts. Furthermore, liaison officers require 
knowledge of the specific information systems 
used within the emergency operations centre to 
expedite the collation, analysis and 
dissemination of information. However, the 
ability to access information systems 
necessitates that the constraints associated with 
privacy and security barriers be addressed by 
governments in the preparedness phase 
(Kruchten et al., 2008; Reddick, 2011; Vogt et 
al., 2011). Legislative changes addressing these 
information sharing barriers could improve 
information flow potentially increasing the 
liaison officer‟s ability to negotiate 
collaboration with greater ease. In performing 
the task of information expert the liaison 
officer must take into account the temporal 
constraints and dynamism of the work domain 
that requires adaptability and flexibility with an 
ability to think laterally. 
2.2.2 Lateral Thinker 
In a strategic level emergency operations 
centre there is often a requirement to access 
information from a variety of sources using 
multiple cognitive artefacts. In the fast action 
environment of a disaster the traditional means 
of organizing that are based upon routines can 
be non-existent.  Liaison officers require the 
ability to work under time pressures and 
address high risk, high consequence demands 
that are often present in an emergency 
management environment in an effort to ensure 
information quality (Gryszkiewicz and Chen, 
2012; Mishra et al., 2011). However, the flow 
of information (in terms of quantity and quality) 
needed to provide continuous situation 
awareness can cause increases in cognitive 
workload which can be problematic (Raj et al., 
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Fig. 1 A theoretical framework for facilitating emergency management multi-agency coordination 
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2011; Tsang and Wilson, 1997). Therefore 
liaison officers require the ability to „think 
outside the box‟ and access information from 
the most appropriate source. This requires 
mastery of emergency management structures 
in an effort to comprehend the most appropriate 
source for the particular situation. The 
challenges accompanying the requirements for 
quality information can also lead to information 
inconsistency resulting in conflict between 
stakeholders. Consequently, the liaison officer 
requires the skill of conflict resolver.  
2.2.3 Conflict resolver 
The skill of conflict resolver can be 
facilitated with the activities of engagement 
champion and forging organizational alliances. 
Familiarity with other stakeholders gained in 
preparedness phase events may assist in easing 
any conflicting situations. Due to the temporal 
constraints associated with strategic level 
emergency operation centres, liaison officers 
must have the ability to provide a rapid 
decision making capability in high risk, 
dynamic decision environments (Faraj and 
Xiao, 2006). An inability to provide a timely 
decision can result in tension between the 
parties involved resulting in conflict. Therefore 
liaison officers require the attributes of a 
legitimate enabler.   
2.2.4 Legitimate enabler 
The activity of legitimate enabler entails the 
liaison officer to have rapid access to a decision 
or the authority and empowerment to make a 
decision to commit to their agency‟s actions. 
This is enacted by having mastery of 
emergency management structures. Liaison 
officers require an understanding of other 
agencies and their own agency‟s limitations 
and potential resourcing requirements so they 
can potentially pre-empt other agencies 
requests and give a rapid answer. Anticipating 
resourcing requests from other agencies and 
providing a rapid decision can assist in 
providing the liaison officer with legitimacy 
within the emergency operations centre thus 
enabling collaboration between the agencies 
which can strengthen organizational alliances. 
Collectively these activities can address some 
of the socio-cultural and socio-technical 
complexities identified when working within 
emergency management temporary supra-
organizations.  
3. Discussions  
In undertaking the development of this 
theoretical framework it is clear that emergency 
management multi-agency coordination is an 
inherently complex phenomenon for liaison 
officers working within strategic level 
emergency management arrangements.  Liaison 
officers deployed to work in a strategic level 
emergency operations centre have to 
incorporate a number of activities in an effort 
to address the diverse socio-technical and 
socio-cultural constraints associated with 
operating in this type of environment and may 
have to do so over long periods of time. The 
theoretical framework presented in this paper 
provides some guidance for industry in the 
development of training and operational 
policies for liaison officers working within 
strategic level emergency management 
arrangements. It offers direction for agencies to 
understand the requirements for the role of 
liaison officers in various stages of the 
emergency management cycle. It also 
advocates active learning from crisis events, 
even if not directly affecting a given agency 
(e.g. Folke et al., 2003). The infrequent nature 
of events makes it imperative that maximum 
value is extracted from events in the 
preparedness phase.  
The theoretical framework acknowledges 
the interdependency of the activities depicted 
and why liaison officers should encompass 
these in the preparedness and response phases 
of the emergency management cycle in an 
effort to facilitate multi-agency coordination. 
The authors recognize that not all liaison 
officers have the luxury of engaging in 
activities in the preparedness phase and thus 
suggest that some of the activities situated in 
the preparedness phase can be adopted in the 
response phase if required. The value of this 
research lays in its empirical origins and 
exploring the challenges of multi-agency 
coordination from the perspective of human-
environment interaction that ultimately 
analyses how to address these constraints. 
Within the practice of human factors and 
ergonomics this framework explicitly draws on 
the core-task analysis (Norros, 2004) 
methodological framework whilst 
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Fig. 2. Elaborated core-task analysis framework (adapted from Norros, 2014)
 
 
simultaneously extending the theory of core-
task analysis in an alternative high reliability 
environment.  
To the best of our knowledge, the core-task 
analysis methodology has had no recent 
application in an emergency management 
context. We applied the methodology to our 
research thus exploring its applicability in the 
domain of strategic level emergency operations 
centres.  We deem that the core-task analysis 
approach was most suitable for this research as 
it directed systematic attention to the particular 
constraints of the work as bases of defining the 
demands on the liaison officers and 
mechanisms they enacted  to manage the 
associated constraints. In particular, aligning 
the activities to the resources of collaboration, 
skill and knowledge, in the context of 
dynamism, complexity and uncertainty was 
wholly appropriate to this theoretical 
framework as it characterized the multifaceted 
challenges associated with working in the 
domain of emergency management.   
Furthermore, we feel that we can also 
suggest how a new issue recently assimilated 
into the core-task analysis methodological 
framework can be adapted to emergency 
management.  A recent article by Norros (2014) 
specifies how core-task analysis has received 
an elaboration so that the connections between 
the environmental constraints and the human 
resources have been handled in a more 
comprehensive way. The initial core-task 
analysis framework (Norros, 2004) had six 
core-task work demands as a result of the 
activities labelled collaboration, knowledge and 
skill interacting with any two of the three 
control demands termed dynamism, complexity 
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and uncertainty (as illustrated by the dots in the 
fine solid lines in Fig. 2). This earlier 
framework was adopted throughout our 
research project. The recently revised 
framework now includes the interaction of all 
three control demands (as illustrated by the 
dots intersected by the broken lines in Fig. 2) 
with all three of the functional resources of 
activity thus creating nine core-task work 
demands.  
Norros (2014) demonstrates the elaborated 
modelling approach in the context of human 
operators‟ work in the on-line management of 
telecommunication networks and illustrates the 
three additional core-task demands applied in 
this context. In this model adapted from Norros 
et al (2012), a new issue of dialogical 
communication was added and is associated 
with the link between collaboration and 
uncertainty (as illustrated by the bold solid line 
in Fig. 2) . 
This is very interesting and our work is in 
alignment with this new demand as it had 
anticipated the need for a communicative 
process using a collaborative activity as a 
mechanism to address uncertainty in the work 
domain. In our earlier empirical data collection 
and analysis the liaison officers described the 
utilisation of communicative processes in 
addressing the challenge of information 
uncertainty. Yet applied in its purist form the 
concept of dialogical communication may need 
to be customized for the emergency 
management domain.  
The concept of dialogical communication is 
often associated with the theologian Martin 
Buber who suggested that dialogue involves an 
effort to recognize the value of the other person 
and is not merely a means to achieving a 
desired goal. Buber suggested that dialogical 
communication is based on reciprocity, 
mutuality, involvement, and openness (Buber, 
1970). The concept of dialogical 
communication is indeed suited to the study 
reported by Norros et al (2012) in which twenty 
people who operate the networks of a Finnish 
communications company were interviewed. 
As all the participants in the study were 
employed by the same company it would be 
sensible to believe that they may have some 
history of interaction with each other and had 
similar overall objectives. Subsequently they 
may embrace the potential to possibly achieve 
„real dialogue‟.  
It would appear that facets of dialogical 
communication are evident in our previous 
research. The concept of distributed situation 
awareness was practiced by the liaison officers 
to manage some of the challenges associated 
with information uncertainty.  This concept is 
also aligned to the notion of dialogical 
communication where there is a requirement 
for communicative processes and in particular 
the collaboration with other personnel in the 
emergency operations centre to address any 
information uncertainties. However, dialogical 
communication may need to be adapted in the 
context of emergency management multi-
agency coordination. Despite the similarities 
between the two high reliability environments 
of telecommunication networks and emergency 
management, strategic level emergency 
operations centres are multifaceted and 
comprise of multiple agencies all with differing 
agendas and objectives. Liaison officers with a 
history of working together such as the police 
and fire services may have a history of trust 
building and therefore able to engage in 
dialogical communication. However, 
compounding the complexities of multi-agency 
coordination is the fact that some liaison 
officers may never have interacted with each 
other previously. Therefore with no basis for 
trust building the concept of dialogical 
communication in its purist form may need to 
be modified for these stakeholders.  
We posit that liaison officers in the 
aforementioned domain assume the activity of 
dialogical communication but for those liaison 
officers with no history of trust building we 
propose that communication is based upon its 
factual content. This form of communication is 
in the ethos of swift trust (Meyerson et al., 
1996) where trust is not so much about 
interpersonal factors and relating to people, as 
is evident in traditional forms of trust building 
over a prolonged period of time. It is more 
about action and the requirement to „get things 
done‟ influenced by the ability to develop 
shared understanding of (evolving) situations 
and the respective contributions made by 
different liaison officers. It avoids personal 
disclosure in favour of a reliance and 
absorption in the task driven by the generic 
features of the setting (Meyerson et al., 1996). 
Paper V 
198 
 
It would seem appropriate that some liaison 
officers adopt this style of communication to 
address the emerging work demands associated 
with strategic level emergency operations 
centres. 
We have proposed a theoretical framework 
for facilitating multi-agency coordination in 
emergency management that can be applied in 
the development of operational doctrine and 
may assist designers in mitigating the 
challenges associated with multi-agency 
coordination in disasters. This research has 
investigated multi-agency coordination using a 
methodological framework grounded in human 
factors and ergonomics and applied it within a 
new domain. By applying the core-task 
analysis framework in an alternate high 
reliability environment we have been able to 
extend the theory of this method embracing the 
unique requirements of emergency 
management.   
This current research is to some extent 
exploratory in nature and thus our theoretical 
framework requires testing by liaison officers 
working within strategic level emergency 
operations centres to assess its applicability in 
facilitating multi-agency coordination. 
Nevertheless, the study is currently facilitating 
participatory development interventions with 
industry stakeholders. At the time of writing 
this article there was a lack of dedicated 
training for liaison officers specifically 
working in strategic level emergency 
operations centres in Australia. The subsequent 
phase of this study has involved extensive 
consultation with liaison officers from multiple 
agencies in the development of a workshop for 
training purposes. The theoretical framework 
suggested in this paper in tandem with other 
insights gained by the research regarding the 
core content of the liaison officer‟s work in 
multi-agency coordination arrangements has 
assisted in the development of the workshop. 
Positively, two pilot workshops have been 
conducted with liaison officers at two of the 
participating strategic level emergency 
operations centres involved in this study. The 
workshop is only in the early stages of 
development but it is anticipated that it will 
enhance the role of liaison officers and 
facilitate multi-agency coordination in strategic 
level emergency operations centres. By 
exploring multi-agency coordination from a 
human-environment interaction perspective we 
believe that we have improved the ability for 
liaison officers working in strategic level 
emergency operations centres to manage 
expected as well as unexpected work situations 
and thereby cope more efficiently (Hollnagel, 
2014).  
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Appendix F: Project and ethics information for individual interviews 
 
Information sheet for individual interviews:  
Multi-agency Emergency Coordination Research 
Project 
 
Project title of overall study: 
 
Enhancing emergency management team effectiveness and organizational learning 
 
Specific PhD Research Question: Achieving multi-agency emergency management coordination 
 
The University of Tasmania, through the Bushfire Co -operative Research Centre, is working to 
enhance inter-agency coordination of critical information flows between emergency management 
partner organizations to support relevant and timely information to communities. As a key stakeholder 
involved in emergency events, you are being invited to participate in an interview to discuss what you 
think enables and constrains successful multi-agency information flow in emergency events at state 
level of emergency management. Some information on the study and the interview phase is outlined 
below. 
 
Who is responsible for the investigation? 
 
Chief Investigator: 
 
Dr. Christine Owen, Senior Lecturer, University of Tasmania, Faculty of Education 
 
Telephone: (03) 6226 2555 
 
E-mail: Christine.Owen@utas.edu.au 
 
Other investigators: 
 
Mr. Steven Curnin, PhD Candidate, University of Tasmania 
Telephone: (03) 6226 7621 
E-mail: Steven.Curnin@utas.edu.au 
 
 
Please contact Christine or Steve if you have any queries about the project. 
What is the purpose of the research? 
 
The study aims to investigate coordination and information flows between agencies involved in 
emergency events in order to enhance relevant and timely information to communities. It has a 
specific focus on how coordination occurs at regional and state levels of emergency management. 
You have been sent this information sheet by a third party because your agency has agreed to 
participate. The research is being undertaken as part of a Bushfire Co -operative Research Centre 
study. We hope that the research will make a significant contribution to understanding what 
organizational processes help and hinder making multi -agency co-ordination more effective. The 
three main objectives are: 
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1. Identify and map the inter-relationships that support the dissemination of critical information; 
 
2. From Objective 2, model similarities and differences in inter-agency coordination and information 
dissemination; and, 
 
3. From Objectives 1, 2 and 3, make recommendations for improvement. 
 
 
What are the likely benefits of the research for me and others? 
 
We will be making a report on the collated data to agencies involved in the study, with 
recommendations for improvement. There are no specific benefits for you as an individual but it is 
expected there will be benefits from an organizational perspective. Although Management in the 
Agencies are not bound to implement any of our recommendations we would hope you may see some 
of the following benefits: 
 
 improved inter-agency networking and coordination; 
 
 improved information flow from response agencies to emergency management partner 
organizations; 
 
 more seamless transition between planning, response and recovery phases of an emergency 
event; and 
 
 better emergency services provision supporting communities. 
Why have I been chosen as a potential participant in this research? 
 
The study is exploring coordination and information flow within multi-agency operations in 
emergency events at regional and state levels of command and control as well as coordination. Recent 
research has shown that the quality and timeliness of information flow is crucial. 
 
As a valued stakeholder with experience in this s field, you are being offered a unique opportunity to 
take part in this ground -breaking and important research. Participation is entirely voluntary, but we 
would hope you can see the benefits and will feel comfortable about participating. 
 
What am I being asked to do? 
 
We are asking if we might be able to interview you to gain your experience of being involved in an 
emergency event. We expect the interview to take between 45 -60 minutes. A copy of the questions 
you will be asked are included with this Information Sheet. If you do not have a copy of the interview 
questions, please email 
 
Christine.Owen@utas.edu.au or  
 
Steven.Curnin@utas.edu.au 
 
Telephone (03) 6226 7621 
 
With your permission, the researchers will audio-record your answers. We are particularly interested 
in what you think helps or hinders effective information flow, and multi-agency coordination, 
particularly at regional and state levels and how this supports incident management at a local level. 
 
Participation is entirely voluntary. You can ask the researcher to stop the interview at any time. Your 
agency is supporting this research so the interview can occur in work time. The interview will be 
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conducted in a location of your own choosing. That is, it may occur in a private space in the 
workplace if you are comfortable with this, or in another location nominated by you. If the interview 
is happening face to face you will need to read and sign the consent form attached to this information 
sheet. The interview may also be conducted by telephone at a time nominated by you. If the interview 
is conducted by telephone, the interview will commence by asking you if you have read the 
information sheet, if you have any questions and if you have read the consent form, and are willing to 
give your verbal consent and to have the telephone interview recorded. If you answer yes to these 
questions, the interviewer will turn on the tape recorder and ask you to acknowledge formally that you 
have read the information sheet, the consent form and are willing under these circumstances to 
participate in the interview, knowing that the interview is being taped and that you can ask the tape to 
be turned off at any stage. 
 
Are there any potential risks or discomforts to me? 
_ 
We have thought carefully about what possible risks there might be for you and we have identified the 
following possible risks. We have also thought carefully about how we may protect you from those 
risks. The risks and the strategies we have developed to mitigate those risks are outlined below. 
 
Why have I been chosen as a potential participant in this research? 
 
The study is exploring coordination and information flow within multi-agency operations in 
emergency events at regional and state levels of command and control as well as coordination. Recent 
research has shown that the quality and timeliness of information flow is crucial. 
 
As a valued stakeholder with experience in this s field, you are being offered a unique opportunity to 
take part in this ground -breaking and important research. Participation is entirely voluntary, but we 
would hope you can see the benefits and will feel comfortable about participating. 
 
 
What am I being asked to do? 
 
We are asking if we might be able to interview you to gain your experience of being involved in an 
emergency event. We expect the interview to take between 45 -60 minutes. A copy of the questions 
you will be asked are included with this Information Sheet. If you do not have a copy of the interview 
questions, please email 
 
Christine.Owen@utas.edu.au or  
 
Steven.Curnin@utas.edu.au  
 
Telephone (03) 6226 7621 
 
With your permission, the researchers will audio-record your answers. We are particularly interested 
in what you think helps or hinders effective information flow, and multi-agency coordination, 
particularly at regional and state levels and how this supports incident management at a local level. 
 
Participation is entirely voluntary. You can ask the researcher to stop the interview at any time. Your 
agency is supporting this research so the interview can occur in work time. The interview will be 
conducted in a location of your own choosing. That is, it may occur in a private space in the 
workplace if you are comfortable with this, or in another location nominated by you. If the interview 
is happening face to face you will need to read and sign the consent form attached to this information 
sheet. The interview may also be conducted by telephone at a time nominated by you. If the interview 
is conducted by telephone, the interview will commence by asking you if you have read the 
information sheet, if you have any questions and if you have read the consent form, and are willing to 
give your verbal consent and to have the telephone interview recorded. If you answer yes to these 
Information sheet for individual interviews 
204 
 
questions, the interviewer will turn on the tape recorder and ask you to acknowledge formally that you 
have read the information sheet, the consent form and are willing under these circumstances to 
participate in the interview, knowing that the interview is being taped and that you can ask the tape to 
be turned off at any stage. 
 
Are there any potential risks or discomforts to me? 
 
We have thought carefully about what possible risks there might be for you and we have identified the 
following possible risks. We have also thought carefully about how we may protect you from those 
risks. The risks and the strategies we have developed to mitigate those risks are outlined below. 
 
Will I be identified? 
 
No personal information will be sought, recorded or published. Only data that has been aggregated 
will be made available for publication and review. 
 
How private is the information I give? 
 
This information has been sent to you by a third party in your agency and the researchers do not have 
your names or contact details. 
 
In addition the researchers will not be advising the agency who from their organization did participate 
in the research. 
 
Once you have participated, we are ethically required to store de -identified data for a minimum 
period of five years after the publication of a report or Thesis. All data will be stored in locked filing 
cabinets or as password protected files in a secure (locked) room at the University of Tasmania, 
Faculty of Education. When your data is no longer needed, electronic files will be erased and printed 
material shredded. 
 
Can I withdraw if I wish? 
_ 
Participation is entirely voluntary. Should you decide to participate, you will be able to withdraw at 
any time during the interview without effect or explanation. However, from the time the interview is 
transcribed your data will not be available for withdrawal because we will have no way of telling 
which data is yours. 
 
Has the research been approved by an ethics committee? 
 
The project has received ethical approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee Tasmania) 
Network which is constituted under the National Health and Medical Research Council. The 
committees under the HREC (Tasmania) Network use the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Research Involving Humans Guidelines to inform their decisions. 
 
Who should I contact if I have any ethical concerns about the project? 
 
If you have any concerns of an ethical nature or complaints about the manner in which the project is 
conducted, you may contact the Executive Officer of the Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Tasmania) Network. The Executive Officer can direct you to the relevant Chair of the committee that 
reviewed the research. 
 
Executive Officer: (03) 6226 2763 or Katherine.Shaw@utas.edu.au 
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How can I access the research results? 
 
You will be sent a copy of your interview transcript for review as necessary and to confirm the 
contents are correct. 
 
What should I do now? 
 
If you decide you would like to participate in an interview, please contact Christine 
Owen either by email Christine.Owen@utas.edu.au or Steven Curnin at Steven.Curnin@utas.edu.au 
or by telephone (03) 6226 7621or facsimile (03 6226 7839) to arrange a suitable time for the 
interview. The interview can either be by telephone or at a time convenient when a researcher will be 
in your area. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Project Information Sheet. If you have any queries, either 
before or after the meeting, please contact Christine or Steven any time. 
 
Date: 02 July 2012 
 
Dr. Christine Owen (chief investigator on behalf of the research team) 
Telephone: (03) 6226 2555 
E-mail: Christine.Owen@utas.edu.au 
Semi-structured interview questions 
 
1. What would you define are the core tasks of a liaison officer at the strategic command level? 
(E.g. Boundary spanning, Information conduit, Communicator) 
 
2. How do you achieve these tasks? (E.g. What information systems do you use, how do you 
achieve situational awareness, what personal skills to you use, and what training did you 
receive to perform this role) 
 
3. What do you see are the challenges and constraints that impact your capacity to perform this 
role? (E.g. IT, cultural, trust) 
 
 
4. How do you overcome these challenges? (E.g. Do you see these challenges as specific to the 
liaison officer role in your specific agency or are they inherent problems applicable to other 
liaison officers from any agency) 
 
5. What do you think would be the impact of a failure in coordination between agencies 
involved in a multi-agency incident? 
 
 
6. Do you think there are circumstances when this could occur due to uncontrollable factors, 
such as poor communication channels? 
 
7. Have you ever been in a situation where this has occurred and how did you overcome these 
obstacles? (E.g. did you encounter any resistance?) 
 
 
8. And finally, what do you see as some of the challenges for the future in the emergency 
management domain? 
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Participation consent form for interviews for the project 
Multi-agency Emergency Management Coordination Research Project 
 
In volunteering to participate in the above project, I hereby acknowledge that: 
 
1. I have read and understood the “Project Information Sheet” for this study. 
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
3. I understand that this phase of the study involves the following procedures: 
4. An audio taped interview of approximately 40-60 minutes that will be transcribed and, once 
de-identified, form part of the collated findings. 
5. I understand that I will be sent a transcribed copy of the interview for review as necessary and 
to confirm the contents are correct. 
6. I understand that only authorised personnel will have access to the audio-tape, and that, no 
unauthorised person, including myself, will be able to listen to the audiotape, and that the 
transcription made from the interview will be de-identified in the ways outlined in the 
information sheet. 
7. I have read the Project Information Sheet and understand the risks involved in participating in 
this research. I understand that the risks identified are mitigated by the strategies outlined in 
the Project Information Sheet. 
8. I understand that de-identified transcribed interview data will be stored securely at University 
of 
9. Tasmania premises for at least five years and will be destroyed when no longer required. 
10. Any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
11. I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published provided that I am not 
identifiable as a Participant. 
12. I understand that my identity will be kept confidential and that any information I supply to the 
researcher will be used only for the purposes of the research. 
13. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may cease the observation or 
withdraw from the interview at any time. Whether or not I withdraw, I appreciate that I will 
not be able to withdraw or modify my data because the data will be de-identified. 
 
Participant‟s name: 
 
Participant‟s signature: 
 
Date: 
 
Statement by investigator: 
 
I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and I believe 
that the consent is informed and he/she understands the implications of participation. 
 
Investigator‟s name: 
 
Investigator‟s signature: 
 
Date: 
Follow up consent form for interviews for the project 
Multi-agency Emergency Management Coordination 
 
Would you be interested in allowing us to contact you again in subsequent years to discuss your 
experiences and any changes you might have noticed? If yes, could you please provide your contact 
details below? 
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Please note this page will be kept in a separate location from your consent form. 
 
Yes I am happy for the researchers involved with this project to contact me again. My contact details 
are: 
 
Name: 
 
Phone number: 
 
Email address: 
 
 
Information sheet for individual interviews 
208 
 
 
 Appendix G 
209 
 
 
Appendix G: Project and ethics information for observational studies 
 
 
Information sheet for observations as part of PhD study  
 
TO ALL PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED IN – 2012/2013 Bushfire Season  
 
Project title: Enhancing emergency management team effectiveness and organizational learning 
(Ethics Reference: H8810)  
 
Specific Research Question: Achieving multi-agency emergency management coordination  
You are invited to attend a briefing to hear more about a research project to be conducted at an 
operationally convenient time. Some information on the study is outlined below. Please contact the 
researchers to learn more or approach them prior to the exercise to ask any questions you may have.  
 
Who is responsible for the investigation?  
 
Chief Investigator: Dr. Christine Owen - Senior Lecturer,  
University of Tasmania Faculty of Education  
Telephone: (03) 6226 2555  
E-mail: Christine.Owen@utas.edu.au  
 
Other investigators: Steven Curnin - PhD candidate,  
 
University of Tasmania Faculty of Education  
Telephone: (03) 6226 7621  
E-mail: Steven.Curnin@utas.edu.au  
Please contact Christine or Steven if you have any queries about the project.  
 
What is the purpose of the research?  
 
The study aims to investigate communication strategies and collaborative work practices in incident 
management team work and this agency has been selected as one of those agencies. The research is 
being undertaken as part of a Bushfire Co-operative Research Centre study and will also be useful to 
assist Steven Curnin to fulfil the requirements of his PhD studies at the University of Tasmania. We 
hope that the research will make a significant contribution to understanding what organizational 
process help and hinder multi-agency coordination. The four main objectives of the study are:  
 
1. Investigate individual and collective communication strategies and collaborative work practices, 
both in evidence, and needed for multi-agency incidents to work effectively;  
2. Identify, map and model information and coordination processes within multi-agency-incidents, 
and identify those organizational structures, levels of information and communication technology 
(ICT) support, and training/learning programs that assist individuals and collectives to successfully 
coordinate information flows during emergencies;  
3. From Objective 2, model similarities and differences observed; and,  
4. From Objectives 1, 2 and 3, make recommendations for improvement.  
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What are the likely benefits of the research for me and others?  
We will be making a report on the collated data to agencies involved in the study, with 
recommendations for improvement. Although Management in the Agencies are not bound to 
implement any of our recommendations we would hope you may see some of the following benefits:  
 
 improved strategies to enhance communication and short-term collaborations with others;  
 improved flows of information between yourself and your co-workers; and,  
 improved training initiatives to enhance the effectiveness of multi-agencies in work practices.  
 
Why have I been chosen as a potential participant in this research?  
The study is exploring communication strategies and collaborative work practices in multi-agency 
incidents. Recent research has shown that the quality and timeliness of interactions are crucial. The 
big challenge is to identify what structures (e.g., training, ICT support etc.) support people to achieve 
seamless information flow across key functional areas of modern coordination centres.  
As a valued member of your agency, you are being offered a unique opportunity to take part in this 
ground-breaking and important research. Participation is entirely voluntary, but we hope you can see 
the benefits and are interested in helping us.  
 
What am I being asked to do?  
We are asking that you allow us to observe, which may include video and recording of your work 
practice, to interview you about what happened and to complete a brief survey (at an assessment sheet 
during an operationally convenient time). In case of planned incident training exercises you may be 
asked to complete the survey both before and after the exercise. We are particularly interested in 
how/when/why you performed certain tasks pertaining to your role.  
 
We may also be taking still photographs of activities in the IMT/coordination Centre. These are 
similar to the photographs agencies typically take of Emergency Operations Centre work activity. We 
would like to use these photographs in our descriptions of the context of the setting under study.  
Should you decide to participate, if you are completing the survey for a training exercise, we will ask 
you to make up a code so we can match your responses before and after the exercise. However, only 
you will know the code and so we will not be able to match your survey to any of the observed 
interactions.  
For the observation you might be asked to wear a lapel microphone and be recorded for a period of 
time as you go about your work. As soon after the observation as possible, we would like to interview 
you to discuss what was going on at certain times. During the interview, we may use parts of the 
video as a memory aid. With your permission, the researchers will audio-record your answers. We are 
particularly interested in how/when/why you interacted with others and what factors affected your 
interactions and decisions.  
 
Participation is entirely voluntary, but if you choose to take part you will need to read and sign the 
consent form attached to this information sheet. You can ask the researcher to stop the observation or 
interview at any time.  
Once the video has been transcribed and coded for types of communications and collaborations it will 
be destroyed within 30 days of your observation.  
Examples of the kinds of communications we will be coding for the observation include „how do you 
gain situational awareness, who do you liaise with, how do you disseminate and receive information, 
do you do this using an IT platform/telephone/face-to-face‟.  
 
Are there any potential risks or discomforts to me?  
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We have thought carefully about what possible risks there might be for you and we have identified the 
following possible risks. We have also thought carefully about how we may protect you from those 
risks. The risks and the strategies we have developed to mitigate those risks are outlined below.  
 
Legal risk  
You may be at legal risk if sub-optimal performance was recorded and if this was subsequently able to 
be linked to an adverse outcome in your work practice.  
 
How will this possible risk be minimised?  
We will ensure that the date and time of your observation are not included when data is recorded. No 
personal details will be recorded or linked to the observation. In the survey only you will know your 
code, so we cannot connect your survey responses to any of the interactions observed. If there is 
anything said or done in the observation that could identify you, we will change it and make it generic 
rather than specific. Once the video and/or audio recording of your observation has been 
transcribed, and the type of collaboration and team-based practices in evidence coded, the video 
tape will be destroyed. This will occur within a 30 day period of the observation.  
 
Psychological/social risk  
If your work is particularly stressful or if an unforeseen event occurred during the observation, you 
could be subjected to unnecessary stress should the observation continue?  You may feel scrutinised 
or coerced into taking part.  
There is a potential social risk if we were to fail to fully protect your identity.  
 
How will this possible risk be minimised?  
At any time during the observation, you can inform the researcher that you would like the observation 
to cease. If this happens, the researcher will immediately cease observing or recording and physically 
remove themselves from the scene.  
The video and interview will only occur for a brief period and will be discrete. Management will not 
know whether or not you have declined to participate since Management have been advised that only 
a sample of those willing to participate will be observed and interviewed. If a member of management 
walked past if the video observation was occurring they may know that you participated in the study 
but they would not know if your data is to be included (we have advised management that we are only 
including a sample of the data collected).  
 
Risk of harming professional standing  
There is a risk to your professional standing and future career prospects if your manager/ supervisor 
learned that you made a mistake during the recorded observation.  
 
How will this possible risk be minimised?  
Management have been advised and understand that they will not have access to any raw data (or 
video should it be used) collected as part of this study and that the video footage will be destroyed 
after we have coded it. We will make sure that no identifying information is recorded, either during 
the observations or the interviews by ensuring that any activities that could identify you in particular 
will be removed or changed. No one other than those authorised by the University ethics committee 
will have access to the video footage (for 30 days) or to the de-identified interview/observation 
transcripts. Those authorised include the researchers and a University-employed transcriber who will 
sign a confidentiality agreement.  
 
Will I be identified?  
No personal information will be sought, recorded or published. Video tapes will be destroyed within 
30 days of the observation following coding. All interview data will be de-identified. Only data that 
has been aggregated will be made available for publication and review. This process will also be time-
delayed (that is, data that is at least 6 months old and collected/analysed from all the observations of 
communication patterns) will be discussed. Management may know that you participated in the 
observations if they were to walk past when an observation was occurring however, they will not 
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know if your data has been included in the overall study and will not be able to link any observational 
data to your observation.  
 
 
 
How private is the information I give?  
We are ethically required to store de-identified data for a minimum period of five years after the 
publication of the findings and the PhD thesis. All data will be stored in locked filing cabinets or in a 
locked filing room or as password protected files in a secure (locked) room at the University of 
Tasmania, Faculty of Education. When your data is no longer needed, electronic files will be erased 
and printed material shredded.  
 
Can I withdraw if I wish?  
Participation is entirely voluntary. Prior to taking part, you will be asked to sign the consent form 
accompanying this information sheet, and, should you decide to participate, you will be able to 
withdraw at any time during the data collection period without effect or explanation. However, from 
the time the observation and the post-observation interview is concluded and consent is confirmed, 
your data will not be available for review or withdrawal. There are two reasons for this, namely:  
 
1. We are trying to capture what actually happens in real-time and for this we need unedited data; and,  
2. Immediately after the observations, your data will be de-identified and coded and no longer 
identifiable as yours. The video tape will be destroyed within 30 days and we will have no way of 
telling which data is yours.  
 
Has the research been approved by an ethics committee?  
The project has received ethical approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) 
Network which is constituted under the National Health and Medical Research Council. The 
committees under the HREC (Tasmania) Network use the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Research Involving Humans Guidelines to inform their decisions.  
 
Who should I contact if I have any ethical concerns about the project?  
If you have any concerns of an ethical nature or complaints about the manner in which the project is 
conducted, you may contact the Executive Officer of the Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Tasmania) Network. The Executive Officer can direct you to the relevant Chair of the committee that 
reviewed the research.  
 
Tel: (03) 6226 2763  
 
E-mail: Katherine.Shaw@utas.edu.au  
 
How can I access the research results?  
We are planning to conduct debriefing sessions in your agency to share the main findings with staff 
following the conclusion of the project. You may also receive a copy of the collated findings at the 
completion of the investigation, should you request it. If you wish to receive a copy of the collated 
findings you need to tell us at the time of interview. A copy of the findings and the PhD Thesis, will 
be available in the organization‟s library should you wish to review the entire project.  
 
What should I do now?  
The researchers will conduct a briefing before the commencement of the exercise and will be 
available for answering any questions at the briefing or in private. We invite you to attend before 
deciding whether or not you would like to take part in the research. If you subsequently decide to 
participate you will need to let the researchers know and you will need to sign the consent form. One 
of the researchers will then approach you and ask you to complete the survey.  
 
 Appendix G 
213 
 
Even if you don‟t want to participate, please understand that at some designated times observations of 
others will be occurring within your workspace. On the day of the observations and interviews, 
notices will be displayed that observations are occurring. If for some reason you manage to cross in 
front of a video camera this will not be included in the subsequent transcription of the observation. If 
you talk with a person being observed it will be recorded as „third party enters area and engages in 
interaction‟. We are only interested in the communications of the participant being observed.  
 
We may also be taking still photographs so we can describe the broad context of work activity in 
publications and displays. If you do not wish your face to be included in the photographs please let 
one of the researchers know and we will ensure any photographs that include you are not used.  
Thank you for taking the time to read this Project Information Sheet. If you have any queries, either 
before or after the meeting, please contact Christine or Steve at any time.  
 
Kind regards  
 
Date: 14 June 2012  
 
Dr. Christine Owen (chief investigator on behalf of the research team)  
 
Telephone: (03) 6226 2555  
 
E-mail: Christine.Owen@utas.edu.au  
 
Participation consent form for observations of training exercises 2012/2013BushfireSeason 
Project title:  
Enhancing emergency management team effectiveness and organizational learning  
 
In volunteering to participate in the above project, I hereby acknowledge that:  
 
1. I have read and understood the “Project Information Sheet” for this study.  
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me.  
3. I understand that the study involves the physical presence of a researcher observing my 
actions and taking notes using the observational protocol document during the exercise. There 
are additional components that you can choose to select if you wish. However, there are no 
consequences to you if you do not wish to choose these additional components. You may 
wish to change your mind at any time and select or opt out of any component. If that is the 
case it is completely acceptable. The additional following procedures are as follows:  
 
4. I agree to a video and audio taped on-site observation  
Yes No  
 
5. I agree to an audio taped interview of approximately 30 minutes  
Yes No  
 
6. I agree to a brief survey (during training exercises) of approximately 5 minutes, to be 
completed at the beginning and the end of the exercise each time it occurs.  
Yes No  
 
7. I agree to periodic checking of my own assessment of how well I feel I am doing.  
Yes No  
 
8. I agree to some still photographs of group work that may be displayed and published.  
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Yes No  
 
9. If I have selected an option that allows the observation to use video I understand that only 
authorised personnel will have access to the video, and that, following the interview where we 
may discuss aspects of the videoed observation, no unauthorised person, including myself, 
will be able to view the video tape, and that the video tape will be destroyed following 
transcribing and coding after 30 days.  
 
10. I have read the Project Information Sheet and understand the risks involved in participating in 
this research. I understand that the risks identified are mitigated by the strategies outlined in 
the Project Information Sheet.  
11. I understand that de-identified coded observation data and de-identified transcribed interview 
data will be stored securely at University of Tasmania premises for five years after 
publication of this research project and will then be destroyed.  
12. Any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.  
13. I agree that research data gathered for the study may be published provided that I am not 
identified as a participant.  
14. I understand that my identity will be kept confidential and that any information I supply to the 
researcher will be used only for the purposes of the research.  
15. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may cease the observation or 
withdraw from the process at any time without any consequences. If I decide to withdraw, I 
understand that I may also choose to withdraw any of my data which relates to me alone 
(group data cannot be separately identified and removed).  
 
 
 
Participant‟s name: _____________________________________________  
Participant‟s signature: ____________________________ Date: ___________  
 
Statement by investigator:  
 
I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and I believe 
that the consent is informed and he/she understands the implications of participation.  
 
Investigator‟s name: ____________________________________________  
Investigator‟s signature: ___________________________ Date: ___________  
 
 
Multi-agency Incident Exercise Observation Sheet 
 
Researcher: _____________ Time/date exercise commenced: ________  
Date: __________________ Time of observation: from __________to__________  
Date/time of observation completion: ___________  
Exercise name: ___________________________________________________  
Location: ________________  
Subjects‟ role: ___________________________________________________  
Subjects‟ agency: ________________  
 
 
Please identify the following:  
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How did the subject gain situational awareness?  
Who did the subject liaise with do disseminate and receive information?  
How did they do this (IT platform/telephone/face-to-face)?  
Did the subject face any challenges in their role?  
What were these?  
How did the subject overcome these challenges? 
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Appendix H: Amended observational study protocol guidelines 
 
 
 
Name of the observer: 
Date and time of the event: 
Location of observation: 
Observed participants agency: 
GENERAL 
INFORMATION 
DESCRIPTION 
 
Receiving information 
(Describe how the participant is receiving information: briefings, IT 
systems, visual displays, informal face to face communication, using 
telecommunications, etc. Are there any challenges related to 
performing this task) 
 
Disseminating information 
(Describe how the participant is disseminating information: briefings, 
IT systems, informal face to face communication, using 
telecommunications, etc. Are there any challenges related to 
performing this task ) 
 
Receipt of information 
(Describe how the participant is in receipt of the information: is 
closed loop communication practices established. Are there any 
challenges related to performing this task ) 
 
 
 
Analysing information 
(Describe if the participant analyses the information or if it is merely 
forwarded on to the appropriate person. Are there any challenges 
related to performing this task) 
 
SITUATIONAL 
AWARNESS 
DESCRIPTION 
How do you feel your 
situational awareness of the 
event is? 
Time…………… 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
Time……………   
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
Time……………   
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
Do you feel the information 
you receive for your 
agencies decision making 
process is…? 
Time…………… 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
Time…………… 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
Time…………… 
0 – none    
1 – poor            
2 – average   
3 – good 
4 – excellent 
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Appendix I: Project and ethics information for group interviews 
 
Group Interview Information sheet:  
Multi-agency  Emergency Coordination Research 
Project 
 
Project title of overall study: Enhancing emergency management team effectiveness and 
organizational learning 
 
Specific PhD Research Question: How do stakeholders from multiple agencies achieve multi-
agency emergency management coordination?   
 
The University of Tasmania, through the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre, is working to 
enhance inter-agency coordination of critical information flows between emergency management 
partner organizations to support relevant and timely information to communities.  As a key 
stakeholder involved in emergency events, you are being invited to participate in a group interview, 
which will involve meeting with other fellow emergency management professionals involved in state 
level multi-agency arrangements. The aim of this group interview is for the group to discuss what 
enables and constrains successful multi-agency information flow in emergency events at a state level.  
Some information on the group interview process and the interview phase is outlined below. 
 
Who is responsible for the investigation? 
 
Chief Investigator: 
Dr. Christine Owen, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Education, University of Tasmania 
Telephone: (03) 6226 2555   Christine.Owen@utas.edu.au 
 
Other investigators: 
Mr. Steven Curnin, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Education, University of Tasmania 
Telephone: (03) 6226 7621   Steven.Curnin@utas.edu.au 
 
Please contact Christine or Steve if you have any queries about the project. 
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
 
As part of the research process the purpose of conducting interviews in a group environment is to 
engage a diverse cross section of emergency management professionals and discuss factors what the 
agency representatives believe enable and constrain successful multi-agency information flow in 
emergency events at state level of emergency management. It will also give the research team the 
opportunity to give feedback on the preliminary findings from the individual interviews conducted in 
2012. It is envisaged that the information from this feedback will form part of the discussion. 
This is consistent with the broader study which aims to investigate coordination and information 
flows between agencies involved in emergency events in order to enhance relevant and timely 
information to communities.   
You have been sent this information sheet by a third party because your agency has agreed to 
participate and you may have already participated in an individual interview as part of this research 
project. The research is being undertaken as part of a Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre study.    
We hope that the research will make a significant contribution to understanding what organizational 
processes help and hinder making multi-agency coordination more effective.  
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What are the likely benefits of the research for me and others? 
 
The benefit of conducting group interviews is that participants will have the opportunity to hear what 
representatives from other agencies think are the constraints and challenges of multi-coordination at 
the state level and to discuss these in a multi-agency environment. It is envisaged that this will 
potentially give the participants a new understanding of the requirements of the different agencies 
involved in multi-agency coordination. The group interviews will consist of participants from 
emergency services, critical infrastructure and other agencies. This gives the participants an 
opportunity to explore the requirements and challenges of agencies that may not regularly operate 
together except outside of an emergency management event.  
Although agency management is not bound to implement any of the recommendations we would hope 
you may see some of the following benefits: 
 
 Greater understanding of agency requirements during a multi-agency emergency management 
event and in the pre-event phase  
 Improved multi-agency coordination at the state level 
 
Why have I been chosen as a potential participant in this research? 
 
You have previously participated in an individual in depth interview with the research team 
discussing the challenges and requirements of your role at a state level during multi-agency 
coordination. The research team interviewed representatives from multiple agencies and feel that it 
would be beneficial to interview you again but in a group interview. Along with other representatives 
from multiple agencies the group interviews will enable all participants to explore further the 
requirements and constraints of personnel operating in this environment and how these challenges can 
be addressed. 
 
What am I being asked to do? 
 
We are asking if you could participate in a group interview to gain your feedback on the results 
collected so far and to gain your insights in discussion with others about the challenges and 
constraints of operating in a multi-agency environment.. We expect the interview to take between 60-
120 minutes. Prior to commencing the group interview a synopsis of the data collected during the 
individual interviews will be presented. A copy of the questions posed to the group is included with 
this Information Sheet.  If you do not have a copy of the interview questions, please email 
Christine.Owen@utas.edu.au or Steven.Curnin@utas.edu.au telephone (03) 6226 7621. 
 
With your permission, the researchers will audio-record your answers.  We are particularly interested 
in how the group discusses the issues that help or hinder effective information flow, and multi-agency 
coordination, particularly at a state level 
Participation is entirely voluntary. You can ask the researcher to stop the interview at any time and at 
this point you are welcome to leave. Should you decide to leave the group the interview will continue. 
Your agency is supporting this research so the interview can occur in work time. The interview will 
be conducted at the State Control Centre in Victoria or the State Fire Operations Centre in Tasmania.   
 
Are there any potential risks or discomforts to me? 
 
We have thought carefully about what possible risks there might be for you and we have identified the 
following possible risks.  We have also thought carefully about how we may protect you from those 
risks. The risks and the strategies we have developed to mitigate those risks are outlined below. 
Legal risk 
 
During the group interview you may feel it is beneficial to the group to give examples of your 
experiences involved in multi-agency coordination. In this case you may be at legal risk if you 
mentioned that you were responsible for sub-optimal performance which was linked to an adverse 
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outcome and that this became publicly known. 
How will this possible risk be minimised? 
We will ensure that the date and time of your interview are not included when data is recorded.  We 
will also ensure that no personal details will be recorded or linked to the interview.  If we report 
anything said in the interview that could identify you, we will change it and make it generic rather 
than specific. 
 
Psychological/social risk 
 
There is a potential social risk if you were to disclose something you did not wish to and where you 
felt vulnerable. The interview may also raise issues or memories that you find distressing. 
How will this possible risk be minimised? 
Participation in the interview is entirely voluntary and you do not have to participate if you do not 
wish to do so. We will be interviewing 6-10 people per group as part of this project. Having the 
interview questions beforehand allows you to reflect on and consider the kinds of comments you wish 
to make in the group discussion. 
If you find that you do feel distressed you are encouraged to contact the following support services for 
counseling and support by trained personnel:  
 
 Lifeline (13 1114) 
 Beyondblue (1300 22 4636) 
 
Risk of harming professional standing 
 
There is a risk to your professional standing and future career prospects if your manager/supervisor 
learns that you discussed doing something wrong during the recorded interview. There may be a risk 
to your professional standing as colleagues from other agencies will be present in the room. 
How will this possible risk be minimised? 
Management has been advised and understands that they will not have access to any raw interview 
data collected as part of this study. We will make sure that no identifying information is included in 
the interview transcript by ensuring that any discussion that could identify you in particular will be 
removed or changed.  No -one other than those authorised by the University ethics committee will 
have access to the interview recording or transcription for coding purposes. 
 
Will I be identified? 
 
No personal information will be sought, recorded or published. Only data that has been aggregated 
will be made available for publication and review. 
Prior to the commencement of the group interview, all participants will be asked to sign the attached 
consent form. All participants in the group interview will be asked to maintain confidentiality and 
anonymity of the group interview process and its participants. However, complete confidentiality 
cannot be guaranteed by the interviewer as the research team is unable to control what the participants 
communicate outside of the group interview process. 
Anonymity of all participants involved in the group interview will be maintained by the research 
team. However, if an anonymous quote from the group interview is used in a publication, there is a 
risk that a fellow participant involved in the group interview may recognize the quote and 
subsequently recognize the interviewee who made the quote. Therefore, while every effort will be 
made to assure anonymity this cannot be guaranteed by the research team. 
 
How private is the information I give? 
 
This information has been sent to you by a third party in your agency and the researchers do not have 
your names or contact details. 
In addition the researchers will not be advising the agency who from their organization did participate 
in the research. 
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As noted above, your anonymity and confidentiality cannot be entirely guaranteed given the nature of 
the group interview.  All participants will be asked to ensure these, but it cannot be guaranteed. 
Once you have participated, we are ethically required to store de -identified data for a minimum 
period of five years after the publication of a report or Thesis.  All data will be stored in locked filing 
cabinets or as password protected files in a secure (locked) room at the University of Tasmania, 
Faculty of Education.  When your data is no longer needed, electronic files will be erased and printed 
material shredded. 
 
Can I withdraw if I wish? 
 
Participation is entirely voluntary.  Should you decide to participate, you will be able to withdraw at 
any time during the interview without effect or explanation.  However, from the time the interview is 
transcribed your data will not be available for withdrawal because we will have no way of telling 
which data is yours. 
 
Has the research been approved by an ethics committee? 
 
The project has received ethical approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) 
Network which is constituted under the National Health and Medical Research Council.  The 
committees under the HREC (Tasmania) Network use the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Research Involving Humans Guidelines to inform their decisions. 
 
Who should I contact if I have any ethical concerns about the project? 
 
If you have any concerns of an ethical nature or complaints about the manner in which the project is 
conducted, you may contact the Executive Officer of the Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Tasmania) Network.  The Executive Officer can direct you to the relevant Chair of the committee 
that reviewed the research. 
 
Executive Officer: 03) 6226 276 3  Katherine.Shaw@utas.edu.au 
 
What should I do now? 
 
If you decide you would like to participate in an interview, please contact Christine 
Owen either by email (Christine.Owen@utas.edu.au) or (Steven.Curnin@utas.edu.au) or by telephone 
(03) 6226 7621or facsimile (03 6226 7839) to arrange a suitable time for the interview. The interview 
can either be by telephone or at a time convenient when a researcher will be in your area. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Project Information Sheet.  If you have any queries, either 
before or after the meeting, please contact Christine or Steven at any time. 
 
Date: 31 January 2013 
Dr. Christine Owen (chief investigator on behalf of the research team)  
Telephone: (03) 6226 2555  
Christine.Owen@utas.edu.au 
 
Semi-structured group interview questions 
 
Prior to commencing the group interview a synopsis of the data collected during the individual 
interviews describing the main demands and challenges of performing liaison roles at a Strategic 
Command level will be presented. 
 
1. How do these findings relate to your personal experiences in multi-agency coordination? 
2. What do you see as the current strengths and challenges of emergency management multi-
agency coordination?  
3. What strategies need to be established to facilitate effective multi-agency coordination at a 
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state level? 
 
Participation consent form for Group interviews  
 
Multi-agency Emergency Management Coordination Research Project 
 
In volunteering to participate in the group interviews for the above project, I hereby acknowledge 
that: 
 
1. I have read and understood the “Group Interview Information Sheet” for this study. 
2. The nature and possible effects of the group interview have been explained to me. 
3. I understand that this phase of the study involves the following procedures an audio taped 
interview of approximately 60-120 minutes that will be transcribed and, once de- identified, 
form part of the collated findings. 
4. I understand that only authorised personnel will have access to the audio-tape and that no 
unauthorised  person will  be  able  to  listen  to  the  audiotape. The transcription made from 
the interview will be de-identified in the ways outlined in the group interview information 
sheet. 
5. I have read the group interview information sheet and understand the risks involved in 
participating in this research. I understand that the risks identified are mitigated by the 
strategies outlined in the group interview information sheet. 
6. I understand that de-identified transcribed interview data will be stored securely at University 
of Tasmania premises for at least five years and will be destroyed when no longer required. 
7. Any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
8. I  agree  that  research  data  gathered  for  the  study  may  be  published  provided  that  I  am  
not identifiable as a Participant. 
9. I understand that my identity will be kept confidential and that any information I supply to the 
researcher will be used only for the purposes of the research. 
10. I understand that while every effort will be made by the research team to ensure all 
participants involved in the group interview process will maintain confidentiality and 
anonymity, this cannot be guaranteed. 
11. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may cease the observation or 
withdraw from the interview at any time. Whether or not I withdraw, I appreciate that I will 
not be able to withdraw or modify my data because the data will be de-identified. 
 
Participant‟s name:   
Participant‟s signature:   
Date:    
 
Statement by investigator: 
 
I have explained this project and the implications of participation in the group interview to this 
volunteer and I believe that the consent is informed and he/she understands the implications of 
participation. 
 
Investigator‟s name:  
Investigator‟s signature:   
Date: 
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Appendix J: Example of a coding list 
 
Coding instructions for the theme – Constraints 
Read the descriptions for each of the three categories below and then read the following twelve 
extracts from the data. Place the letter associated with the extract that most corresponds to the 
description of the category in the table below. If you believe the extract can be aligned to more than 
one category, place in multiple categories. However, indicate which category it is most applicable to 
by using a number from 1 to 3. The number 1 indicates the best match, 2 indicates some relevance to 
the category and 3 indicates a minor association with the chosen category. 
Coding descriptors 
 
Category Description Author Other researcher 
Cultural The interviewee identifies challenges regarding 
the differences between agencies and how this 
may impact their role as an EMLO. This could 
apply to a lack of inclusion in activities in the pre-
response and response phases, a lack of 
understanding of other agencies roles and 
requirements, or difficulties breaking in to the 
inner circle of the SCC. 
D1 
E 
G 
J2 
K 
D 
E 
G 
 
K 
Information The interviewee recognizes that there are factors 
that affect how they receive and pass on 
information to and from other agencies within the 
SCC. This could relate to a lack of 
interoperability between information systems, a 
lack of familiarity or difficulties regarding the 
complexity of the systems used in the SCC, no 
clarification of agencies actual information 
requirements, or challenges with gaining situation 
awareness of the event. 
A 
C 
D2 
F 
H1 
I 
L 
A 
C 
 
F 
H 
I 
L 
 
Temporal The interviewee makes reference to the 
challenges associated with time constraints 
operating in this role.  This could refer to working 
in an environment that is fast acting and the 
requirement for EMLO‟s to make decisions 
quickly or work under time pressure. 
B 
H2 
J1 
B 
 
J 
 
Extracts from the data 
 
A. The other thing just quickly is on top of all of this that everyone has different systems.  So in 
terms of IT, information flow systems integration‟s a really big thing and to round that off, 
there is no common operating picture for Victoria to let everyone know at their different 
levels, what is going on.  
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B. I think we got the scan map 8 or 10 hours after it was done which as we know, from the way 
the fire spread, was going to be hugely inaccurate anyway because it would have been a much 
larger fire by the time we got it.  So the timeliness is awfully important, I guess particularly 
for agencies that are trying to respond in and around the hazard, whatever it might be.  
 
C. I think the greatest challenge I‟ve come across is probably just being either out of the loop or 
not, as far as information flows or situation awareness.  
 
D. The other issue is you know, the emergency services have a uniform and you can identify that 
uniform very quickly, they‟ve always got name badges on and all that sort of thing.  So you 
identify with these people a lot easier, you know, you see an ambo uniform and that sort of 
thing, you just instantly strike up a conversation.  Whereas somebody who is dressed in a suit 
and they may or may not have their tabard on, and even then it might just say EMLO.  So you 
don‟t know who they are or where they‟re from and suddenly they come up to you and start 
asking all sorts of questions, and you get very defensive cause you don‟t know them, they‟re 
asking all sorts of questions, you know, you don‟t necessarily want to give out all sorts of 
information, so, yeah, it‟s kind of a bit of a stand off until you get to know these people and 
that‟s happened to me a couple of times and just somebody coming up and they‟re obviously 
quite high level in their organization but you don‟t know who they are and you don‟t want to 
just offer them, you know, any information.  But certainly the uniforms and the identity helps, 
I believe, quite a lot.  
 
E. You turn up (to the SCC) with a shirt and tie, people haven‟t got a clue how long you‟ve been 
in, what you know or courses you‟ve done.  It‟s not inferred. Whereas if you‟re wearing a 
uniform, it‟s already inferred.  So, it‟s a problem.  It‟s not really a problem, it‟s just a case of 
people won‟t necessarily jump to you because if they don‟t know you, they‟ve got no, there‟s 
no outward sign of your training or your skills set and the only way round that is to actually 
prove it.  
 
F. There‟s no interoperability that‟s an issue.  Normally people bring in their own systems and 
things like that.  They‟ll often bring in laptops and that type of thing, so that they can 
communicate.  There‟s access to the external system so they can see what‟s going on from the 
external perspective on various websites.  They just can‟t see the internal ones.  But then 
again we can‟t see each other‟s internal ones‟ either at the moment.  So we all have access to 
the external stuff but we don‟t have access to each other‟s systems.  And we don‟t have one 
system here.  We have a range of systems.  
 
G. Let me put it this way, I reckon if you wear a uniform and I‟m talking about the emergency 
services, the blue shirts, it‟s very easy to get credibility cause you‟ve got some form of rank 
on your shoulder or whatever, on your uniform that says you‟re this type of person.  But if 
you‟re from a land management agency like Parks or DSE in Victoria, then it is a bit harder 
because you don‟t actually have, you‟ve got a badge but you haven‟t got a rank.  
 
H. One of the issues that I see is that on, especially on a busy day in the State Control Centre 
there is a lot of people in there and there could be, I don‟t know, top of my head, but I would 
have said 40 to 50 people on a bad day and it‟s trying to then go to the, find the right person 
who‟s got the information, cause every single person in the room has got a little piece of 
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information and it‟s about how we share that (information), who you actually go to when you 
want something.  
 
I. IT is a challenge because even the thing I‟m reading now, there‟s no interoperability between 
the agencies at all really.  We can‟t, we can log into a CFA system, we can log in to a DSE 
system and see what some of the stuff going on but we don‟t know how to operate the sites 
properly so you know you see a limited amount but you can‟t have 10 screens operating at the 
same time so a single IT platform is a far better way to go.  
 
J. And it‟s a time thing.  You may ask someone to just take this back and go and get advice and 
then an hour later they come back.  They‟ve got to be able to say, yep, you do this or as the 
co-ordinator say, yeah I need you to do that and know that they‟re going to do it cause the co-
ordinator can then say to the State Controller, you‟d better look at this.  
 
K. And three times I had our State ESLO say to their controller, just sit down, where are you 
going, how can Telstra help you, we don‟t want anything from you, we want to help you.  
They‟re obviously of the opinion that everyone always comes in, they always want something, 
and they want priority or whatever.  And were saying, no we don‟t want that, let us work 
together for the good of the community.  
 
L. Look I still think the biggest challenge we have as a sector is building that common operating 
picture and that common situation awareness and a lot of that isn‟t just down to, a number of 
people think it‟s about technology, that we need to be on one platform or one system.  I don‟t 
think that‟s the issue.  I think there‟s, that‟s certainly going some way of facilitating that but 
we‟ve actually got to work out ways in which information is shared, that we have an 
understanding of which piece of information is critical to which players.  
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Appendix K: Example of operational doctrine  
 
 
EM Knowledge Filename – RS.25.05.doc 
Planning – EMLO  
 
Role Description 
The role of the Emergency Management Liaison Officer (EMLO) located at the State Control Centre 
(SCC) is to provide a link between their parent organization and the emergency management 
agencies at the SCC. 
 
Accountabilities 
The primary accountabilities of an EMLO include: 
 Represent their organization providing the technical or subject matter expertise to the SCC. 
 Providing the primary contact and face-to-face coordination between their parent organization 
and the SCC. 
 
Responsibilities 
EMLO responsibilities include: 
 Obtaining up to date information/intelligence from Emergency Management Agencies 
 Maintaining an on-going awareness of emergency management efforts in respect to the 
operation of their organization 
 Obtain collate and disseminate information to their parent organization and into the SCC. 
 Providing authoritative and accurate information to EM agencies regarding the impact and 
consequence of emergencies and incidents on their organization and its operations 
 Understanding their organizations resourcing requirements and coordinating resource 
requests from the SCC. 
 Providing support to EM Agencies where requested 
 Contributing to the production of SitReps 
 Maintaining own and agency contact details 
 Planning for relief staff from their organization 
 Providing handover briefing to incoming EMLO. 
 
Skills and Attributes 
EMLO’s should bring with them a range of skills and a level of expertise including an in-depth 
knowledge of their agency. They need to have the ability to speak on behalf of their agency, and; 
 Ability to network with multiple stakeholders in the preparedness and response phases swiftly. 
 Communicating effectively and succinctly with multiple agencies. 
 Be a broad subject matter expert regarding their own organizations activities, capabilities and 
broader strategic aims appropriate to the emergency event. 
 Requires broad knowledge of the multiple agencies involved, how they can contribute to the 
event and how their agency and other agencies complement the emergency management 
structure. 
 Ability to work under time pressures. 
 Demonstrate initiative and proactively deal with issue 
 Demonstrate problem solving / decision making skills. 
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Key Relationships 
 Reports to the Planning Officer. If this is not practical and the matter needs to be dealt with 
immediately the EMLO should contact the SCC Duty Manager. 
 Works closely with the Intelligence Officer and the Situation and Analysis Unit members. 
 Supports the Strategic Risk Unit in identifying potential risks and consequences related to 
their organization. 
 
Other Requirements 
N/A 
 
Revision History 
Topic No RS.25.05 
Topic Name Plan - EMLO 
Procedure Owner FSC Planning and Intelligence Coordinator 
Remote Copies None 
Revision Date Amendment Detail 
01/11/2013 Updates from Peter Norman, Cain Trist, Justin Kibell and EMLO Induction feedback. 
End of Topic 
 
Unless stamped “CONTROLLED COPY” in RED, then when 
printed this document is uncontrolled. 
© Copyright – This information is the property of the Fire Services Commissioner. No part of 
this information may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or 
mechanical, including but not limited to, photocopy, recording, or by any information storage 
and retrieval system, without the prior written permission. 
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